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Radicalisation and the Media
This book examines the circulation and effects of radical discourse by analysing 
the role of mass media coverage in promoting or hindering radicalisation and 
acts of political violence.
	 There	 is	a	new	environment	of	conflict	 in	 the	post-	9/11	age,	 in	which	 there	
appears to be emerging threats to security and stability in the shape of indi-
viduals	and	groups	holding	or	espousing	radical	views	about	religion,	ideology,	
often represented in the media as oppositional to Western values. This book asks 
what,	if	anything,	is	new	about	these	radicalising	discourses,	how	and	why	they	
relate	to	political	acts	of	violence	and	terror,	and	what	the	role	of	the	mass	media	
is in promoting or hindering them.
 This includes exploring how the acts themselves and explanations for them 
on the web are picked up and represented in mainstream television news media 
or	 Big	 Media,	 through	 the	 journalistic	 and	 editorial	 uses	 of	 words,	 phrases,	
graphics,	images	and	videos.	It	analyses	how	interpretations	of	the	term	‘radical-
isation’ are shaped by news representations through investigating audience 
responses,	 understandings	 and	misunderstandings.	 Transnational	 in	 scope,	 this	
book seeks to contribute to an understanding of the connectivity and relation-
ships	that	make	up	the	new	media	ecology,	especially	those	that	appear	to	tran-
scend	 the	 local	 and	 the	 global,	 accelerate	 the	 dissemination	 of	 radicalising	
discourses	and	amplify	media/public	fears	of	political	violence.
	 This	 book	will	 be	 of	 interest	 to	 students	 of	 security	 studies,	media	 studies,	
terrorism	studies,	political	science	and	sociology.
Akil N. Awan	 is	 a	 Lecturer	 in	 Contemporary	 Islam	 and	 the	 current	 RCUK	
Fellow	in	the	‘Contemporary	History	of	Faith,	Power	and	Terror’	in	the	Depart-
ment	of	History	at	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	London.	Andrew Hoskins is 
Professor	 of	 Cultural	 Studies	 and	 Director	 of	 Research	 in	 the	 Department	 of	
Culture,	 Film	&	Media	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Nottingham.	Ben O’Loughlin is 
Lecturer	in	International	Relations	at	Royal	Holloway	University	of	London	and	
Associate	Director	of	the	New	Political	Communication	Unit.
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1 Media and radicalisation
Grappling uncertainties in the new 
media ecology –radicalisation gone 
wild
As part of her evidence to the UK government appointed Iraq Inquiry,1 Baroness 
Eliza Manningham- Buller, Director General of MI5, 2002–2007, directly 
connected the UK’s role in the US- led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 
to an increased threat of radicalisation in Britain. She stated:
Our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word, a whole genera-
tion of young people – not a whole generation, a few among a generation – 
who saw our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as being an attack on Islam.
This quote from Baroness Manningham- Buller’s recorded evidence was one of a 
number that soon appeared on news websites, and in the national UK press the 
following day. For instance, the above quote was exactly how it appeared (in 
inverted commas) contained within a story on page 7 of The Guardian of the 21 
July 2010, under the title: ‘Iraq invasion radicalised British Muslims and raised 
terror threat, says ex- MI5 chief ’ (Guardian 2010). However, applying a modi-
fied form of conversation analysis to the video recording of this extract from the 
Iraq Inquiry (Box 1.1, below) the emphases and texture of Baroness 
Manningham- Buller’s words and expressions can be illuminated:
Box 1.1  Modified conversation analysis transcript of the television 
recording of a short segment of Baroness Manningham- Buller’s 
evidence to the Iraq Inquiry (BBC News Channel, 20 July 2010)
Our involvement (0.5) in Iraq (1.0) erm (0.5) radicalised er for want of a better word
[part laughs]
but [inhales] erm (0.5) a whole generation (0.5) of young people (0.5) some of 
them
[sits back in seat]
British Citizens–not- a-whole- generation (0.3) a few 
among a generation (0.5) e- who
[gesticulates with hands held outward]
were erm saw our involvement in (0.5) Iraq on top of our involvement in 
Afghanistan as being an attack on Islam.
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 The timed (approximate) pauses (indicated with the timing in brackets) show 
the highly reflective pace of Baroness Manningham- Buller’s talk. So, she can 
clearly be heard (and seen – she looked down for most of this part of her evid-
ence rather than looking at the committee members arranged in a semi- circle 
before her) to be choosing her words very carefully. Her nervous- sounding qual-
ification of her use of the term ‘radicalisation’ thus seems out- of-synch with her 
very purposefully chosen phrases, suggesting perhaps that this was a rehearsed 
ambiguity. In other words, the qualification of the term ‘radicalisation’ here is 
indicative of the term’s wider ambiguous or controversial status.
 The slipperiness of the application of the term radicalisation and the scaling 
of the threat it posed is also indicated by what appears at least to be a genuine 
(or that might even have been a rehearsed) slip (indicated by the Baroness sitting 
back in her seat and gesticulating as she tries to find the right qualification to her 
words). The correction of ‘a few among a generation’ after the suggestion that ‘a 
whole generation of young people’ had been radicalised by the UK’s military 
involvement in Iraq, is indicative of the paradox at the heart of the UK media- 
political-security service inception of the term radicalisation in the 2000s. This 
is their characterisation of a terrorist threat from young Muslim men as potential 
terrorists that is ubiquitous, i.e. any one person could potentially be radicalised 
and thus pertains to a ‘whole generation’, and yet only ‘a few among a genera-
tion’ have been found to commit or plot to commit violent acts (in this context 
routinely described by the same media- political-security services as ‘terrorist’).
 In this way, the use of the term radicalisation is an ideal extension of the 
media, political and security services discourses of the incalculable scale and 
other parameters of the threat posed by twenty- first century terrorism. Further-
more, this points to the minimal prospects for ever attaining precision in terms of 
the proportionality of response to or pre- emption of a threat conceived in such 
an imprecise and non- scalable term.
 And what the extract above reveals is that the term ‘radicalisation’ no longer 
serves those who one would think were (at least initially) its very purveyors. 
And so, the former Director of MI5, who was absolutely pivotal to the former 
government’s counter- terrorist strategy in which the countering of ‘radicalisa-
tion’ was a central plank, shows unease even in using the term.
 Here then we can talk not just of the slippage of radicalisation in terms of its 
meaning and usage, but of its slippage from the hands of its former would- be 
masters. Radicalisation has been unleashed, it has, so to speak, ‘gone wild’. And 
it is the ‘going wild’ of the central UK counter- terrorist agenda constructed 
around radicalisation, that this book takes as its problematic. This is not just a 
matter of the exploration of a set of somehow detached media and government 
discourses speculating and attempting to pre- empt the nature and varying 
degrees of the threat posed by terrorism and other twenty- first century risk. 
Rather, the emergence of radicalisation is a sign of a new pervasive mediatised 
condition of ‘hypersecurity’ (Masco 2006; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010a).
 This condition marks a shift from a relatively institutionalised (i.e. via main-
stream broadcast media) and ordered discursive regime of terror threats to one 
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Media and radicalisation  3
characterised by an emergent ‘contingent openness’ (Urry 2005: 3). And yet, at 
the same time, seemingly paradoxically, there occurs a reflexive institutionalisa-
tion of this very contingent openness of terror in and of the contemporary era 
through attempts to demarcate and control perceived and potential security 
threats by those charged with the protection of the many. It is these attempts to 
‘make terror at least governable’ according to Michael Dillon, that spawns a 
‘radical ambiguity’: ‘western societies themselves governed by terror in the 
process of trying to bring terror within the orbit of their political rationalities and 
governmental technologies’ (2007: 8).
 Radicalisation, we are suggesting here, is both symptom and cause of the state 
of hypersecurity, which is an optimum candidate for what Dillon (ibid.) proposes, 
namely a ‘double- reading’ of terror. And so it is with the intangibility of ‘radicali-
sation’: it feeds a state of hypersecurity through the term’s glossing over of any 
coherent and generalisable explanation in terms of why, when and how individuals 
become ‘radicalised’. There is no reliable prescription that can account for the so- 
called ‘journey’ of stereotypically disenfranchised and disaffected young British 
Muslim men (or anyone else for that matter) from citizen to terrorist.
 Moreover, the traditional targeting of an ‘enemy’ as previously understood as a 
meaningful requirement for the constitution of a threat is divested under the con-
ditions of hypersecurity. Rather, it is more the case that the notion of ‘enemy’ has 
been replaced with the threat itself, something that Frank Furedi, for example, con-
siders is ‘a threat beyond meaning (2007: 77). Radicalisation in the UK but also 
elsewhere across Europe, has quickly emerged as a tangible, intangible threat, 
feeding into the radical ambiguity of the construction of and responses to ‘terror-
ism’ and particularly in the UK following the 2005 London bombings.
 In what follows we interrogate the emergence and the mediatisation of radi-
calisation, as a discursive frame that has ‘gone wild’ in escaping the very para-
meters its deployment was intended to control, or at least be seen to control.
Box 1.2 Defining radicalisation
The OED defines ‘radicalisation’ as: ‘The action or process of making or becoming 
radical, esp. in political outlook’2 and ‘radical’ as: ‘Polit. Advocating thorough or 
far- reaching political or social reform; representing or supporting an extreme section 
of a party.’3 In fact to trace a genealogy of the term is to reveal its application to 
having a certain strength of character, in espousing radical principles in UK and US 
eighteenth and nineteenth century politics, for example. Yet, it is in the twenty- first 
century that radicalisation has suddenly emerged in its least- benign form as a key 
concern of policymakers, security services, and journalists, notably as a threat to the 
stability and security of countries around the world. Radicalisation, to these groups, 
is often constructed as a process which a person (or persons) undergoes that may 
result in their committing violent, and moreover, ‘terrorist’ acts. Put another way: 
radicalisation today is seen as: ‘The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, 
views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism’ (emphasis added).4
 To provide another example, this time taken from the Netherlands ‘National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism’ (2007: 91):
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Radicalization is seen primarily as a process with some sort of start, and can 
end in the worst cases with a transition to terrorism. Indicating where radicali-
zation starts and ends is not an exact science, however, and there are also a 
range of determinative positions.
Again, the criticality of the ‘end point’ of radicalisation is in its resulting in a 
violent act. Given it is very difficult to attribute beginning and ending points and 
any other generalisable characteristics and effects to the process of radicalisation, 
its identification and pursuit as a security threat for government, directly feeds 
hypersecurity, as we have already set out.
 From the above definitions, the heavy qualifications are immediately apparent, 
and are indicative of the highly speculative nature of the discourses on security 
threats in the opening decade of a century already marked with what is often pre-
sumed to be a ‘series’ of terrorist attacks which have been intensely and exten-
sively reported. To give just one example from the UK: Figure 1.1 reveals the 
sudden engendering of the term ‘radicalisation’ in the British press in its Islamic 
context. This followed the 7 July 2005 (‘7/7’) London bombings in which four 
suicide bombers killed 52 and injured more than 770 people in co- ordinated 
attacks in central London, and the attempted bombings again in London two 
weeks later. Yet radicalisation as a discernible cause of this or other terrorist 
atrocities at the same time appears to be tenuous at best, So, as the official House 
of Commons report into the London Bombings concluded, for at least three of the 
four 7/7 bombers, ‘there is little in their backgrounds which mark them out as 
particularly vulnerable to radicalisation’ (Home Office 2006: 26). The consider-
able difficulties in both identifying someone who has undergone a process of 
radicalisation and also those likely to become radicalised does appear to render 
the term as employed by those charged with counter- terrorist strategies and opera-
tions, as not particularly useful. What explanations are there then for the estab-
lishment of the term radicalisation in security discourses and what function does 
it perform and for whom?
Sc
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Figure 1.1  The term ‘radicalisation’ in Islamic and non-Islamic contexts in British papers 
2000–2008 (source: al-Lami 2008).
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Media and radicalisation  5
The emergence of radicalisation: the new media ecology
The answers to these questions this book situates in the study of contemporary 
security in a ‘new media ecology’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010a; cf. Cottle 
2006; Fuller 2007; Postman 1970). This is the current rapidly shifting media sat-
urated environment characterised by a set of somewhat paradoxical conditions, 
of, on the one hand, ‘effects without causes’, in Faisal Devji’s terms (2005), yet, 
on the other, a profound connectivity through which places, events, people and 
their actions and inactions, seem increasingly connected. So, for example, 
Hoskins (2011) identifies a ‘connective turn’, as the ‘massively increased abun-
dance, accessibility and searchability of communication networks and nodes, 
and the seemingly paradoxical status of the ephemera and permanence of digital 
media content’.
 There are a number of cross- cutting and in some ways convergent accounts of 
the characteristics of the new media ecology across the social sciences and 
humanities. A resurgent term that is particularly useful in exploring the relation-
ship between media and radicalisation in terms of the mapping out of its pres-
ence and influence in security discourses is the idea of ‘mediatisation’. Stig 
Hjarvard is one of the most influential proponents of the term. He writes of the 
mediatisation of society itself and defines this as:
the process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or 
becomes dependent on, the media and their logic. This process is character-
ized by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the opera-
tions of other social institutions, while they also have acquired the status of 
social institutions in their own right. As a consequence, social interaction – 
within the respective institutions, between institutions, and in society at 
large – take place via the media
(2008: 113, original emphasis)
War and conflict, education, business practices, family life and other social 
realms today, to differing extents, are not simply mediated (relations sustained 
via media as medium); they are actually dependent upon media and, con-
sequently, have been transformed to increasingly follow media logics; they are 
mediatised.
 Across much of the advanced and developing worlds there are few times and 
spaces that can be conceived of as existing ‘outside’ of the new media ecology. 
But across new media studies there are emergent a range of positions along an 
axis of mediation – mediatisation with different scholars positioning social, 
political and cultural phenomena as embedded in or subject to media logics to 
varying extents (see Couldry 2008; Livingstone 2009). Crucially, this also 
involves a broadening and a deepening of the definition of ‘media’ itself to 
include but go beyond that which was once subsumed under the generic ‘mass 
media’. For instance, in their study of terrorism in the context of a ‘new memory 
ecology’, Brown and Hoskins (2010: 88) state:
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‘Media’ . . . refers not only to formal broadcast media but also to the multi-
tude of techniques, technologies and practices through which discourse and 
interaction is mediated. In other words something like the entire ‘semiotic 
environment’ in which terrorism is understood and made relevant to a given 
community or group of persons.
Across these works we see a sense of a growing entanglement of media with 
phenomena to an extent that their separate conceptualisation and study actually 
misses the most significant dynamics of their production and impact.
 Do these shifts towards an increasingly mediatised society actually represent 
an acceleration of existing trends to which long- standing theoretical and meth-
odological tools of analysis can simply be applied and perhaps tweaked? Or do 
they represent a paradigmatic shift that requires a much more radical orientation 
to a study of media. This is highly contested by some scholars and particularly in 
the UK version of ‘Media Studies’ (see, for example, Barker 2006). The very 
paradigm shift in the velocity, accessibility, and connectivity afforded by 
advances in digital technologies, facilitates the phenomenon of radicalisation, 
both its actuality and its discursive iterations, and of course that which comes 
from the co- constitution of the two. Furthermore, where our approach is distinc-
tive is in our demarcation of two ‘phases’ of mediatisation (following Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin 2010a) to help illuminate the nature, extent and timing of the 
shift. The first phase of mediatisation involves the forms, practices and experi-
ences associated with the dominant media and institutions of the broadcast era, 
and particularly television. The second phase interconnects and overlaps with 
elements of the first, but is distinctive in that it requires a shift in how we 
approach and formulate the very relationship we have with media. Notably, this 
is owing to its much more immediate and extensive interpenetration with the 
everyday on an individual, social and continual basis. The formal broadcast and 
print news media are so thoroughly penetrated and affected by the digital in 
terms of production, dissemination and consumption that they are no longer 
separable as institutions of mass media, for they exist and can only exist in the 
new media ecology.
 The condition of hypersecurity emerges through a sense of connectivity to a 
range of threats and risks that is suddenly and continuously available online, but 
which is also mediated through and connected by so- called traditional main-
stream media, but which also construct a sense of pervasiveness and an unknow-
able and thus uncontainable arena of all that which is ‘out there on the Internet’. 
The new media ecology is not a matter of old or new media, but rather it is the 
environment through which media content and forms are ‘remediated’ (Bolter 
and Grusin 1999) through both established and emergent media. Put another 
way, radicalisation has been incubated in the cracks or fissures that have opened 
up through a fundamental miscomprehension of the very nature of mediatisation 
and attempts to ‘govern’ security, as we alluded to above, in the new media 
ecology. So, radicalisation and those who radicalise and those who are radical-
ised constitute ‘a threat beyond meaning’ in Furedi’s terms, above (2007: 77), 
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Media and radicalisation  7
partly owing to inculcation and attempted combating through ‘media beyond 
meaning’. Yet, at the same time, a kind of accumulative structural meaning is 
shaped by the ‘non- institutional timeworld’ of al- Qaeda members, for example 
(Knorr Cetina 2005: 222). This is facilitated by the information infrastructure 
through which ‘global microstructures’ (Knorr Cetina 2005) take on a particular 
emergent unity; emergent events can be rapidly assimilated into already- 
established narratives in a powerfully diffused way through the digital tools 
(blogs, social networking sites, videos) employed by amateurs as well as by 
‘official’ al- Qaeda media productions. What is key here and significantly over-
looked in the field is the relationship between global microstructures and their 
digital connectivities, and their representation in and relationship to the main-
stream media, and this we argue is critical to understanding the dynamic work-
ings of radicalisation in the new media ecology.
 This book concerns discourses through which it is presumed people are radi-
calised: specifically, the arguments disseminated by al- Qaeda and other Jihadists 
as they wage what is, according to the British government, a ‘battle of ideas’ to 
win public support. But we are also concerned with discourse about radicalisa-
tion: the ways in which media, political institutions and security agencies repre-
sent ‘radicalisers’, ‘the radicalised’ and ‘radicalising websites’, how Jihadist 
media culture is portrayed and its effects conceptualised. It is the discourses 
about radicalisation, we argue, that are constituted by a consistent set of misun-
derstandings. Our main argument is: Uncertainty about how discourses of radi-
calisation operate in the new media ecology is the condition for discourses about 
radicalisation to proliferate. Discourses of radicalisation do not cause discourses 
about radicalisation, but media, political institutions and security agencies have 
responded in ways that encourage, sustain and at times exploit this disjuncture.
 To understand how these disjunctures and misconceptions operate, it is useful 
to examine how ‘Global Jihad’, media and fear are assumed by academics, 
policymakers and journalists to be intimately connected.
Global threats: risk, fear and resilience
Modernity is defined by the creation by humans of problems they cannot control, 
argues Ulrich Beck (2006). Institutions such as science, business, and govern-
ment may have brought advances in many spheres of life, but simultaneously 
they have generated new risks. These include ‘side effects’ of modernity such as 
climate change and the contagious behaviour of financial markets which can 
bring economic instability and collapse. But modernity also creates the con-
ditions for intentional, deliberate harm from terrorism and the exploitation of 
social fears. From the exploitation of industrial logic for mass killing in the Hol-
ocaust to the exploitation of modern air transport for mass killing on 11 Septem-
ber 2001, modernity produces risks that can easily be transformed into 
catastrophes.
 The relationship between risk and catastrophe presents a problem of know-
ledge. Contemporary risks are fiendishly complex, involving chains of causation 
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that are uncertain but potentially rapid. For instance, new communications tech-
nologies enable quicker financial market transactions, making regulation of 
markets more difficult, making a crash more likely, which then has knock- on 
effects on housing, social welfare, jobs; these in turn affect patterns of travel and 
migration, which are a vector for the spread of pandemics. Simple cause- and-
effect models of policy become difficult: based on this chain are better commu-
nications technologies a cause or a way to reduce the risk of pandemics? 
Radicalisation looms at the nexus of risk and catastrophe. There appears to be a 
risk that ‘vulnerable’ people could turn to violence under the general cause of 
‘Jihad’, but there is very little grounded knowledge about how this process might 
occur. What factors make a person ‘at risk’, and what conditions or influences 
would make them more likely to ‘tip over’ into acts of violence? For example, 
Githens- Mazer and Lambert (2010) analyse the lifecourse of two brothers who 
shared the same upbringing, were both ‘exposed’ to radical materials, but only 
one of whom went on to commit terrorist acts. The same explanatory factors 
were present (ideology, social networks, political ideology) but the outcomes 
differed. In studies of convicted terrorists, such factors are usually considered 
causal, but as Githens- Mazer and Lambert suggest, these factors are ‘present in a 
variety of cases where individuals don’t become terrorists’ (2010: 895). Some 
security agencies recognise the impossibility of objective risk measures based on 
reliable models, but ‘useful fictions’ like ‘pathways’ to radicalisation or stereo-
typed imaginaries of ‘loners in their bedroom’ being ‘radicalised through the 
Internet’ continue to circulate in public debate.
 The objective degree of risk is in some sense irrelevant in public debates. To 
point out that fewer people die from terrorism than from smoking or traffic acci-
dents is to miss the point. The emergent, cross- cutting forces of risk society 
could lead to something not only more catastrophic but that also could occur 
anywhere, at any time, to any society. It is this spectre of unknowability that is 
the dilemma for anyone seeking to make sense of terrorism. It is the condition 
for hypersecurity.
 Beck’s global risk thesis originated before the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem-
ber 2001. However, that date has become significant in public debates about 
global risks to the extent that the term ‘post- 9/11’ has become a meaningful 
marker of a discrete period. We have witnessed the conduct of a ‘global war on 
terror’, and the geographical pattern of Jihadist attacks appears to be reasonably 
global in scope, including Bali, Mumbai, Riyadh, Baghdad, Istanbul, Madrid, 
London, and New York City and Washington DC (Latin America and China 
seem to have escaped). But this does not necessarily imply global fear has been 
created. Rachel Pain (2009a) has conducted an overview of academic studies of 
global risks and global fear and discovered that these assumed trends are ques-
tionable in key respects.
 First, treatment of the concept ‘fear’ is problematic. Academics rarely talk to 
the supposedly fearful. Numerous studies show the majority of Western popula-
tions suffer elevated levels of fear following terrorist events but these levels soon 
decrease (Pain 2009b). However, for marginalised groups in those societies, fear 
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Media and radicalisation  9
is felt at higher levels. While Beck (2006), for instance, points to the greater 
impact of catastrophes on the world’s poor, he does not explore how the poor 
within Western societies feel continual insecurity. As Gillespie has documented 
through a series of ethnographic studies of insecurity in cities in the UK, fears 
and insecurities are contextual and localised (Gillespie 2006; Poynting et al. 
2004). Emphasis on fear of ‘global’ risks such as terrorism comes at the expense 
of attention to other issues around which people feel fear. There is also a need to 
understand the fears of those whom people are afraid of: if media reports on ter-
rorism continually reference ‘signs’ of radicalisation like growing a beard or 
attending mosques, how do people with those signs feel, facing the possibility 
that they make others afraid?
 There is a lack of historical awareness in studies of fear. Pain writes, 
we might see emotions not just as blank canvasses, waiting to be affected by 
wider events and relations, but as . . . already formed and always changing 
. . . It was not dropped onto western countries following the handful of ter-
rorist attacks since 2001.
(Pain 2009a: 478)
Who fears who and what is a question demanding analysis of historical traject-
ories and relationships. For instance, we might ask whether fear of Muslims 
among white- majority Western societies in recent years is tied to colonial his-
tories, where migrants are not only a reminder of empires lost, and atrocities 
committed in the name of empire, but migrants may also be perceived to pose 
the threat of ‘reverse colonisation’ (Gilroy 2006). Is fear of radicalisation a 
proxy for other fears?
 The second major problematic aspect of the global risk, global fear thesis is 
the assumed global dimension or scale of fear. The very idea of ‘global fear’ 
posits a unified phenomenon, which may overlook the differentiated degree and 
experience of fear around the world. Who fears what may depend on gender, 
ethnicity, class, experiences and media consumption. Nor is it clear exactly how 
fear would become global. Do emotions just ‘move’ as if across empty space, or 
rather must we account for emotions being pushed and pulled through complex 
and uneven webs of social and material relations? How do news media or enter-
tainment genres amplify or contain vectors of fear or sympathy forming around 
events?
 In discourses of global risks and how these discourses travel, we must also 
ask how and why some processes or threats become understood as risks and 
some do not. This is not always clear in accounts of global risks. There is a large 
body of studies in political science demonstrating that certain actors in any 
society have the capacity to set agendas for what become recognised as public 
and significant matters- of-concern and what matters remain absent or invisible. 
But as far as global risks are presented, it appears that ‘risks are determined in a 
level playing field’ (Isin 2004: 219). What national and transnational interest 
groups benefit if we understand the world as constituted by certain risks? Just as 
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we can speak of a Holocaust industry – the various cultural centres and academic 
institutes that depend upon and actively support the importance of the Holocaust 
– is there now a radicalisation industry, namely the think tanks, academics, 
private security firms, religious clerics and various other experts and consultants 
who provide diagnoses and solutions to the problem of radicalisation? To the 
extent this is the case, do journalists take this into account when introducing 
these figures during news reports? If not, journalists reporting on ‘global risks’ 
such as radicalisation may be inadvertently functioning in interests of these 
groups.
 We might also ask what rhetorical work is done by the label ‘global’, and 
what assumptions it suggests about how the world is constituted. For Pain, many 
studies assume an ontology of global and local phenomena, and that fear is part 
of global events which trickle down and are absorbed in local, everyday rela-
tions. To speak of ‘global fear’ is to assume a level of action and experience that 
is distinct from the non- global but that is subject to impact from global forces. 
The past decade has seen a proliferation of studies of ‘the everyday’, although it 
is worth noting while some reify this distinction by identifying an everyday level 
of social life within which ‘resistance’ to ‘global’ forces can be found and 
encouraged, not all make this move (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007; Langley 
2008). Nevertheless, if academics fail to disaggregate actual experiences of risks, 
threats and anxieties then we may not expect journalists, under pressure in break-
ing news events, to question officials who may refer sweepingly to ‘global’ risks 
and threats.
 Global risk discourses can also be questioned for assuming that fear and inse-
curity are bad things in themselves. We examine this critique next.
Is insecurity so bad? Are we not resilient?
The absence of studies of how people live with fear in the context of risks, an 
absence evident in the work of Isin and Beck, is significant because the resulting 
analysis or discourse lends support to notions that societies need support in the 
face of risks; that individuals and societies are vulnerable and need to be made 
resilient.
 This discourse emerges around Jihadist radicalisation in the UK. Malignant 
‘radicalisers’ prey upon ‘vulnerable’ individuals who are already Muslim or 
might convert to Islam; if only the individuals’ families, communities or the 
state had helped them become more resilient and resistant to radicalising influ-
ences, for instance by helping them realise that the radicalisers misrepresent 
Islam or that British values are compatible with and complementary to Islam. 
But a similar discourse emerges around a society’s infrastructure: transport 
systems, energy supplies, information and communication networks become 
classified as vulnerable entities which require intervention and management to 
ensure they are resilient.
 The 2007 report of the UK Cabinet Office, Dealing with Disaster, claims that 
the ‘central government’s approach to civil contingency planning is built around 
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Media and radicalisation  11
the concept of resilience’, though it does not define ‘resilience’ (Furedi 2008: 
645). Is resilience a property of individuals or infrastructures, or is it the external 
factors that contribute to individuals or infrastructures being resilient? An earlier 
Cabinet Office report, the Draft Contingencies Bill of 2003, defined resilience as 
the ability ‘at every relevant level to detect, prevent, and if necessary, to handle 
and recover from disruptive challenges’ (op. cit.: 646). Here, resilience seem 
synonymous with emergency planning, conceived as something done by states 
in association with private, business and voluntary sectors, but not done by com-
munities of their own accord. From this particular understanding follows pre-
scriptions for the form of response – joint public- private expert- led practices – and 
a temporality of response: such risks are with us for the foreseeable future. They 
will not be solved, only managed.
 Against this, Furedi argues resilience is the default condition. The aftermaths 
of both 9/11 and 7/7 demonstrate not only that people will cope with disruption, 
but that the organic ties that develop as people try to solve problems together 
generate solidarity that enhances resilience – independently of any state or expert 
intervention. His argument is supported by a review of empirical studies by 
Shalev and Errera (2008) of civilian responses to terrorist attacks. They note 
than in many cases, authorities now diagnose resilience in terms of whether pop-
ulations suffer post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following an attack. But 
defining resilience as the absence of PTSD is dubious, they suggest, since we all 
suffer and overcome many risks, dangers and challenges in our lifetimes such 
that the number of people without PTSD, i.e. people who are resilient, is almost 
everyone. Rather than conceiving resilience as the negation of something 
(PTSD), it must be defined as the presence of some capacity, such as the capac-
ity to adapt. It seems Shalev and Errera’s findings complement Furedi’s warn-
ings against a precautionary cultural milieu. So there seems a dichotomous way 
we can think about risk suggested by Ulrich Beck: ‘The philosophy of laissez- 
faire – it’s safe, as long as it has not been proven to be dangerous; and the philo-
sophy of precaution – nothing is safe, as long as it has not been proven harmless’ 
(2006: 10). For Furedi, the latter results in a diminished conception of humanity: 
that we cannot act or get on with our lives just in case there is a small risk.
 The work of Shalev and Errera is important because much discussion of resil-
ience, like the global fear discourse, remains empirically unsubstantiated. For 
instance, Furedi’s argument about the construction of a ‘culture of fear’ depends 
on unsystematic selection of news articles that support his thesis, and use of 
opinion polls as evidence of the degree to which publics are afraid. As Bleiker 
and Hutchinson (2008: 19) argue, opinion polls and surveys are evidence of 
what people say about fear, how they represent their emotions. They are not 
evidence of fear itself, or any other emotion. It may be that fear and trauma 
cannot easily be put into words. It may be that we need to analyse how people’s 
actions are modified, or not, because of fear. People may say tell opinion poll-
sters they are not afraid, but fear is ‘an emotion with embodied sensations and 
material implications. Fear inhabits people, and they, rather than ethereal, mobile 
or free- floating discourses, [should be] the subject of empirical and analytical 
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attention’ (Pain 2009a: 475). What is reported in news is evidence of a news dis-
course, which may be part of a culture but is not synonymous with it. Furedi’s 
‘culture’ is a series of representations. How might we step beyond the rather 
generalised claims of Beck and Furedi that propose a dichotomy of paralysing 
global risks versus resilient humanity?
 What is required is a methodology that shows how global ‘threats’ like 
Jihadists are represented in media cultures by journalists and understood by 
ordinary people in different countries. It is the dynamic workings, the transla-
tions between and across – the remediations – of extremist ‘messages’, dis-
courses, events and responses to events by a host of connected actors that 
require illumination to enable a critical inquiry into the nature of the phenome-
non called ‘radicalisation’, its emergence and its consequences. And this basis 
for what follows here was developed through our 2007–2009 empirical inquiry 
‘Legitimising the discourses of radicalisation: political violence in the new 
media ecology’, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
Programme ‘New Security Challenges: ‘Radicalisation’ and Violence – A Crit-
ical Reassessment programme.5 We devote the remainder of this introductory 
chapter to providing an overview of our empirical project, its objectives, meth-
odology, and findings.
The empirical research project: New Security Challenges
Context
Research completed on phase two of the ESRC New Security Challenges Pro-
gramme: ‘Shifting Securities’ by Gillespie, Gow, Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
(www.mediatingsecurity.com) (hereafter Shifting) identified a growing ‘securiti-
sation of everyday life’ in Britain whereby the ritualised interactions of policy-
makers, journalists and citizen audiences constitute the ‘media- security nexus’ 
as a ‘battlespace’ of mutual disrespect and suspicion. This contributes to the 
marginalisation of British Muslims and is one of the many antecedents to poten-
tial radicalisation. These developments suggested that policymakers face a range 
of new and difficult challenges, at the heart of which is the legitimation of secur-
ity policy to hostile and sceptical national and diasporic media that question key 
policy assumptions.
 Our Legitimising project built directly on the Shifting research by adopting 
the issue identified as pivotal in the media- security nexus – that of legitimacy – 
and exploring its origins, function, impact, significance and, from a counter- 
terrorist strategic perspective, its robustness, in discourses of and about 
radicalisation.
 Legitimacy has repeatedly been perceived as the critical ‘measure’ of progress 
in the prosecution of the War on Terror (Kagan 2004; Reid 2006); its absence 
held to be corrosive of the efficacy of certain policies. Our theorisation of legiti-
macy in Shifting provided the basis of a conceptual framework for an investiga-
tion of radicalising discourses. But whereas Shifting focused on print and 
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Media and radicalisation  13
broadcast media in a primarily UK context, this project took the Internet as the 
centrifugal and transnational dynamic of the legitimising and the contesting of 
discourses of radicalisation in the new media ecology. In other words, Legitimis-
ing was not merely an investigation of the content of media and ‘representations’ 
of political violence and its antecedents, support and contestations. Rather, this 
project revealed the tensions and conflicts in the ‘mediality’ or ‘medialogical 
significance’ (Grusin 2010) of ‘radicalisation’ to an array of actors in an emer-
gent new media ecology. Mediality refers to our relationship to mediation itself, 
and it is important to analyse not just how actors engage with events and issues 
reported on, but how they engage with the presence of such reports themselves, 
particularly given the increased scope for people who are not professional jour-
nalists to produce, distribute, annotate and adapt media content.
 Legitimising explored ‘Web 2.0’ (second generation services available on the 
Web to which users can contribute as easily as they can consume) as the forum 
of choice for terrorists and for those intent on radicalising and recruiting indi-
viduals, groups and organisations to their cause. It is the collaborative and par-
ticipatory potential of these web tools and environments that make them rich 
attractors of support, combined with their ease of creation, access and mobility 
(to other web spaces and at other times). Thus, Web 2.0 facilitates asymmetrical 
warfare, particularly with regard to a ‘war of ideas’, by allowing relatively insig-
nificant non- state actors to compete with (and often supersede) state entities, 
whilst cloaking the personal or organisational security of those non- state voices.
 Our work contributes to an understanding of the diffused prolificacy of the 
Internet which appears in a perpetually ‘preparadigmatic’ state insofar as there is 
no stable object around which a research paradigm could cohere (Hine 2005, 
emphasis added). Although we have moved beyond the stage of the treatment of 
the mass media as separate and separable from the ‘negatively globalised’ 
(Bauman 2006) setting in which contemporary terrorism operates, government 
and academia appear to be increasingly ill- equipped to address the pace and the 
seeming perpetuity of the technological transformations that have ensured the 
‘weaponisation’ of media. Our aim was to make a significant contribution to an 
understanding of the connectivities and relationships that make up the new 
media ecology especially those that appear to transcend the local and the global, 
accelerate the dissemination of radicalising discourses, and amplify media/public 
fears of political violence.
 Our approach was divided into three interconnecting strands of research 
undertaken by academic experts in different fields. The first investigated how 
Web 2.0 blogs, chat rooms, social networking and other forums were being used 
to spread ideas that might be considered to be radicalising in advocating political 
or religious acts of violence and terror, particularly against Western cultures and 
institutions. This work included exploring how these messages and acts pub-
lished or broadcast on the Web were supported and legitimated. The second 
strand of research examined how the acts themselves and explanations for them 
on the Web are ‘picked up’ and represented in the mainstream television news 
media, through the journalistic and editorial uses of words, phrases, graphics, 
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images, videos and so on. Finally, the third strand explored how interpretations 
of the term radicalisation are shaped by news representations through investigat-
ing audience responses, understandings and misunderstandings, through audi-
ence research in England, France, Denmark and Australia.
 Instead of focusing on just one medium or event, we employed the three 
strand approach as a way of tracking and understanding how support for polit-
ical or religious violence emerged and shifted over time across different media 
and in response to events considered as newsworthy in national and global 
news cultures. It is by integrating these three strands that an analytical grip on 
the nexus of places, events, people and their actions and inactions. We will 
now briefly outline the methodology we employed that contributed to this 
approach.
Methodology
We conducted a multilingual investigation of the discourses of radicalisation: 
their circulation through Web 2.0 and mainstream media, and their role in 
legitimating Jihadist actors, acts and ideologies. The new media ecology 
context for this research is one in which the availability and interactivity of a 
range of news sources contributes to a proliferation of (online) public–private 
spheres with loose and problematic engagements with mainstream public 
institutions and debates. The emergent and amorphous character of these com-
munication networks demands innovative, dynamic research methods and 
conceptual frameworks, particularly in an investigation of their shaping of a 
new language of radicalisation including the mediated contestation of the 
divergent meanings of this term and thus divergent responses to the nature of 
the ‘threat’ it describes. We conceptualised these intersecting empirical 
strands through the ‘nexus analysis’ framework proposed by Scollon and 
Scollon (2004), which they define as ‘the study of the semiotic cycles of 
people, objects, and discourses in and through moments of socio- cultural 
importance’.
 We investigated radicalising discourses as dynamically configured through 
synchronic and diachronic mediated spaces and narratives and took key events 
as triggers for research across the three methodological strands. For example, 
the conflict in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 between Hamas and 
Israel triggered claims across all three strands: on Jihadist forums, members 
called on Muslims to fight for their suffering brothers and sisters; in main-
stream media, news reported or speculated upon the potential for the radicali-
sation of Muslims in Western countries in response to media coverage of the 
violence in Gaza; audiences too were aware of the conflict, enabling us to 
evaluate the extent to which they were aware of attempts to radicalise or news 
media reports about the threat of radicalisation. Across the empirical research 
period (2007–2009) a number of triggering events enabled us to map how 
these ‘cycles’ of meaning around radicalisation were initiated, sustained, and 
contested, across both languages and geographic and mediated spaces.
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Media and radicalisation  15
The three strand approach
Strand A: Identify, map and evaluate the discursive legitimation of the culture 
and ideology of Jihadism in Web 2.0 and related emergent Internet forums.
The diffused prolificacy of the Internet poses a challenge for qualitative research, 
especially given the fluidity and ephemerality of much Internet content. This is 
particularly the case for Jihadist sites that are either closed down by anti- terrorist 
agencies or which shift or disguise their URLs to avoid detection. Our awareness 
of this ‘hydraulic effect’ whereby Jihadi content moves from site to site, allowed 
us to tailor our data collection and archiving processes. Our identification and 
selection of Jihadist websites and other content was initially guided by terrorism-
 monitoring sites such as Internet Haganah, SITE and MEMRI in addition to 
snowball and convenience sampling approaches. Other selection factors were 
influenced by the mainstream media discourses aspects of the project given our 
aim of tracing intermedial discursive flows. This includes, for instance, refer-
ences to and listings of ‘sister Jihadist sites’ found on the ones initially identi-
fied, as well as the writings of prominent ‘Jihadists’ themselves who cited 
forums (e.g. al- Zawahiri on al- Tawhid wal Jihad site).
 Our initial selection process identified a number of Jihadi forums as being 
relevant to the current study. These were selected on the basis of their popular-
ity, hosting of extremist content, accessibility and credibility within Jihadist 
circles. These included al- Hesba, al- Ikhlaas, al- Buraq, al- Nusra, al- Firdaws, 
Shumookh al- Islam, Tawhid and Jihad, At- Tibyan, Islamic Army in Iraq, and 
Aljazeeratalk forum.
 Having established the basic corpus for initial analysis, our researcher then 
applied for membership of these communities. The membership process is 
inconsistent across forums, and one that can range from being instantaneous to 
taking weeks for membership to be bestowed – in some cases, membership was 
only open for short periods of time or was never granted. After the initial period 
of registering for membership and cursively scouting forums, a new sample 
subset was identified based upon accessibility, popularity and relevance to our 
research questions. The research then focused on this subset and entailed:
• daily observation of forums in order to follow new stories, threads and pat-
terns, etc.;
• mapping of dissemination routes for individual stories across forums;
• analysis of language, mostly Arabic, used: colloquial, standard, dialect, ref-
erences to religious text, etc. Language is important as it could indicate the 
region of the author or member if using a regional dialect; the extent of his/
her education and finally theological as well as political and historical know-
ledge. Language is very powerful in lending legitimacy or disqualifying its 
speaker or author;
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• study of members including posting patterns, interactions, online identifica-
tion markers (such as avatars, etc.);
• examination of archived material, particularly postings contemporaneous to 
critical security events (e.g. 7/7, etc.);
• observation of responses to ideological tracts and statements;
• analysis of Jihadist video production, with a focus on distinctions between 
producers, distributors and posters;
• analysis of Nasheeds and devotional music accompanying videos and their 
emotive impact;
• examination of legitimating tools on online forums, including religious/ the-
ological aspects;
• translation and analysis of key statements and texts from ideologues.
All material was archived by downloading relevant multimodal material (text, 
videos, audios and images) saving HTML pages as offline content, and printing 
out (and filing) hard copies of pages and material of vital importance.
 In February 2009, a substantial dataset was added to the project corpus of 
Jihadi propaganda material comprising of more than 50 websites and forums 
from 2002–2005.6 This includes much of the original al- Qaeda website ‘al- Neda’ 
from 2002, and some of the most prominent sites during the early years of Jihad-
ist media: Azzam.com, Khilafa.com, Jehad.net, al- Farooq, Ansar, Sawt- al-Jihad, 
Islamic- minbar.com, Mojahedoon.net, Waaqiah.com, Khurassan.com, al- Ikhlaas, 
Minbar al- Tawhid wal Jihad, al- Ansar News Agency, al- Mohajeroon.net.
Strand B: Identify, map and evaluate mainstream media representations of polit-
ical violence and the uses of the term ‘radicalisation’ and its associated terms, con-
texts and discourses.
 We undertook a multimodal content and discourse analysis of international 
television and online news images and stories recorded, digitised and tran-
scribed, and coded these using NVivo 8 software. Pivotal events analysed were: 
the July 2005 London bombings, June 2006 Forest Gate Police Raid, and the 
August 2006 Airlines Terror Plot. In accordance with the project’s ‘data- driven’ 
philosophy we identified and analysed a range of news stories that have emerged 
over the lifetime of the project to date. Prominent amongst these are:
• The turn from Hizb ut- Tahrir to deradicalisation operations by Maajid 
Nawaz in September 2007
• The conviction of Mohammed Hamid on 26 February 2008, found guilty of 
training men in secret camps in the Lake District and New Forest to prepare 
them to fight overseas.
• The Israeli military offensive in Gaza and the West Bank from late Decem-
ber 2008 to mid- January 2009.
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Media and radicalisation  17
For several of these stories, we undertook analysis of Arabic media and Jihadist 
media. For example, al- Jazeera and al- Arabia satellite channels on 7/7 and the 
planes plot and al- Ikhlaas and al- Firdaws Jihadist forums on 7/7, enabled us to 
follow the story’s trajectory across media publics. This allows for a nexus analy-
sis of the contours and content of a story as it moves across cultures.
Strand C:7 Identify, map and evaluate mainstream news public understandings 
and interpretations of political violence and the term ‘radicalisation’ and its associ-
ated terms, contexts and discourses.
 We developed and extended the methodology of collaborative ethnography 
integrated with media text analysis and processes of legitimation pioneered by 
Gillespie (2006) and employed on the Shifting project. A total of 67 interviews 
were conducted by our research team in London, Aarhus (Denmark), Paris and 
Sydney. The population was broad, with news audiences of different genera-
tions, gender and faith. Participants initially recruited were part of the social net-
works of our team of ethnographic researchers, with further participants recruited 
through snowballing. In addition to the interviews, two focus groups were 
carried out, one focused on a specific episode of BBC’s Newsnight on the Gaza 
crisis, another on citizens’ anxieties around media technologies. The analysis of 
the interviews was first organised through their coding into Nvivo 8. Categories 
for coding were designed in relation to this strand of the Legitimising project and 
to other strands, to achieve integrated analysis across the project of key themes 
such as legitimacy, violence and visuality. However, close analysis was then 
conducted on the transcripts. This was informed by approaches to ordinary lan-
guage and experience in the social sciences and humanities.
 The central idea underpinning our audience research was that the meaning of 
radicalisation, like the meaning of any other word, is ordinary. Minimally, this 
means that there is no need for a specialised language, academic or otherwise, for 
radicalisation to mean anything; it is an expression belonging to the ordinary lan-
guage and hence that makes sense within this ordinary language. Additionally, 
this idea suggests that radicalisation is used in practice and bound to its usages; it 
does not have a meaning outside its practical uses. In order to identify everyday 
understandings of radicalisation then, our interviews needed to afford opportun-
ities for our respondents to connect this concept of the ordinary language to some 
people, activities and situations in order to render the concept a witnessable phe-
nomenon (Coulter 1979; Wittgenstein 1967). The interviews were not organised 
so as to decide what ‘radicalisation’ ultimately means. This is not to say that all 
conceptions of ‘radicalisation’ are equal. Rather, ethnomethodology and the 
philosophy of ordinary language suggest that understandings and misunderstand-
ings are tied to the circumstances of use of the term. Hence, interviewers did not 
ask for ostensive definitions and instead focused on identifying what is connected 
to radicalisation in practical situations of uses of the term.
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 Concrete examples were mobilised in the interviews in order to elicit reac-
tions as to whether or not they can meaningfully be described as instances of 
radicalisation. In this approach, what was constituted as not being related to radi-
calisation was as important as what was construed as being related to it. Finding 
out what is not associated with it enabled us to touch the limits of the practical 
meaning of radicalisation: the moment when it disappears and when something 
else becomes relevant; that is, it allowed us to draw the boundaries between this 
expression and others. The analysis of the interviews was first organised through 
their coding into NVivo 8. Categories were designed in relation to those of 
Strands A and B in order to achieve the integration of the three strands of the 
project.
Results
Strand A: Web and Web 2.0 content analysis of Jihadi and related 
discourses
The ideological conflict that underlies the ‘Global War on Terror’ is being con-
ducted almost entirely on the Internet’s battlefield. Prominent Jihadist ideologues 
like Ayman al- Zawahiri, increasingly aware of their increasingly marginalised 
status vis- à-vis the mainstream media as a consequence of ‘the media war on ter-
rorism’ have sought to legitimate their aims, goals, methods and tactics through 
the virtual realm in this ideological conflict for the ‘hearts and minds of fellow 
Muslims’.
 However, Jihadist forums, which are popularly assumed to be the principle 
vehicles for the propagation of the ideology and culture of Jihadism, do not 
ostensibly serve to legitimate Jihadist acts and thus their role in radicalising 
potential supporters or neutral publics is questionable. Instead, these forums are 
often exclusively closed spaces that seek to reinforce a ‘group- think’ mentality 
amongst committed members and thus are often proverbially ‘preaching to the 
converted’. Indeed key findings are:
1 They are hierarchically organised, with a highly controlled dissemination 
process that adopts a systematic, centralised, and controlled top- down 
approach in production and distribution.
2 This control over media has made Jihadi forums less interactive and made 
members mere recipients, and circulators at best, of Jihadi material, which 
is something of an anachronism to the revolution in ‘participatory’ audience 
roles heralded by Web 2.0.
3 Contrary to the established view that Jihadist websites/forums seek to radi-
calise, results show that most virtual forums exert no considerable or sus-
tained effort in persuasion or legitimation of the ideology or culture of 
Jihadism.
4 Following on from point 3, there is little ostensive or meaningful debate, 
discussion, or dialogue amongst members of most Jihadi forums observed. 
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For example, a statement by al- Zawahiri or a new militant video would be 
lauded with a string of support, praise and prayers by members, without any 
critical engagement with the material in question. Consequently, words and 
deeds of Jihadists are accepted wholesale and go unchallenged.
Instead, the transition of younger, neutral publics from apathy to support has 
increasingly taken place in more open and genuinely democratising Web 2.0 
forums such as blogs, open forums and file- sharing platforms, in which theologi-
cal legitimation has been superseded by the appeal of emotive audio- visual 
material. Here Jihadist acts ‘speak’ for themselves through the ‘propaganda of 
the deed’.
 However, as these forums are often outside the purview of Jihadist leader-
ship, they have had the inadvertent effect of undermining an ageing and weak-
ened Jihadist officialdom (see below). This Jihadist core consequently offers 
little guidance or recognition to potential sympathetic audiences, who instead are 
often forced to turn to mainstream media such as BBC or al- Jazeera to find out 
what core al- Qaeda have been doing.
 Global Jihadism itself has undergone something of a legitimacy crisis, 
particularly throughout the duration of our empirical project. Indeed, a number 
of factors are illustrative of this process:
1 al- Qaeda has been experiencing a continual waning of legitimacy and a 
weakening of its support base, particularly as a result of revisionist critiques 
from ex- Jihadists (Dr Fadl, Noman Benotman, LIFG and so on).
2 The concerted attacks on Jihadist media organs and web forums e.g. 
downing of the forums and expulsion from YouTube and Facebook) from 
September 2008 onwards served to remove the principal platforms for the 
promulgation of Jihadism on the Web.
3 The growth of moderate forums that allow space for extremists to express 
their opinions and post their material (such as Aljazeeratalk forum) has 
proven effective in contesting and countering al- Qaeda’s metanarrative and 
religious exegesis.
4 Al- Qaeda seems more likely to tailor its statements and plans, and perhaps 
future acts, in accordance with the demands of the Muslim public in order 
not to lose its waning support base. It appears al- Qaeda are bowing to 
Muslim public opinion, at least rhetorically.
5 Consequently they have engaged in public diplomacy exercises (such as al- 
Zawahiri’s Ask Aymen exercise) with a view to engaging with a critical 
public and becoming more approachable.
6 Increasing use of testimonies of Western officials, analysts, and soldiers that 
are unfavourable to Western policies to enhance claims al- Qaeda makes.
7 Contraflow of Jihadist material/info; while Jihadist groups may be largely 
critical of mainstream media, the relationship is more complex; main-
stream media are a source of material, and a platform, for Jihadist media 
products.
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Comparative and historical analysis
Analysis of the additional 2002–2005 Jihadist corpus enabled insights of groups 
and websites banned in Britain today. This reinforced our already existing evid-
ence of the ephemerality of Jihadist forums and the constant ‘shuffling’ of top 
sites.
 The visual and musical aspect of Jihadist sites and material played a smaller 
role in the early days of Jihadist media. Multimodal features have become 
increasingly significant since this period, with the development and command of 
software and rise of powerful and more professional media wings. A key trans-
formation identified in this respect is a shift from the production and publication 
of militant and graphic videos to an increasingly documentary- style and even 
‘glossy’ professionalisation of Jihadist output, part of al- Qaeda’s increasing 
focus on seeking legitimacy.
 More credible and scholarly (even though radical) figures wrote regularly on 
Jihadist forums in the 2002–2005 period as well as being some of their promi-
nent members. Members of early sites had titles of Dr, Sheikh and Imam. Today 
the writings of these figures are present on Jihadist forums only through 
members who post them (rather than their directly writing on the forum). This 
clear absence of credible figures among the membership of today’s Jihadist sites 
is oft- reflected in current forums.
Strand B: mainstream media discourse analysis
We identified six key interpenetrating dimensions of the emergence and estab-
lishment of the term ‘radicalisation’ into the British politico- media lexicon 
across mainstream media discourses. Together, they make radicalisation present 
without offering certainty about what the phenomenon refers to. Here is a 
summary of these dimensions:
1 There is a routine clustering of terms, phrases and associated discourses 
(e.g. on paedophilia) by journalists, policymakers and security services, so 
that the term radicalisation has become part of the rhetorical structure of the 
waging of the ‘War on Terror’ with little reflexive interrogation evident of 
its distinctiveness, genealogy or function, in describing a ‘root cause’ of ter-
rorist activities which thus requires a policy and/or tactical response (i.e. 
‘deradicalisation’). Such clustering affords a ‘false certainty’ to media 
reporting and commentary. The coherence of these clusters is questioned 
within the reporting of radicalisation- related stories by those identifying 
with the ‘accused’. For example, following instances in which media 
identify a ‘turn to religion’ and outward appearances such as the growing of 
a beard as signifying radicalisation, these signifiers and claims are contested 
by members of Muslim communities within news reports.
2 Uncertainty is a key dynamic in both journalistic reporting and in the medi-
ation of security service and government discourses on radicalisation. 
Eclectic elements (clustering, above) were routinely pieced together to form 
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narratives presented as constituting ‘definitive’ cases of radicalisation. In 
this process, less attention is afforded to the logical and the contextual 
coherence of the clusters. This leads to ‘slippage’ whereby apparently unre-
lated concepts – grooming, brainwashing, religious conversion – are con-
flated into a phenomenon that is presumed as coherent, in that 
audiences- cum-publics will understand as ‘radicalisation’.
3 The language and clustering of ‘radicalisation’ contributes to a public dis-
course of vulnerability for British society. The mediatised representations 
and the contextualisations of radicalisation are hooked into a more pervasive 
discourse or continuum of the everyday and the exceptional, the normal and 
the extreme. This is apparent at the level of the mediatised construction of 
and focus upon the normalcy of those who are represented as having been 
‘radicalised’. Emphasis on vulnerability as a guiding concept could lend 
credibility to use of the antonym ‘resilience’ in policy debates which 
requires scrutiny.
4 Mediality is an increasingly dominant frame through which radicalisation 
(and terrorist threats more broadly conceived) are represented. The ‘normal’ 
or the ‘everyday’ is operationalised and blurred with the extraordinary, by 
journalists, through a connection made with publics’ everyday media 
practices. Thus, from representations of the Internet as a medium of radical-
isation, through to the self- shot home movie of the leader of the 7/7 
Bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan, bidding farewell to his baby, it is the 
mediality – the continuity and familiarity of these representations and acts 
with everyday media practices that has created a new medial style to the 
reporting of radicalisation and terrorism in our new media ecology.
5 Speculative premediation was found as an increasingly routine prism 
through which recent and ongoing terrorist and radicalisation news stories 
are constructed. This is the journalistic or ‘expert’ speculation on the scale, 
magnitude and the consequences of terrorist threats. Although speculation is 
a standard of journalistic discourses, we found that speculation around radi-
calisation had significantly greater momentum owing to the precautionary 
principle of reacting to potential threats seen as operated by UK security 
services (the 1 per cent doctrine – if there’s a 1 per cent risk, you respond 
with 100 per cent force). So, when pressed to justify such precautionary or 
pre- emptive tactics, officials can necessarily only offer vague claims. These 
vague claims entered into and propagated a cycle of speculative premedia-
tion. By premediation we refer to how (television) news presented viewers 
with news they had already seen. In the first decade of the twenty- first 
century, the BBC offered regular drama- documentaries or simulations of 
security crises, with a programme each on a smallpox epidemic, transport 
catastrophe and terrorist attacks on London. Each of these ‘premediations’ 
was used to prepare citizens – and any policymakers, journalists and emer-
gency response workers watching – for how a real crisis might unfold. 
Indeed, the ‘London under attack’ terrorist simulation featured the very 
‘experts’ who were used for reporting actual terrorist incidents in the years 
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to come. This nexus of ‘fact and fiction’ articulated through repeated blur-
ring of actors and formats constituted an official/media discourse which, 
Strand C data indicates (below), citizens found difficult to evaluate or 
engage with.
 The media discourse uncertainty patterns around the nature of and the 
threat posed by radicalisation identified in Strand B, had particular reso-
nances amongst our ethnographic audiences sample, as set out below.
6 The emergence of security journalism, a field of reporting which routinely 
focuses on terrorism- related matters such as violent attacks, apparent cases 
of incitement to violence, criminal trials, and interviews with former 
‘radicals’. In contrast to the large body of academic literature and popular 
iconicity of ‘the war correspondent’, security journalism is an under- 
explored but increasingly significant field of journalism.
7 Jihadists are largely absent from mainstream media. Breaking news 
events around radicalised violence are marked by an absence of informa-
tion. Either officials do have information but are slow to release it, or 
authorities have acted on the precautionary principle and do not have any 
confirmed information, having acted in response to an imagined or pre-
sumed threat to which the consequences of not responding would be more 
catastrophic than taking wrong action. This creates a space for speculation 
about threats in general, and attempts to connect general theories to scraps 
of information about these particular events. We find discourses of risk, fear 
and resilience shape what is said and how the events are conceived, not 
Jihadist media content. Their legitimations of violence do not fill the break-
ing news information- void. It is only through the integration of our three 
strands of research that this disjuncture becomes clearly visible.
Strand C: audiences’ ethnography
Radicalisation appears to be a highly contested expression in ordinary settings 
and does not possess the relative stability that it does in media and official 
discourses.
 Its current contextualisation, terrorism, although seen as dominant, was also 
contested: in addition to events and people related to Islamic terrorism and 
extremism, the contexts of radicalisation refer to all forms of religious funda-
mentalism, left- wing radicalism, minorities’ struggles against forms of oppres-
sion, radical thinkers, fascist ideologies and actions by governments and states 
(See Appendix II). Consequently, the interviews show that ‘radicalisation’ 
cannot be taken as a property of Islamic groups and ideologies.
 For some, especially in France, the contemporary usage of radicalisation in 
media and official discourses was seen as a misappropriation or distortion of a 
term which used to engender much more positive connotations (i.e. to be ‘pro-
gressive’ and to be ‘radical’). News media were seen as responsible for the con-
flation of this and related terms, so that ‘radicalism’ becomes all- encompassing 
and ‘Al Qaeda’ was seen to be the locus for ‘terrorism’. There was concern 
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expressed over (a) the media conflation of terminology and its generalisation to 
emergent acts of violence; (b) the legitimisation and/or increased likelihood of 
disproportionate responses of the security services; and (c) the impact this would 
have in encouraging others to act in a similar way but also an over- heightened 
state of response from wider publics. There is a correlation between negatively 
connoting radicalisation and expressing concerns about it, versus understanding 
radicalisation in terms of progressive, radical politics and being unconcerned. 
Twenty interviewees claimed to personally know people who have been through 
a process of radicalisation. In keeping with the range of contexts to illustrate 
what radicalisation is, these 20 cases display a range of settings, including reli-
gious fundamentalism, and right or left wing politics.
 Reflexivity is needed for interpreting how and why interviewees offered 
positive or negative connotations of the term ‘radicalisation’, because 
interviewees are doing more than just talking about terrorism ‘out there’. The 
disjuncture citizens understand to exist between official and media discourses 
and their own conceptions of radicalisation is typical of ‘news talk’ in which 
audiences- cum-citizens are addressed and understand themselves as part of what 
Scannell (2000) labels ‘for- anyone-as- someone’ structures of communication. 
Interviewees routinely spoke about concepts anyone would hear, but they also 
spoke as someone: as not- your-typical- viewer, as more cynical or independent- 
minded than others in the presumed news public they p sition themselves within. 
Such negotiations enabled individuals to establish or maintain their political 
identity and their sense of ontological security or control over their relation to 
the threats these discourses both represent and, inadvertently, constitute. This 
helps when interpreting apparently contradictory data, for instance in making 
sense of how a majority of interviewees could state they felt threatened by calls 
for violence such as ‘Behead those who insult Islam’, yet about a third of the 
interviewees thought that calls for violence may have some legitimacy. Such 
ambiguous positions make sense if we account for the identity work being 
undertaken by interviewees.
 Such analysis of how interviewees talk about radicalisation and security, not 
just what they say, illuminates how they understand religious and political iden-
tity and affiliations: mainstream and marginal publics, dominant and subordinate 
cultures, vulnerable and resilient ‘types’ of people. This data, alongside Strand B 
analysis of the representation by media of its presumed news publics (‘What you 
need to know’, ‘How this will affect Britons’), enabled us to map and compare 
how ‘the social’ is represented and constituted in and through mediatised con-
temporary security cultures.
 A second point of intersection between Strands B and C concerned represen-
tations of technology as a source of threat. This was not an original hypothesis 
but emerged in the project’s duration. Routine news representations of terrorism, 
identity theft and paedophilia ‘over the Internet’ contributed to some 
interviewees’ understandings of radicalisation: that although they might not be 
familiar with Jihadist media or discourse, they experienced a diffuse awareness 
that the Internet could deliver threats and as such was at once both a useful yet 
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threatening medium. A focus group was convened on this issue. As above, inter-
viewees and participants suggested that others would be vulnerable to these 
threats, not themselves.
 A third point of intersection between Strands B and C involved a focus group 
in which Newsnight’s report on the Gaza crisis was shown and discussed. Parti-
cipants said it did not provide a balanced view of either the Israel–Palestine con-
flict nor of the nature of Islam. They all found the report to be of a poor 
journalistic quality and even a piece of propaganda due to journalists’ uncritical 
representation of the UK government’s position concerning the conflict and its 
alleged consequences on domestic politics, i.e. radicalisation of Muslim youth in 
Britain. The report was also shown at a Digital Media and Security Workshop 
we convened at the University of Warwick in May 2009 to academic and user 
experts who articulated similar critical positions. A future research priority we 
conclude must be to enable journalists to speak face- to-face with expert and lay 
audiences about why they reach such conclusions about the credibility and polit-
icisation of security reporting.
 The findings from the Danish, French and Australian interview contexts 
confirm the importance of national media and political contexts in shaping 
understandings of the term, rather than a transnational threat being understood in 
transnational terms. This complements a finding of Strand A that much Jihadist 
forum discussion focuses on national concerns and c nflicts.
Summary
In this introductory chapter we have set out some of the difficulties in precisely 
defining radicalisation or finding a consensus as to its meaning. Moreover, it is 
this intangibility that has been ultimately dysfunctional for those who have pro-
moted its usage, i.e. policymakers, security services and what we call ‘security 
journalists’, in terms of its reception by citizen publics. Radicalisation and its 
related lexicon may though have first served a function in terms of its obscura-
tion of the nature, duration, extent or imminence of the threat posed by terror-
ism, and thus may have provided some initial cover for British security 
policymaking, if not just rhetoric, following the 7/7 London bombings. However, 
there is no doubt that there has occurred over the medium- term a thorough de- 
legitimisation and devaluation of the term ‘radicalisation’ in media- security dis-
courses, as is evident from their once most certain proponents and indicated by 
the extract of Baroness Manningham- Buller’s evidence to the UK’s Iraq Inquiry, 
with which we opened this chapter.
 From setting out our version of the problematic of the term and something of 
its genealogy, we then outlined our new media ecology approach to the dis-
courses of radicalisation as demonstrated in our two- year New Security Chal-
lenges empirical project. The following chapters provide a more detailed 
exposition of elements drawn from each and also across the three research 
strands (Jihadist Web 2.0 cultures, mainstream news discourses, audiences).
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2 Legitimising Jihadist ideology1
Introduction
Al- Qaeda and the Global Jihadists have consistently invoked the image of an ideo-
logical battle as being central to the current ‘Global War on Terror’. This ideo-
logical conflict is almost entirely predicated on issues of legitimacy, in which each 
side must convince supporters, neutral audiences and even enemy publics of the 
justness of their cause, the morality of their strategy, the legality of their methods, 
and the ethicality of their vision for the future. Echoing the hackneyed ‘winning 
the hearts and minds’2 dictum of Western leaders, al- Qaeda ideologues like Ayman 
al- Zawahiri have argued, ‘More than half of this battle is taking place in the battle-
field of the media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of 
our Ummah (community).’3 The Jihadists have been remarkably prescient in rec-
ognising the centrality of the media to this battle, and arguably far more so than 
their opponents (Tatham 2006; Soriano 2008). In a letter to Mullah Omar in 2002, 
Osama bin Laden himself wrote, ‘It is obvious that the media war in this century is 
one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total prepara-
tion for the battles.’4 However, as a corollary to this profound awareness of the 
power of the media, the Jihadists have also been pre- occupied by concerns over 
the grave threat posed to their movement’s legitimacy, in light of its increasingly 
marginalised status vis- à-vis the mainstream media – a problem endemic to all ter-
rorist or revolutionary organisations (Hoffmann 2006). This, Hammond (2003) 
argues, is a consequence of ‘the media war on terrorism’. As early as 2001, al- 
Zawahiri appealed, ‘We must get our message across to the masses of the nation 
and break the media siege imposed on the Jihad movement. This is an independent 
battle that we must launch side by side with the military battle.’5
 To this end, the Global Jihadist movement have employed a range of legiti-
mation mechanisms to successfully propound their ideology and narrative, and 
have engaged in a number of strategies in order to manufacture legitimacy 
amongst audiences in the Muslim world and beyond. Essentially, all of this fre-
netic activity has taken place within the confines of the new media ecology, as 
characterised in the previous chapter.
 This chapter seeks: (i) to explore how aspects of the new media ecology has 
been employed to propound the Jihadist narrative and disseminate ideas and acts 
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that fall under the rubric of ‘radicalisation’; (ii) to analyse the strategies and 
mechanisms through which these messages, acts and discourses, published or 
broadcast in this new media environment are supported and ‘legitimised’ (the 
ways in which Jihadists convince others of their claims, and persuade others to 
adopt their worldview); and (iii) to assess the efficacy of these legitimation strat-
egies on radicalisation of audiences of Jihadist material, exploring how legiti-
macy has been conferred upon, or conversely divested from, radicalising 
discourses.
Success and failures of the metanarrative
In order to understand how the new media ecology has benefited the narrative, it 
is important to first discern what actually constitutes this narrative, and assess its 
successes and failures prior to the emergence of the new media landscape.
 When referring to this putative Global Jihadist movement, it is easy to inad-
vertently imbue the movement with an aura of ideological coherence and homo-
geneity that is not actually borne out by reality. Rather, the Global Jihad attracts 
a surprisingly diverse group of individuals, consisting of differences in national-
ity, ethnicity, language, culture, age, social background, educational level, eco-
nomic status, religious affiliation, religiosity and criminality (Awan 2008; 
Sageman 2008; Brachman 2009). Indeed, in recent years, the Holy Grail for 
many in both counterterrorism and academia has been the identification of a 
socio- psychological profile of radical Islamist terrorists, which unsurprisingly 
has been met with little success.
 Instead, the ideological cohesion within this eclectic cohort, which provides 
some semblance of uniformity, is derived from the alluring simplicity of the 
metanarrative itself. Thus the importance of the metanarrative cannot be over-
stated; it is the ideological glue that holds the movement together. This overarch-
ing narrative compels Muslim audiences to view contemporary conflicts through 
the prism of a wider historical global attack on Islam by a belligerent ‘Zionist- 
Crusader Alliance’, and in response to which the Jihadists claim to serve as the 
sole and crucial vanguard. This narrative, as Scheuer (2004), Lawrence (2005) 
and others have recognised, has remained remarkably coherent and consistent 
over time. Osama bin Laden’s earliest message to the world in his 1996 Decla-
ration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 
Places,6 often referred to as the ‘Ladenese Epistle’, argued:
The people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice 
imposed on them by the Zionist- Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to 
the extent that the Muslim’s blood became the cheapest and their wealth as 
loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. 
The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon are still fresh in 
our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippine, 
Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya and in Bosnia- Herzegovina took 
place, massacres that send shivers in the body and shake the conscience.7
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The potency of the Jihadist’s alluringly simple metanarrative is bolstered by the 
stark and unflinching certainty of its interpretational framework for events that 
might otherwise be perceived as inexplicable. Audiences perplexed, for example, 
by the fact that terrorist attacks on 9/11, carried out predominantly by Saudi 
nationals at the behest of a sub- state terrorist entity, nevertheless resulted in the 
invasion and occupation of two sovereign nation states, namely Afghanistan and 
Iraq, may be inclined to find coherence and meaning in the acute clarity of the 
Jihadist’s framework for interpreting current events. Revelations of forged dos-
siers and patent fabrications masking ulterior motives for the invasion of Iraq in 
particular, not to mention perceived Freudian slips by Western leaders (most 
infamously, George W. Bush’s unfortunate use of the term ‘crusade’8), only 
serve to strengthen the Jihadists’ reading of events. Exploiting these controver-
sies in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, bin Laden argued, ‘the Bush- 
Blair axis claims that it wants to annihilate terrorism, but it is no longer a secret 
– even to the masses – that it really wants to annihilate Islam.’9
 For the undecided, the manner in which the Global War on Terror has been 
conducted, in particular the damning indictments of the United States and Coali-
tion partners in the light of torture claims, extraordinary rendition flights and the 
lurid excesses witnessed at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, have 
further undermined trust and delegitimised the state- sanctioned interpretation of 
current events.
 Other contemporaneous events, which ostensibly have no bearing on the war 
on terror, but nevertheless contribute to the perception of a faith under siege, 
reinforce the Jihadists’ contention that Islam itself is being targeted. Actions 
ranging from European sartorial restrictions on Muslim women, to the deliber-
ately provocative publication of Danish cartoons of Muhammad deemed offen-
sive to Muslims; or from the withdrawal of financial and other support from the 
democratically elected representatives of the Palestinians in Gaza, to the rise in 
Islamophobia in the US and Western Europe (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; 
Richardson 2004), all work in favour of al- Qaeda’s assertion of a concerted 
assault on the Islamic faith. The Jihadist movement has sought to gain traction 
from many of these incidents, for example in December 2009, al- Qaeda’s media 
wing as- Sahab released a missive entitled ‘Letter to My Muslim Sisters’ from 
Umayma al- Zawahiri (Ayman al- Zawahiri’s wife) in which she stated, ‘The 
campaign against the veil represents the most intense battle between Islam and 
unbelief ’, no doubt seeking to influence the sentiments of many European 
Muslim women. Similarly, the Danish cartoon controversy has also been appro-
priated by Jihadists in the new media ecology hoping to capitalise on feelings 
of anger and resentment felt by Muslims across the world, in particular by the 
former head of the Islamic State of Iraq – Abu Omar al- Baghdadi, who offered 
a substantial reward for the assassination of cartoonist Lars Vilks. In an online 
audio- statement, he calls for the ‘liquidation of the cartoonist Lars who 
offended our prophet . . . We announce a reward of $100,000 to anyone who 
kills this infidel criminal. This reward will be raised to $150,000 if his throat is 
slit’.10
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 But perhaps the greatest strength of the Jihadists metanarrative, is the fact that 
their Manichean worldview of believers and infidels; of a ‘land of war’ and a 
‘land of Islam’,11 is reflected, and indeed corroborated by the equally diametri-
cally opposing dichotomy offered by their ideological opponents, from the infa-
mous Bush dictum ‘you’re either with us or against us’,12 to Huntington’s (1996) 
‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. Indeed, in his 2004 Message to the American 
People, bin Laden alluded to this incongruous synergy, ‘it seems as if we and the 
White House are on the same team’, and that this ‘truly shows that al- Qaida has 
made gains, but on the other hand it also shows that the Bush administration has 
likewise profited.’13
 This reciprocity of legitimation is helpful in understanding why the Jihadists 
might have welcomed President Bush’s election to a second term, or would 
endorse Republican Senator John McCain in the 2008 US Presidential election.14 
For example, one message, posted on the al- Qaeda-linked Jihadist forum al- 
Hesbah wrote: ‘if the mujahideen want to exhaust the US economically and mili-
tary, then victory for the impetuous Republican candidate would be an advantage 
because McCain would continue the failing march of his predecessor Bush.’15 
Indeed the complementary nature of this reciprocal legitimation was aptly illus-
trated when McCain’s endorsement by the Jihadists was followed by the inad-
vertent admission by one of McCain’s own campaign advisors, who suggested 
that a terrorist attack on American soil would in fact be a ‘big advantage’ to the 
Republican candidate’s election campaign.16 Consequently, the success enjoyed 
by the Jihadists in promulgating their ideological narrative has not only rested to 
a large degree, on the coherence and cogency of that very ideology, but concom-
itantly, also on the corroborative reciprocal legitimation of its ideological oppon-
ents in the West.
 Bearing all of this in mind, it is not difficult to see why bin Laden’s emphatic 
challenge to the Ummah to recognise the assault upon their faith, lands, and 
people, and to retaliate in kind, might strike powerful emotional chords with 
Muslim audiences everywhere. Indeed, the hundreds of individuals who have 
heeded bin Laden’s fervent calls thus far, are surely testament to the alluring 
potency of this narrative. Moreover, the carnage wrought by al- Qaeda and its ilk, 
in places as far afield as New York, Bali, London, Madrid, Casablanca and 
Riyadh demonstrates in devastating fashion the irrefutable power of this message 
which compels followers to engage in violent reciprocity. This then has been the 
resounding success of the ideology so far.
 However, although the Jihadists’ may have enjoyed considerable success over 
the years in recruiting and mobilising hundreds of individuals to take up the 
banner of Global Jihad, and despite their spectacular terrorist successes, they 
have proven themselves unable to persuade wider audiences (namely the Muslim 
Ummah at large) to similarly accept and endorse this polarising worldview. 
Instead, the Muslim masses, on whose behalf al- Qaeda pretentiously claim to 
serve as this crucial vanguard, have remained largely immune to the cajoling 
messages of Global Jihad, with large swathes of the Muslim world in fact having 
repudiated the message outright (Pew Research Centre 2005, 2009). As 
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al- Zawahiri (2001) laments ‘we should realize the extent of the gap in under-
standing between the Jihad movement and the common people.’ This then has 
been the patent failure of the Jihadist ideology to date.
Averting failure through the media Jihad/legitimising the 
narrative
The Jihadist themselves have long been cognisant of the potential ramifications a 
lack of popular support would have for their movement’s longevity and indeed 
survival, as al- Zawahiri argues,
the victory of Islam and the establishment of a Caliphate in the manner of 
the Prophet . . . will not be accomplished by the Mujahid movement while it 
is cut off from public support. In the absence of this popular support, the 
Islamic Mujahid movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the 
masses who are distracted or fearful. Therefore, our planning must strive to 
involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the Mujahid move-
ment to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them.17
The desire to legitimise the ideological narrative, and engage with and mobilise 
the Muslim masses then, has been precipitated primarily by the fear of the grave 
existential threat posed by the impending demise of their movement. The Jihad-
ists have attempted to accomplish this by building grassroots legitimacy amongst 
the general populace, by mobilising public support, as well as continuing to con-
solidate their existing constituency, and we shall turn now to explore some of 
these legitimation strategies and mechanisms employed within the new media 
ecology.
The primacy of theological legitimation
As one might expect, historically religion has played a central role in the legiti-
mation of Jihadist worldviews and discourses. Bin Laden’s statements all begin 
with a highly ritualised invocation of God and the Prophet. Martyrdom testa-
ments, Jihadist media productions, communiqués, and treatises are all conspicu-
ously preceded by some form of religious sanctification. This is not to implicate 
religion per se, rather, religious labels are often misappropriated for violent ends; 
a practice that is neither new nor confined to the Islamic tradition. Moreover, reli-
gion has often been employed as a powerful mobilising and legitimising tool in 
ostensibly secular contexts too (Juergensmeyer 2004; Hoffman 2006). For 
example, even avowedly secular groups employing terrorism (such as the IRA, 
EOKA, or the Tamil Tigers to name but a few), have often relied upon a clear 
religious constituency as their support base. It should come as no surprise then 
that for Jihadists, who claim to be ‘striving in the path of God’,18 and for whom 
Islam provides (at least in their own minds) the raison d’être for their acts of viol-
ence, the theological basis for legitimation should take precedence over all else.
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 The new media ecology has served to reinforce the primacy of theological 
legitimation in Jihadist discourses, particularly in the more regulated spaces 
occupied by Jihadism; the Arabic language roster of forums generally thought to 
be dedicated to the promulgation of Jihadism (muntadayat), and to a lesser 
extent ‘official’ blogs (such as the weblog of al- Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State in 
Iraq).19 These semi- official spaces appear to be steeped in religious symbolism, 
imagery and content, displaying an inordinate focus on scriptures and texts, and 
the valorisation of Islamic scholars or historical Muslim personalities. Similarly, 
many of the prominent Jihadist media organs within the Jihadist new mediascape 
also display explicit religious connections. In some cases, the religiosity is 
explicit in the very name itself, as in the case of the Global Islamic Media Front, 
whereas others have more subtle religious connotations, as in the case of al- 
Furqan, which literally means ‘the Criterion’ – a word used to also describe the 
Qur’an;20 or the al- Fajr Media Centre, meaning ‘dawn’ but also being the title of 
the eighty- ninth chapter of the Quran. The content of their video and other media 
productions are similarly infused with religious elements, from Quranic verses 
emblazoned onscreen, to stirring devotional songs, and from the conspicuous use 
of religious labels to describe their enemies (e.g. as ‘heretics’, ‘apostates’, ‘cru-
saders’, or ‘worshippers of the cross’), to depictions of men capable of brutal 
violence appearing serene in prayer and worship.
 A cursory review of the most prominent Jihadist forums, such as al- Ikhlaas, 
al- Firdaws, al- Buraq, or al- Hesba,21 also reveals an explicit association (and 
indeed preoccupation) with religion. The role of religion in Jihadist forums is 
particularly intriguing as the content, and therefore the putative religiosity con-
tained therein, is generated (at least in theory) by a diffuse body of individual 
users. To illustrate this point we might examine the usernames selected by forum 
users which are often based upon companions of the Prophet, such as Umar al- 
Farouq; historical Islamic personalities, such as Salahuddin al- Ayyubi; or 
demonstrably Islamic names, such as Saifullah (lit. sword of Allah). Other iden-
tifying markers of forum users may also reference religion in some way – for 
example, user avatars may display the Prophet’s black flag, or signatures may 
include verses from the Quran or sayings attributed to the Prophet. As forums 
are intrinsically anonymous environments, revealing little about users except that 
which they voluntarily disclose themselves, the conspicuous religious saturation 
of identifying markers is highly revealing. Moreover, the forum vernacular itself 
is imbued with a strongly religious hue; members greet one another, exclaim joy, 
elation, grief or praise using a standardised and strikingly religio- canonic lan-
guage. Whilst the religious character of language is prevalent and indeed com-
monplace throughout the Muslim world, its frequency and usage here can 
sometimes appear to be forced and even ritualised, suggesting that membership 
of these forums engenders conformity through strictly regulated modes of inter-
action. Communication between members also displays religious undertones; 
members are overwhelmingly polite, respectful and even affectionate with one 
another, consciously displaying good adab (manners) and ostentatious piety. The 
language is also highly fraternal, with users referring to one another as ‘my 
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beloved brother/sister’, reinforcing the strong impression of unity and solidarity 
encouraged by the Islamic faith.
 As one would expect, Jihad provides the raison d’être for Jihadist forums; 
without the perceived need for Jihad and the attendant rise of Jihadism, these 
spaces would be rendered unnecessary. Curiously, however, the structures of 
many forums are arranged in such a manner that the ‘Jihad’ ostensibly only con-
stitutes part of the forum’s remit, with other sections of the forum being devoted 
to more patently ‘religious’ concerns. Other sub- forums, for example, may focus 
on aspects of fiqh (jurisprudence), morality, virtue, and religious guidance or the 
provision of fatawa (legal rulings) on a range of issues. This diversification of 
Jihadist spaces to incorporate various other issues pertaining to religion is partly 
pragmatic: these forums help members negotiate daily religious issues, ranging 
from diverse concerns such as the manner in which to conduct divorce proceed-
ings, to the validity of dealing in the stock market. However, the focus on reli-
gious inculcation more generally has another more important ideological purpose 
too. From the perspective of scholars and ideologues, the legitimation of Jihad is 
an important part, but crucially, only a part nonetheless, of the broader ideology 
of salafi- Jihadism.22 Moreover, the intellectuals of the Jihadist movement are 
understandably wary of the creation of a generation of Jihadists who understand 
little more than violence, but more importantly, cannot contextualise that viol-
ence as an unfortunate but ‘necessary’ aspect of the broader struggle, as opposed 
to simply revelling in the violence itself. Al- Zawahiri criticising the youthful 
Jihadist following of al- Zarqawi for their pre- occupation with bloodshed and 
brutality, wrote in 2005,
Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and 
support you will never find palatable, also, are the scenes of slaughtering the 
hostages. You shouldn’t be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous 
young men and their description of you as the Sheikh of the slaughterers.23
In fact, many within the Jihadist movement are acutely aware that this diversifi-
cation may also help to dispel insinuations from disparaging co- religionists that 
Jihadists are only obsessed with Jihad, at the expense of all else. The prominent 
role of religion in these sites, however, may not necessarily be anomalous, but 
rather may illustrate the uniquely Muslim influence of culture and religion even 
in the virtual universe (Bunt 2003). As Hoffheinz (2007) suggests, Arabic lan-
guage websites are unique in that ten out of the top 100 have a decidedly reli-
gious orientation.
Legitimising Jihadism through religion
Whilst the fact that Jihadists utilise religion extensively within Jihadist spaces is 
patently obvious, it is the manner in which Jihadists employ religion within the 
new media ecology to legitimise their discourses, acts and narratives that is of 
interest to us here and worth exploring in greater detail. Curiously, although the 
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Jihadists may appear to be morally compelled to adhere to the Sharia and broader 
religious precepts, in reality this can prove remarkably problematic for them. In 
addition to general prohibitions against the taking of innocent life and fighting 
non- combatants or fellow Muslims (Kelsay 2008), the established rules of 
engagement for war located within the Islamic Canon automatically place most 
Jihadist acts outside of the ethical ambit of the Islamic just war.24 Confronted 
with the overwhelming weight of Quranic injunction, Prophetic tradition 
(Sunnah), historical precedent and scholarly consensus (ijma), Jihadist legitima-
tion strategies must then principally focus upon circumventing these religious 
encumbrances.
 The manner in which Jihadists within the new media ecology deal with this 
quandary is largely dependent upon two factors: (i) their background and com-
petency in issues of religion and theology; and (ii) their interest in religion and/
or their levels of personal piety. These variables allow us to suggest three puta-
tive attitudinal motifs vis- à-vis religion and theological legitimation.
 (a) Self- aggrandising: These include forum administrators and the top tier 
of forum members who often display little distinction from Jihadist ideo-
logues and leadership in terms of the confident and self- aggrandising 
manner in which they approach issues of theological legitimation. These 
individuals are often fairly well versed in religi n or, crucially, can at least 
give the distinct impression that they are (parts of the new media ecology 
are widely hailed as enabling self- empowerment). Nevertheless, the appar-
ent degree of religious learning does not necessarily always correlate with 
levels of respect and authority within the hierarchy. For example, Abu 
Muhammad Asem al- Maqdisi, who is regarded by many as ‘the most influ-
ential living Jihadi theorist . . . and the key contemporary ideologue in the 
Jihadi intellectual universe’,25 has on a number of occasions been disdain-
fully criticised by many young Jihadist forum members more supportive of 
al- Zarqawi’s bloody methods.
 The conspicuous similarity between the views of Jihadist leadership and 
forum administrators/senior members may not be accidental, and in fact 
may be a consequence of the mechanics of Jihadist media processes. For 
example, the transmission of media from within the ‘field’ to the wider new 
media ecology involves processes of editing, incorporation of visual effects, 
subtitles and logos, and other stages of post- production, before the final end 
product is uploaded to the virtual environment. The hierarchical and strictly 
regulated processes of media dissemination on Jihadist forums (Kimmage 
2008; Awan and al- Lami 2009) lead us to speculate that a number of the 
individuals involved in these processes downstream, may be involved in 
other aspects of the media strategy too.
 (b) Deferential: The vast majority of forum users do not appear to have 
sufficient competency in religious subjects, and by extension appear to be 
far less sophisticated ideationally when compared to the previous group. 
Nevertheless, they still consider themselves to be staunch adherents of the 
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Salafi- Jihadist ideology, and fully recognising their ‘theological inadequacy’ 
in a fairly self- effacing way, they either display strongly deferential attitudes 
to more senior members, or pedantically cite Jihadist ideologues on issues 
of legitimation. In cases where they propound viewpoints on issues of reli-
gion or legitimation, they are often careful to attribute these views to ‘higher 
authorities’.
 (c) Ambivalent: The final motif includes individuals who are not particu-
larly knowledgeable in matters of religion, but crucially for whom religion 
is not a particularly strong motivator either. It may seem strange to casual 
observers that Jihadists could be anything other than pious, devoutly reli-
gious individuals whose every action hinges on religious considerations. 
However, one of the enduring contradictions of Jihadism has been the theo-
logical illiteracy of many of its adherents (Awan 2007a; Roy 2004). These 
individuals are far more likely to be attracted to other facets of the ‘Jihad’ 
and/or political considerations. This is not to suggest that they do not also 
employ the ‘religio- canonic’ lingua franca of Jihadist spaces. This category 
is far less well represented in Jihadist forums than the previous two, but that 
does not necessarily imply that they do not make up a significant segment of 
the Jihadist constituency more generally. Rather, they favour occupying 
alternative spaces within the new media ecology that do not necessarily 
expose their perceived weaknesses of faith and religious acumen, or which 
cater to their specific skill- sets. Consequently these individuals will be con-
siderably more comfortable occupying more generic third tier Islamic or 
youth forums, or social networking sites and file- sharing platforms (see 
Chapter 3). If they do inhabit Jihadist forums, they are likely to do so as 
spectators rather than contributing in any substantial manner to the forum’s 
content.
 With this audience stratification in mind, we can return to the Jihadists’ 
dilemma posed by the dissonance between Jihadist actions and Islamic ethical 
and legal considerations, and examine some of the legitimation strategies that 
have attempted to circumvent these religious encumbrances. Those individuals 
that ostensibly command sufficient knowledge of Islamic sources (or once again 
can claim to do so), most commonly engage in processes of eclectic and ad hoc 
self- legitimation, employing a highly selective reading of the Quran and pro-
phetic traditions. For example, the Global Jihadists’ employment of the Quran to 
bolster their claims is extremely narrow in its focus and revolves around a subset 
of less than 75 verses from the Quran’s total 6,236 verses. In fact, many of these 
verses are used partially, and without reference to preceding or following verses 
which may alter the meaning, or attenuate the injunction to engage in violence 
considerably.26 Moreover, these selective religious excerpts are deployed both 
ahistorically and sans context, or without reference to traditional exegetical con-
cepts, such as naskh (abrogation), asbāb al- nuzūl (the contexts of revelation), or 
chronological cognisance (particularly vis- à-vis the Meccan and Madinan 
verses). Unfettered by respect for traditional authority and established learning, 
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or methodological considerations, neo- Jihadists are then free to dispute main-
stream interpretations, or indeed formulate novel interpretations that violate clear 
tenets of Islam, for example, in the unlawful targeting of civilians.27
 For both these individuals and those with lower levels of religious profi-
ciency, this highly skewed reading of the Islamic Canon is reinforced, and 
indeed exacerbated, by the recourse to quasi- religious ‘authorities’ who serve to 
corroborate these aberrant worldviews. Remarkably, these ‘religious’ authorities 
are themselves rarely trained in the classical religious sciences and therefore 
unqualified to pronounce religious edicts or engage in serious exegesis of the 
Quran and other religious texts. A small number of these conferrers of theologi-
cal legitimacy are themselves occupants of the new media ecology, with some 
indeed acting solely within these spaces. A number of these individuals have 
even managed to garner considerable prestige in recognition of their presumed 
religious acumen, being granted honorific titles such as sheikh, and include well- 
known Jihadist forum personalities like Sheikh Abu Abd ar- Rahman al- Yafi and 
Sheikh Abu Ahmed Abd ar- Rahman al- Masri. The appropriation of religious 
authority by those perhaps undeserving of it, is made considerably easier by the 
inherently anonymising nature of the Internet, in which individuals can readily 
create or assume convincing identities, as many in the security services have dis-
covered to their benefit.28 The widespread availability of searchable databases of 
the Quran, Hadith collections, tafsir (commentary), and the wider democratisa-
tion of Islamic knowledge facilitated by the Internet more generally (Bunt 2003), 
allow novices, the laity and the uninitiated to engage in religious debates with a 
level of sophistication and competency that belies their more modest back-
grounds. A question or comment posed on a forum allows virtually anyone to 
formulate a considered and erudite response that benefits from extensive open 
source research online, giving rise to the phenomena of the instant Web expert.
 Nevertheless, despite the presumed egalitarian and democratising nature of 
new media (Castells 2009; Bunt 2003), conducive to the ‘levelling’ of hierar-
chies of knowledge and power, the principle source of theological legitimation 
and authority remain with the ‘traditional’ Jihadist ideologues and leadership. 29 
However, somewhat surprisingly, these individuals often mirror the startling 
lack of religious credentials found amongst Jihadist demagogues within the new 
media ecology more generally. In fact, the absence of religious legitimacy has 
long been recognised amongst Jihadist leadership, and in whom it continues to 
be glaringly conspicuous by its absence. Indeed, the vast majority of Jihadist 
ideologues have undergone modern secular educations, for example, bin Laden 
studied civil engineering; both al- Zawahiri and Sayyid Imam al- Sharif (one of 
the founding members of al- Qaeda) studied medicine; Abu Mus’ab al- Suri (the 
most important strategist of modern Jihadism) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
(the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks) both studied mechanical engineering; 
Mohammed Atef (the former military chief of al- Qaeda) was an agricultural 
engineer and later a policeman; Abd al- Salam Faraj (who wrote the highly influ-
ential Jihadist primer, The Neglected Duty) was an electrician; Abu Musab al- 
Zarqawi (the former head of al- Qaeda in Iraq) did not even manage to complete 
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his high school education. Indeed, even Sayyid Qutb, often regarded as the ideo-
logical godfather of Jihadism, was a journalist and literary critic.
 This fact is not lost on the Jihadists themselves, and thus efforts to adorn 
themselves in the regalia of religion, most recognisably in their impeccable 
white robes, pious beards and saintly turbans seen in Jihadist media productions, 
alongside the employment of a superfluously religio- canonic rhetoric, can serve 
to cloak what are often highly political or worldly aims, as part of the compensa-
tory mechanism for this theological illiteracy. Moreover, the lack of religious 
credentials do not necessarily divest Jihadist leadership of this religious mantle, 
as these quasi- scholars may be considered eminently more trustworthy, more 
genuine, and more rightly guided than bona fide ‘mainstream’ scholars, who are 
perceived instead to have been tainted by complicity with and subservience to 
secular or despotic regimes. Indeed, the pariah status of individuals like bin 
Laden grants them autonomy from the political machinations, internecine con-
flicts and ‘worldly’ affairs within which mainstream scholars are seen to be 
embroiled, yielding a potent legitimacy not based on scholarly erudition (Awan 
2007a). Consequently, and despite the token reverence afforded to religious vali-
dation in the Jihadist new mediascape, the theological illiteracy of Jihadist 
leaders can be readily compensated for by a presumed level of probity, personal 
piety and unflinching commitment to the cause.
 In some respects, the broader strategies of theol gical legitimation have 
changed little in the new media ecology. Legitimation remains inordinately 
focused on elevating the Lesser Jihad30 to an individual duty,31 and indeed an 
obligatory sixth pillar of Islam (Bonner 2006). These attempts at extolling the 
virtues of Jihad and convincing fellow Muslims of its centrality to their lives are 
not new, but rather follow the tone and precedent set by earlier militant works 
written in the 1970s and 1980s. The most important amongst these included the 
widely acclaimed Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Faith 
(1979) and Join the Caravan (1987) penned by the Palestinian scholar and chief 
proponent of the Afghan Jihad against the USSR, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam; and 
the seminal Jihadist diatribe against the established Sunni position on Jihad, The 
Neglected Duty (1981), written by Abd as- Salam Faraj, an electrician and leader 
of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group responsible for the assassination of Presid-
ent Anwar Sadat in 1981.32
 If the Jihadists can successfully persuade audiences in the new media ecology 
that they are somehow lax in their religious observances as Muslims, or worse, 
are committing grave sins, they may be capable of engendering a mindset 
amenable to the broader Jihadist worldview. Mohammed Siddique Khan, the 
ringleader of the 7/7 London bombers, provides a typically bullying harangue in 
his posthumously released ‘martyrdom testament’ video from 2005, produced by 
al- Qaeda’s premier media production wing as- Sahab, stating, ‘Jihad is an 
obligation on every single one of us, men and women, and by staying at home 
you are turning your backs on Jihad which is a major sin.’33 However, despite 
the banal exhortation to Jihad, there is no real attempt to convince others that 
Jihad is indeed an obligation; instead this is presumed to be self- evident. Indeed 
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the seemingly axiomatic obligatory nature of Jihad has been the single most 
recurring theme amongst Jihadists in the new media ecology. In fact, bin Laden 
predicated his infamous 1998 ‘fatwa’ on the notion that defensive Jihad as an 
individual duty was incontestable, invoking authentic historical religious author-
ities to pre- emptively silence any dissenting voices,
Religious scholars throughout Islamic history have agreed that Jihad is an 
individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries. This was related 
by the Imam ibn Qudama in The Resource, by Imam al- Kisa’i in The 
Marvels, by al- Qurtubi in his exegesis, and by the Sheikh of Islam [ibn 
Taymiyyah] when he states in his chronicles that ‘As for fighting to repel an 
enemy, which is the strongest way to defend freedom and religion, it is 
agreed that this is a duty. After faith, there is no greater duty than fighting 
an enemy who is corrupting religion and the world.’34
However, for the Jihadists, it is not simply a case of legitimising the concept of 
militaristic Jihad, or the obligatory nature of defensive Jihad, which is ostensibly 
a straightforward task and fairly uncontentious; but also legitimising that which 
actually constitutes the ambit of Jihad. Whilst the former has remained fairly 
static over time, it is the latter that has been constantly reinterpreted and rein-
vented by successive generations of Jihadists, in rder to legitimate varying 
degrees of political violence. For Abdullah Azzam, the seminal philosopher- 
theologian of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union, Jihad was only permis-
sible in defence of land which had at some point in its history fallen under 
Muslim sovereignty. Moreover, the Jihad itself would be ordinarily conducted as 
conventional or guerrilla- type warfare in recognised theatres of conflict, against 
military or state targets. Despite Azzam’s own considerable scholarly creden-
tials, he nevertheless sought out (and received) religious sanction for his fatwa 
legitimising Jihad against the Russians from prominent Saudi ulama (religious 
scholars) before its publication.
 In stark contrast, the Jihad espoused by bin Laden, which in many cases 
has been reduced to indiscriminate terrorism against civilian targets, bears very 
little resemblance to the violence sanctioned by Sheikh Azzam. For example, 
bin Laden’s notorious 1998 ‘fatwa’ egregiously reads, ‘We pronounce to all 
Muslims the following judgment: To kill the American and their allies – civilians 
and military – is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim in all 
countries.’35
 Moreover, whilst bin Laden similarly sought validation in the mid 1990s from 
the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul- Aziz bin Baz, his appeal was 
instead met with derision, with bin Laden being denounced in highly derogatory 
terms as a Kharijite.36
 It is important to understand how far the ideology of Global Jihadism has 
diverged from Azzam’s pronouncements on Jihad, particularly as Azzam’s 
seminal importance to the Jihadist movement cannot be overstated. As an early 
teacher and mentor to Osama bin Laden, he first convinced the young Saudi 
873 02-Radicalisation-02.indd   36 18/11/10   12:30:01
T &
 F 
Pro
of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Legitimising Jihadist ideology  37
millionaire along with hundreds of other Arab volunteers to lend their services to 
the Afghan Jihad. Moreover, Azzam established the Maktab al- Khidmat, a guest 
house for the foreign mujahideen, and according to some authorities even coined 
the theoretical conception of al- Qaeda al- Sulba, or the ‘firm base’ for the muja-
hideen vanguard, from which the global Jihad could then be waged (Bergen 
2006; Lawrence 2006). Indeed, Azzam’s crucial status amongst the Jihadists is 
perhaps best illustrated by bin Laden’s hagiographic eulogy, ‘Sheikh Abdullah 
Azzam was not an individual, but an entire nation unto himself. Muslim women 
have proven themselves incapable of giving birth to a man like him after he was 
killed.’37
 Nevertheless, despite these reverent tributes, and despite having laid the ideo-
logical foundations for Global Jihadism, the conception of Jihad espoused by 
Abdullah Azzam often appears diametrically opposed to the actions masquerad-
ing as Jihad under the guise of Global Jihadism today.
Framing strategies for dealing with the dissonance in the new 
media ecology
Recognising this dissonance is central to understanding the manner in which the 
‘neo Jihad’ has been legitimised in the new media ecology. Whilst bin Laden 
and other assorted neo- Jihadists may unctuously assert that in the event of attack 
or occupation, defensive Jihad is a religious obligation on every Muslim, this is 
a premise that is unlikely to be ‘religiously’ contested, and therefore requires 
little theological validation. Rather it is the discordance between the classical 
views and the neo- global views of the nature and form that the Jihad assumes 
that is most likely to be impugned and thus poses the greatest legitimation chal-
lenge for Jihadism today. Morally repugnant actions such as the wanton killing 
of fellow Muslims,38 the targeting of non- combatants more generally, the insti-
gation of bloody sectarian strife (as in the case of Iraq), the use of suicide bomb-
ings, reprehensible strategies of recruitment,39 and internecine feuds amongst the 
Jihadists themselves, cannot easily be subsumed under the sanctifying rubric of 
a legitimate ‘holy struggle’. Indeed, these actions are the most likely to be con-
tested by opponents and thus Jihadists must mitigate the dissonance engendered 
by these contradictions if they are to legitimise their movement for their existing 
constituency, as well as successfully radicalise others within the new 
mediascape.
 These endeavours are essentially enabled by strategies of framing/frame- 
setting; the practice of disseminating and presenting information in certain ways, 
through preferential selection, emphasis and exclusion, that furnish an internally 
coherent interpretation and evaluation of events, texts, acts or discourses, and 
therefore aid in the manipulation of audience opinion. According to Entman 
(1993: 52), to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in such a way as to promote a particular moral evaluation. 
These practices have long been recognised as part of the news media paradigm, 
being particularly associated with the shaping of public opinion (Entman 2004; 
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Chyi and McCombs 2004). Through framing, Jihadists provide audiences with a 
schema for interpreting events, through selection and salience, and these prac-
tices can have an inordinate influence on the way in which audiences come to 
understand those events.40
 The least sophisticated strategy is to simply divert attention from major fail-
ings by reference to successes. The practice, often known as ‘priming’ is well 
understood within political circles, and refers to attempts by politicians to be 
associated with issues on which they have the strongest reputation (Iyengar and 
Kinder 1987). Politicians and their ‘media proxies’, can thus ‘prime’ opinions 
and evaluations of political leaders and policy through the preferential selection 
of news stories, to the detriment of others.
 Through this process of priming then, Jihadists can gloss over contradictions 
and inconsistencies by focusing efforts instead on highlighting only those acts 
and discourses that are deemed to be free of controversy, and consequently 
display without equivocation, the integrity, strength and success of the Jihadists. 
For example, a video of Juba the sniper41 posted online by the Islamic State of 
Iraq in 2005, which cleverly mimics the reticle of a sniper’s telescopic sight, 
shows the highly adept killing of a heavily armed US marine whilst he stands 
beside an Iraqi traffic policeman, who is left intentionally unharmed. The 
message imparted to audiences is clear: the Jihadists are professional soldiers 
who only engage legitimate enemy combatants in legitimate theatres of conflict, 
and in a highly discriminatory and even humane manner. Juba in fact is 
renowned for his highly discerning ‘one- shot’ kills in which the victim dies rela-
tively quickly – a particularly pertinent point when juxtaposed against the excru-
ciatingly slow and painful deaths of the unfortunate victims of ‘video 
beheadings’, as popularised by the likes of al- Zarqawi. Even the Jihadists’ harsh-
est critics would grudgingly concede that this is not an unfair depiction of events 
in this particular instance. Generally, most Jihadists acts and operations carried 
out against occupying military forces, and employing conventional modes of 
warfare can potentially be framed and portrayed in this manner. These actions 
represent the pinnacle of Jihadist operations (particularly if the combatants are 
killed during the course of battle and can be hailed as ‘martyrs’), and in which 
the valour, upright conduct and self- sacrifice of the Jihadists becomes patently 
manifest and incontrovertible, even by their enemies’ standards. Unsurprisingly, 
the propagandistic value inherent in productions of this nature is immense, and 
whilst this may constitute the least sophisticated strategy, it is nevertheless the 
most difficult to counter as the actions are largely beyond censure.
 However, not all Jihadist acts appear to be so idealistic or free from reproach, 
and thus propagandists must find alternative modes of legitimation for actions 
that may invite criticism or contestation, and in particular, those that might fall 
under the rubric of terrorism. In such cases, Jihadists may for example, in order 
to obscure facts and thus manipulate public opinion, conveniently omit events 
and facts that might depict their actions in a pejorative light, focusing instead on 
what they perceive to be the more laudatory, or commendable aspects. We might 
illustrate this practice by examining a recent as- Sahab video production 
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documenting a suicide bombing by the Islamic State of Iraq. The video, like 
many others of the genre, begins with a biographical focus on the persona of the 
‘living martyr’ (al- shaheed al- hayy), highlighting his piety, steadfastness, calm 
demeanour and composure prior to the operation. The camera follows his final 
preparations, recording a brief but stirring valedictory message before he bids 
farewell to his colleagues. The camera then switches to an eerily quiet scene 
only to be abruptly punctuated by the tremendous explosion itself, which is then 
replayed from multiple viewing angles and accompanied by stirring devotional 
songs. The video ends without revealing the true consequences of the bombing, 
save for an exultant message informing the audience that their ‘brother achieved 
martyrdom’ in a ‘heroic operation against the apostate regime’. The video and 
attendant commentary, however, do not reveal the rather inconvenient fact that 
the bombing claimed the lives of scores of civilian bystanders alongside the 
intended victims, new Iraqi police recruits. Nor does the video show the after-
math of the attack or the grotesque carnage wrought in which the faintly discern-
ible body parts of innocent bystanders litter the streets amongst the burning 
wreckage of the destroyed vehicle. Thus the as- Sahab video employs a highly 
distorting prism to depict the event in a manner that omits important factual ele-
ments that would no doubt present profound challenges to the legitimation of 
such actions.
 The Jihadists’ attempts to propound their narrative, ideology, acts and dis-
courses through framing, priming and various other means, have also been aided 
by the cloistered, yet highly immersive environment of the Jihadist new media-
scape itself. The hierarchical and strictly regulated spaces of ‘official’ Jihadist 
forums and blogs (Awan and al- Lami 2009), which effectively ‘cocoon’ audi-
ences (particularly new or potential recruits) from alternate realities and interpre-
tational frameworks, give rise to an insular virtual community that venerates the 
ideology of Jihadism at the expense of all else. Moreover, these environments 
stifle almost any form of debate, discussion, or dialogue instead acting as ‘echo 
chambers’ or rhetorical amplifiers,42 which predispose audiences towards unre-
servedly accepting the Jihadists’ rendition of events, and thereby inculcating 
blind obedience to the Jihadist cause.43
Countering criticism of Jihadist acts and discourses in the 
new media ecology
Whilst there is little doubt that these efforts in preferentially framing Jihadist 
discourses have met with tremendous success, ironically it is the new media 
ecology itself that has the potential to cause the unravelling of these manufac-
tured and contrived narratives and discourses. The general proliferation of 
sources of news, information and commentary in the new media ecology, 
coupled with increasingly media- savvy audiences, who are far less likely to 
accept the veracity of any one narrative and more likely to evince dissatisfaction 
with conventional modes of mediation, has undoubtedly challenged what 
Sonwalkar (2004) refers to as ‘media imperialism’ (Awan 2007b). Indeed the 
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ubiquity of these dynamics in the new media ecology has inevitably meant that 
Jihadist media organs, who despite their attempts at retaining control of the nar-
rative through traditional paradigms of media production and dissemination, 
have not proven immune to these developments either.
 Consequently, the very openness of the new media ecology has exposed the 
vulnerabilities of Jihadist discourses in a number of ways. The increasing acces-
sibility to a veritable overload of information from a multitude of sources, 
particularly online, means that the Jihadists cannot easily falsify or omit those 
facts and details which might be considered to pose threats to the legitimacy of 
their discourses. Indeed, despite the Jihadists’ best attempts at sequestering their 
audiences, unsavoury elements that are deemed problematic may still reach audi-
ences, thus making it far more difficult to frame narratives through omission and 
preferential selection. Moreover, criticisms and condemnation of Jihadist actions, 
ideology and discourses are also far more difficult to conceal in the transparency 
offered by the new media ecology. As a result, Jihadist leadership and ideo-
logues have instead been compelled to employ means other than framing in 
order to counter this deluge of damaging material and criticism. The Jihadists’ 
principle recourse has been to cast aspersion on the sources of these critiques 
and question the veracity of such reports, labelling them as enemy propaganda 
designed to tarnish the Jihadist movement’s image.
 Nevertheless, despite this rhetoric, the critiques have proven difficult to sum-
marily dismiss as enemy propaganda, particularly as they stem from sources far 
closer to home; from opposition co- religionists (particularly Islamists and non- 
violent Salafists), from broader Muslim publics, from religious scholars and 
authorities and, most notably, from credible Jihadists voices who have found 
themselves increasingly alienated by Jihadism’s dystopic trajectory. Joining the 
cacophony of protest directed against al- Qaeda, prominent ex- Jihadists such as 
Sayyid Imam al- Sharif (a.k.a. Dr Fadl), Noman Benotman and other members of 
the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),44 have focused on the evident discord 
and incongruity between the Jihadists’ stated lofty goals and manifest actions, 
accusing the movement of egregious excess and violating Islamic legal and 
ethical principles. The authenticity of these and other voices from within the 
Islamic tradition, and by extension the irrefutable validity of their objections, 
have become increasingly difficult for the Jihadist movement to simply evade or 
reject outright. In response, the Jihadist leadership have, in some instances, been 
forced to adopt what is perhaps their most honest and forthright approach thus 
far, by responding directly and candidly to the points of contention raised. As a 
prime case in point, in December 2008, acknowledging the intense criticism 
directed at the movement from within the Muslim world, Ayman al- Zawahiri 
solicited questions from Jihadist forum participants in an online question and 
answer session hailed as the first Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al- Zawahiri. 
This highly significant and unprecedented move by the leadership towards trans-
parency and dialogue, although widely welcomed by Jihadist supporters, was 
seen by many critics to be a desperate attempt to win back their dwindling 
support base. Al- Zawahiri, citing time constraints, elected to answer only a 
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selection of the questions, perhaps eschewing the more difficult queries that 
questioned the strategic effectiveness of al- Qaeda or indeed its very existence. 
Nevertheless, the exercise represented something of a paradigm shift for Jihad-
ists, in that it was an early attempt to acknowledge widespread criticism of the 
movement in a largely uncensored manner, and somehow render themselves 
accountable to their putative constituency.
 Many of the questions focused upon the deliberate targeting of civilians and 
the preponderance of Muslim casualties amongst al- Qaeda’s death toll. One of 
the more scathing critics asks:
Excuse me, Mr. Zawahiri, but who is it who is killing with Your Excellency’s 
blessing the innocents in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria? Do you consider 
the killing of women and children to be Jihad? I challenge you and your 
organization to do that in Tel Aviv. Why have you – to this day – not carried 
out any strike in Israel? Or is it easier to kill Muslims in the markets? Maybe 
it is necessary [for you] to take some geography lessons, because your maps 
only show the Muslims’ states.
Another questioner reiterates the widespread aversion to al- Qaeda’s convoluted 
conception of that which falls under the ambit of ‘legitimate Jihad’:
With your [al- Qaeda’s] reputation of killing innocent people, how do you 
expect Muslims to trust you and consider your activities legitimate jihad, let 
alone people of other faiths?
Al- Zawahiri, conscious of the tenor of criticism of al- Qaeda and associated 
movements, chooses not to ignore the unanimous condemnation of their position 
on Muslim casualties, instead responding directly on this issue:
I would like to clarify to the brother questioner that we don’t kill innocents: 
in fact, we fight those who kill innocents. Those who kill innocents are the 
Americans, the Jews, the Russians and the French and their agents. Were we 
insane killers of innocents as the questioner claims, it would be possible for 
us to kill thousands of them in the crowded markets, but we are confronting 
the enemies of the Muslim Ummah and targeting them, and it may be the 
case that during this, an innocent might fall unintentionally or unavoidably, 
and the Mujahideen have warned repeatedly the Muslims in general that 
they are in a war with the senior criminals – the Americans and Jews and 
their allies and agents – and that they must keep away from the places where 
these enemies gather. The Crusader- Jewish propaganda claims that the 
Mujahideen kill the innocent, but the Muslim Ummah knows who its enemy 
is and who defends it.
Elsewhere in the Open Meeting, he states: ‘There is no way they [Jihadists] 
would intentionally kill an innocent Muslim. However, if that does happen, then 
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it is certainly unintentional or merely a lie fabricated by state- crusader media 
whose lies you have many times experienced.’
 In responding to his interlocutors, al- Zawahiri employs sophistry to reject 
these critiques. In fact, he first denies the claim outright (‘we don’t kill inno-
cents’), but later qualifies this statement by countenancing the possibility that 
civilians may have inadvertently been harmed by the Jihadists’ actions. He offers 
a number of explanations for this patent violation of the sanctity of Muslim life, 
as enshrined within the Sharia. He resorts to the earlier tactic of disparaging 
reports of civilian deaths as empty enemy propaganda concocted to denigrate the 
movement, once again displaying contempt for his audiences’ intelligence. He 
also rather curiously locates the blame for these deaths squarely with the casual-
ties themselves on account of their proximity to the enemy during Jihadist opera-
tions. Implicit in this statement is the notion that the ‘true believers’ will refrain 
from any interaction or engagement with the enemy. Al- Zawahiri reinforces this 
intimation by redefining the enemy as ‘the Americans and Jews and their allies 
and agents’. Consequently, Muslims killed by Jihadist operations can be posthu-
mously recast as traitors, agents, heretics or apostates, depending on their identi-
ties. This is particularly the case for Shiites and others who are accused of 
complicity with the occupying forces, and thus considered to be legitimate 
targets. This practice is certainly not new; elements within Jihadist circles have 
long employed the reprehensible practice of takfir (literally the pronouncing of 
disbelief ),45 as a mechanism for delegitimising their opponents and sanctioning 
the shedding of Muslim blood. Finally after exhausting these other possibilities 
and much prevarication, al- Zawahiri concedes that there may have been innocent 
civilians killed, acknowledging the possibility that errors may have been com-
mitted by the Jihadists:
we haven’t killed the innocents, not in Baghdad, nor in Morocco, nor in 
Algeria, nor anywhere else. And if there is any innocent who was killed in 
the Mujahideen’s operations, then it was either an unintentional error, or out 
of necessity as in cases of al- tatarrus.
 . . . It is not hidden from you that the enemy intentionally takes up posi-
tions in the midst of the Muslims, for them to be human shields for him.
However, he astutely tempers this admission by claiming that the Jihadists may 
also have acted out of necessity by appealing to an obscure medieval Sharia 
ruling pertaining to the employment of ‘human shields’ by the enemy, known as 
al- tatarrus. In the past, enemy forces facing Muslim armies had occasionally 
placed Muslims before their vanguard in the knowledge that Islamic law forbade 
the killing of fellow Muslims, essentially rendering the Muslim army impotent. 
In the face of impending military paralysis, scholars applied the ruling of opting 
for the lesser of the two evils, and legitimised the engagement of forces, irre-
spective of the presumed sanctity of the lives of fellow Muslims. Al- Zawahiri’s 
employment of this ruling applies the same principle but in a convoluted and 
excessive manner that provides both theological justification and a precedent for 
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legitimising violence against Muslim populations in this way. Other Jihadist 
texts, such as Abu Yahya al- Libbi’s al- Tatarrus in the Modern Jihad, have sim-
ilarly sought to capitalise on obsolete and archaic legal positions to justify their 
actions.
 Whilst many of these legitimising tactics may be met with derision and ulti-
mately fail to sway wider publics, they have nevertheless proved immensely 
reassuring to core Jihadist audiences, for whom they continue to validate the 
actions and discourses of al- Qaeda and Global Jihadism more broadly. Part of 
the reason why these mechanisms have proven so successful, has much to do 
with Festinger’s (1957) classical theory of cognitive dissonance which suggests 
that individuals seek out information confirming beliefs or behaviours while 
actively avoiding contrary information, in order to mitigate uncomfortable psy-
chological tension. Jihadists ensconced within the reaffirming hyperreality (see 
Chapter 3) of the new Jihadist mediascape are therefore deliberately and con-
sciously immersed in content that is congruent with existing opinions and 
beliefs, whilst simultaneously eschewing that which is not. Moreover, the 
acceptance of rhetoric, sophistry, frame- setting and shrewd strategies which may 
appear naïve to outside observers may nevertheless allow much of the moral dis-
sonance to be largely negated in core audiences.
Deeds over words and infallibility
Much of the preceding discussion is predicated upon the notion that theological 
legitimation is paramount, and that moral dissonance can be engendered by 
failing to uphold religious imperatives. However, it would be erroneous to 
assume that theological legitimation holds equal validity for all drawn to Jihad-
ism. As our audience stratification earlier has shown, many Jihadists immersed 
within the new media ecology may display an ambivalent attitudinal motif vis- à-
vis religion, and therefore may appear unperturbed by the discord between reli-
gious principles and Jihadist actions. Indeed, religious appeals to moderate their 
actions, and particularly their violence, are unlikely to be heeded by the newer 
generation of Jihadists. We might demonstrate this point by comparing this atti-
tudinal motif to that of al- Zawahiri, who represents the earlier generation of 
Jihadists. During his Open Meeting, al- Zawahiri is asked, ‘Does the doctor con-
sider himself a Muslim scholar of Sharia? If so, upon what basis does he issue 
his fatwas that oppose those of notable Muslim scholars?’
 Al- Zawahiri’s responds by modestly stating, ‘I do not consider myself to be 
one of the great Muslim scholars but I highly admire and respect them and try as 
much as possible to disseminate what I know of their words of wisdom’.
 Whereas al- Zawahiri’s rejoinders to his critics at least pay lip service to the 
idea of religious legitimacy and respect for authority and learning, many of the 
newer generation of Jihadists have no such qualms. Indeed the legitimacy of 
Global Jihadism, particularly in the new media ecology has been predicated in 
large part upon the ascendancy of deeds over words, and most Jihadists have 
attempted to usurp traditional authority from clerics and religious leaders 
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through their acts in this way. Mohammed Siddique Khan’s ‘martyrdom’ video 
released by as- Sahab spoke disparagingly of Muslim scholars in Britain and 
implied that ‘real men’ like himself, whose deeds and sacrifices were self- 
evident, were most worthy of the Prophet’s legacy:
Our so- called scholars today are content with their Toyotas and their semi- 
detached houses . . . If they fear the British Government more than they fear 
Allah then they must desist in giving talks, lectures and passing fatwas and 
they need to stay at home – they’re useless – and leave the job to the real 
men, the true inheritors of the prophet.46
The meteoric rise of Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, the late leader of al- Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), epitomised this trend. Despite being theologically illiterate and hailing 
from a criminal background, al- Zarqawi gained immense popularity and prestige 
as a result of his notorious video beheadings and the instigation of bloody sectar-
ian strife in Iraq. Indeed, his violent excesses were so flagrant that even the al- 
Qaeda leadership found them disconcerting, with al- Zawahiri sharply rebuking,
Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and 
support you will never find palatable, also, are the scenes of slaughtering the 
hostages. You shouldn’t be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous 
young men and their description of you as the Sheikh of the slaughterers.47
Nevertheless, these grisly deeds continued to propel (now) Sheikh al- Zarqawi to 
international prominence, evident in the bestowal of two particularly dubious 
honours; the title of ‘Emir of al- Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers’, and the US 
bounty of $25 million for his death or capture, matching that on bin Laden 
himself at the time.
 Placed in stark contrast to the perceived apathy, weakness or inaction of 
Muslim rulers, clergy and even other Islamists, the Jihadists’ engagement in a 
tangible response to the external threat is uniquely placed in the Muslim world. 
No matter how odious or counterproductive this response may be (and certainly 
it has often been both), the Jihadists will never be accused by their opponents of 
procrastination or indolence. As a result, their manifest deeds enable them to 
undermine the credibility of other dissenting voices who use words alone, and 
consequently arrogate to themselves the authority of Islamic officialdom.
 Increasingly this brazen self- aggrandisement has given rise to claims of right-
eous infallibility, which insist that Jihadist ‘field experience’ endows them with 
the quality of being free from error in judgement and action, and outside of the 
scope of scholarly criticism (Alshech 2008). Consequently, they do not need to 
exonerate themselves from accusations and critiques,48 but rather insist that 
anyone who seeks to criticise their methods or goals must first serve alongside 
them on the frontlines, before they are accorded that privilege. This has proven 
to be a particularly expedient rejoinder to the spate of recent criticisms from 
renowned ex- Jihadists such as Sayyid Imam al- Sharif and Noman Benotman.
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Conclusion
Whilst engaging in discussions of Jihadist legitimacy, we must acknowledge the 
uneasy truth that a great number of their actions are beyond censure in the wider 
Muslim world, and to some extent, even beyond. Against the backdrop of mili-
tary invasion and occupation of two Muslim majority countries, attacks (conven-
tional or otherwise) against military targets within these theatres of the ‘classical 
defensive Jihad’, such as IED attacks against Coalition convoys or highly dis-
criminate killings of US soldiers by Juba the sniper, will invariably be con-
sidered legitimate. Indeed such tactics cannot even be placed under the rubric of 
terrorism, and the US military itself has been wary of distinguishing between 
insurgents and terrorists in this respect. Al- Qaeda do not exist in vacuum; they 
are principally a reactionary movement that has only been able to exert any influ-
ence due to the actions and failings of others. One might posit that the move-
ment’s legitimacy is in many ways inversely proportional to that of its enemies 
(in this instance, the legitimacy of the US in the Muslim world).
 Ironically, it is the Jihadists’ own penchant for bloodshed and violent excess, 
allied with a frighteningly dystopic and intolerant vision of a post- Jihadist future 
that has severely undermined this tacit legitimacy and popular support. This has 
been a particular challenge for the Jihadist movement whose successive attempts 
to successfully propound their narrative have been hampered enormously by 
their engagement in acts of violence and terrorism that ostensibly violate reli-
gious and cultural mores. Even many of the Jihadists themselves have not neces-
sarily accepted the legitimacy of Jihadist acts and discourses in toto as they may 
be deemed illegitimate by even their own referential frameworks. Many poten-
tial radicals, with romanticised and earnest but largely inchoate notions of 
defending the Ummah and championing the cause of the oppressed, can have 
their (often laudable) empathies diverted (due to a lack of accessibility to the 
principal cause) or manipulated to deadly effect. They may initially have been 
drawn to legitimate forms of Jihad and they may not have had any desire to 
participate in more ‘controversial’ operations, but by that point they have long 
crossed the Rubicon. Mohammad Atta reputedly wanted to travel to Chechnya to 
defend its Muslims against the brutal repression of the Russians, prior to his 
involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Awan 2007a).
 Nevertheless, the Jihadist leadership have attempted to confer legitimacy 
upon their acts and discourses in numerous innovative ways, and have often suc-
ceeded in doing so. Whilst this dynamic has been particularly apparent in the 
new media ecology represented to a large degree by the Internet, many of these 
strategies in fact function irrespective of the offline/online divide – indeed it 
make little sense to speak of this ephemeral divide. Moreover, the online world 
itself is problematic if postulated as a monolithic entity. The new media ecology 
and online world is in fact composed of a multiplicity of spheres, where, as 
Manovich (2001: 42) contends, ‘every citizen can construct her own custom life-
style and select her ideology from a large number of choices’. Consequently, it 
makes little sense to consider the role legitimation plays in the Jihadist new 
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media ecology per se, rather, we must examine the credibility of Jihadism within 
a multiplicity of spaces within the new media ecology.
 Discussions of legitimacy must also take into account the changing character 
and demographic of the Jihadist movement itself. The newer generation of Jihad-
ists, who are increasingly drawn to the movement in a largely autonomous 
manner, appear ideologically less sophisticated and display a greater ambiva-
lence towards the religious sphere, whilst simultaneously exhibiting a greater 
inclination to extreme forms of violence than their predecessors.
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3 Media Jihad1
Introduction
The previous chapter explored the role of the new media ecology in helping to 
support and legitimise the ailing ideology of Jihadism in the twenty- first century.
 The importance ascribed to the media has allowed the articulation and ascend-
ancy of a very particular form of radical Islamist activism – namely the media 
Jihad. This chapter sets out how the new media ecology has facilitated the rise of 
the ‘virtual Jihad’ or the ‘media Jihad’, which has increasingly gained promi-
nence and credibility as a legitimate alternative to the traditional militaristic or 
‘real’ Jihad. Media Jihad allows for the production, dissemination, (re)mediation 
and proliferation of material that serves to reinforce Jihadist leaders’ interpreta-
tion of ongoing events and the situating of those events within larger narratives 
of a war on Islam, which may resonate with potential supporters’ experience in 
daily life in whichever country they reside. However, the emergence of Web 2.0 
participatory media has diminished traditional Jihadist leaders’ control over ‘the 
message’, as a diffuse collective of autonomous supporters – including women – 
have brought Jihadist media culture to broader audiences but at the same time 
significantly altered the ideology. This process has run parallel to the struggle 
between mainstream, professional news media, and blogs, social network sites 
and citizen journalism or what Gillmor (2006) called We the Media.
 This shift in authority and control has coincided with changes to how Jihadist 
action is legitimated. This chapter documents how credibility in Jihadist media 
spaces has in some cases shifted from legitimation through scholarly or religious 
expertise to ‘propaganda of the deed’; several figures have gained popularity and 
support within this culture by leaving the virtual realm to participate in violent 
activities ‘in the field’. Nevertheless, for many supporters this is not an attractive 
or feasible option, and the cathartic opportunity to engage in modes of ‘info- war’ 
or propaganda battle is deemed sufficient (though this carries its own risks still, 
such as arrest).
 What this history of the recent present demonstrates is that the new media 
ecology brings risks and contingencies to Jihadists too; Web 2.0 and the oppor-
tunity to engage and persuade broader audiences carries with it the danger of the 
Jihadist ideology or narrative being detached from any core, official or central 
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authority. So, not only does this make it difficult to construct models or general-
ise about the effects of Jihadist media or the Jihadist media culture on potential 
supporters, but Jihadist leaders themselves face difficulties understanding how 
their ideology could be legitimated in these fast- changing media conditions. The 
new media ecology enables new connectivities that make it difficult to think in 
terms of local or global, virtual or real. Indeed, we begin by asking whether 
‘global’ Jihad was even possible before the Internet.
The rise of virtual Jihadism
In order to help contextualise the rise of the media Jihad and to explain why 
much of the legitimising activity detailed in the previous chapter has taken place 
within the confines of the new media ecology, it is worth providing a brief over-
view of the development of Jihadist media at this stage.
 To Western audiences inured to depictions of Jihadists as medieval Luddites 
whose religious zealotry heralds only self- immolation and destruction of the 
West, there must be something inherently incongruous and deeply unsettling 
about al- Qaeda extolling the virtues of twenty- first century mass media cam-
paigns, or exhibiting anxieties over being misrepresented by the Press (as illus-
trated by the quotes from al- Zawahiri and bin Laden in the previous chapter).
 However, these apparent anachronisms are perhaps rendered a little less 
strange if one considers the fact that Jihadism is a thoroughly modern phenome-
non,2 the rise of which has coincided with the revolution in information and 
communication technologies witnessed during the early 1990s. Indeed one could 
argue that the advent of a truly Global Jihadism is wholly predicated on the 
development, availability and affordability of these new technologies (Sageman 
2004: 158); satellite phones, digital video recording and editing equipment, PCs, 
and in particular, on the growth of the Internet and the emergence of the World 
Wide Web. In the early 1990s, these and other technologies enabled the muja-
hideen, heady from victory over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, to coalesce 
around radical new, but yet inchoate goals, establishing a loose and decentralised 
transnational network of sorts. Throughout the 1990s, key events, such as the 
Bosnian War (1992–1995), the first World Trade Center bombing (1993), the 
First Chechen War (1994–1996), and the publication of bin Laden’s infamous 
twin ‘fatwas’ (1996 and 1998), helped to not only strengthen the burgeoning 
Jihadist community, but also provided the impetus for the gradual migration of 
these networks to the new virtual havens offered by the emerging World Wide 
Web.
 Whilst the 1998 twin terrorist bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam 
and Nairobi did begin to focus far greater attention of security services on the 
communicative and operational uses of the Internet by al- Qaeda and affiliated 
groups, it was only following the momentous attacks of 11 September 2001 that 
the Jihadist media presence really became an object of intense international scru-
tiny (Awan and al- Lami 2009). In this new security climate, these virtual spaces 
offered unparalleled advantages over conventional media operating in the ‘real’ 
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world; they provided a free and uncensored medium for communication, mobil-
isation, recruitment, training, media production and dissemination, as well as a 
host of other related functions (Weimann 2006; Awan 2007b). The loss of a 
physical sanctuary in Afghanistan following Operation Enduring Freedom, 
simply expedited al- Qaeda’s metamorphosis into this diffuse virtual network, 
aptly named ‘al- Qaeda 2.0’ by a number of commentators (Bergen and Footer 
2008; Lynch 2006). Indeed, as the Taliban collapsed in November of 2001, bin 
Laden’s biographer Hamid Mir recalled witnessing ‘every second al- Qaeda 
member carrying a laptop computer along with a Kalashnikov’ as they prepared 
to scatter into hiding and exile (Coll and Glassner 2005).
 Unsurprisingly, the Internet quickly became the principle platform for the dis-
semination and mediation of the culture and ideology of Jihadism (Awan 2007b). 
The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF ), a prominent media organ of al- Qaeda, 
even acknowledged in 2005 that it was now the only platform available to them:
This is the Internet that God has enlisted in the service of jihad and of the 
mujahideen, which has come to serve your interests – given that half the 
battle of the mujahideen is being waged on the pages of the Internet – the 
sole outlet for mujahideen media.3
A newer generation of Web 2.0 spaces, including social networking sites and 
file- sharing portals, helped to consolidate the ascendancy of Jihadist media 
whilst simultaneously raising the spectre of mediated self- radicalisation; the idea 
that previously unaffiliated individuals could be drawn to the kind of violence 
and terrorism espoused by al- Qaeda, in a largely autonomous manner through 
the mediation of the Internet (Awan 2007c; Stevens and Neumann 2008; Bergin 
et al. 2009). Today the Jihadist counterculture flourishes in the new media 
ecology,4 with virtual propagation of Jihadism proceeding apace; a seemingly 
exponential growth in ‘Jihadist content’ over the last decade appearing on web-
sites, blogs, forums, social networking sites and file- sharing portals (Weimann 
2006; Awan 2007b).
 The rise of the media Jihad in the new media ecology then has arisen from a 
coalescence of factors: the revolution in information and communication tech-
nologies from the 1990s onwards; the loss of a physical sanctuary in Afghani-
stan following Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001; and the urgent realisation 
by Jihadists of the effect a lack of popular support would have for their move-
ment’s longevity and indeed survival.
The media Jihad: providing an evidentiary basis for 
metanarrative
Today, the functions of Jihadist media in the virtual arena are manifold; commu-
nication, mobilisation, recruitment, training, media production and dissemina-
tion, as well as a host of other related functions (Weimann 2006; Awan 2007a). 
However, the principle function of Jihadist media, and indeed its raison d’être, 
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has always been, depending on one’s perspective, news provision or propaganda; 
to furnish information about Muslim oppression and grievances, and document 
the activities of the mujahideen in order to mobilise the masses and rally others 
to the cause. The earliest Jihadist media emerging during the Afghan Jihad 
against the USSR (1979–1989), which of course provided the conditions for the 
emergence of both al- Qaeda and the broader Global Jihadist movement, did pre-
cisely this. The al- Jihad magazine edited by Sheikh Abdallah Azzam for 
example,5 focused on the humanitarian plight of Afghan civilians, denouncing 
the atrocities committed by Soviet forces, and simultaneously extolled the 
virtues of Jihad in defence of Muslim lands – all of which greatly facilitated the 
steady influx of donations, equipment and volunteers, particularly from within 
the Arab world.
 In short, from the very outset, the primary role of the media Jihad has been to 
provide an evidentiary basis for the metanarrative. If we understand this as the 
principle, even defining function of Jihadist media, then it is not difficult to 
appreciate its early limitations too. The al- Jihad magazine, launched in 1984, 
was one of the most successful early examples of Jihadists’ own media organs. 
However, it was plagued by serious problems from the outset. Al- Jihad first 
appeared as an amateurish black and white mimeograph, and required substantial 
financial resources to keep it afloat. Indeed it only evolved into a full colour 
glossy from 1986 after a substantial increase in public interest injected funds and 
resources into the publication. Naturally these problems severely affected its cir-
culation, thereby further circumscribing an already limited potential readership. 
To make matters worse, al- Jihad’s potential ambit was circumscribed further by 
countries in which its message was considered to be illegal or incendiary (Lia 
2006). Indeed there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that at the height of its pop-
ularity, around half of al- Jihad’s readership was to be found not in the Gulf 
States, as one might assume, but instead in the United States where its dissemi-
nation was protected by constitutional freedoms. So although al- Jihad could 
control its message very strictly, and thus tailor the evidentiary basis for its 
claims, the medium itself proved to be the limiting factor in terms of audience 
size, scope, reach and the lack of audio- visual content.
 The only real alternative to the shortcomings evident in the Jihadists’ own 
media organs, was to attempt to manipulate and exploit the mainstream media as 
unwitting communicative agents for the message. As we have already noted from 
al- Zawahiri’s lament over the ‘media siege imposed on the Jihad movement’, this 
was rarely possible either. To illustrate this point, we might consider one of the 
earliest attacks by al- Qaeda: the twin US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam 
and Nairobi in 1998. Whilst these attacks convincingly displayed al- Qaeda’s 
competence, technical prowess and a certain flair for the ‘theatre of terrorism’ 
(Stohl 1988), they also displayed how utterly reliant terrorists remained on the 
symbiotic relationship with mainstream news media identified by Schmid and De 
Graaf (1982). Indeed, Jihadist media organs had made little effort to consolidate 
their ‘propaganda of the deed’, or communicate their actions to rapt international 
audiences who had witnessed the spectacles of violence onscreen. In hindsight, 
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damning critiques from within the Jihadist movement lambasted the ‘horrible 
informational and political shortfall regarding these events’, decrying the fact that 
audiences resorted to ‘western foreign media to quench their thirst for the true 
news’.6 Here, whilst the Jihadists had managed to temporarily usurp the medium, 
their message was controlled by myriad factors outside their control; editorial 
controls, commercial and political considerations, news agendas, media frames, 
governmental pressure, censorship and audience sensibilities amongst other 
factors. If we understand terrorism to be ineluctably political, and following 
McLuhan’s (1978) famous phrase, ‘without communication, terrorism would not 
exist’, then the abstract depictions of spectacular terrorist acts did little to politi-
cise Jihadist violence, or communicate the underlying reasons behind that viol-
ence. Unsurprisingly, al- Zawahiri (2001) concluded the pernicious effect of this 
‘complicity’ noting, that amongst the tools that Western powers use to fight 
against Islam are ‘the International news agencies and satellite television’.
Image warfare
The capacity of an image to ‘cut through’ prior understandings of an event and 
influence a person’s viewpoint or even worldview is relational: images are ‘read’ 
in relation to other images seen before in relation to words and captions which 
might anchor the meaning of the image within that text, and in relation to a per-
son’s understandings of the larger historical processes the image may indicate 
(an event snapshot within a longer story). There is hence nothing intrinsically 
shocking about an image, no given power, so to understand the role of images 
projected by Jihadist media we need to account for the context vis- à-vis other 
media the target audience may be familiar with, the textual composition, and the 
events the image is taken to denote or authenticate (O’Loughlin 2010).7
 If the role of the media Jihad has been to provide an evidentiary basis for the 
metanarrative, then the role of images has proven to be absolutely central to this 
endeavour. If we return to the Ladinese Epistle cited in the previous chapter, we 
can appreciate the power of the image quite clearly. The potency of bin Laden’s 
discourse in his 1996 statement, replete with visceral imagery of ‘Muslim blood 
being spilled’ may be undeniable, however, it is only when it is substantiated by 
the role of the image that it takes on any tangible meaning in the minds of audi-
ences. Bin Laden, cognisant as ever of the role of images, pointedly alluded to 
the ‘horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana’, which only four months earlier 
had shocked audiences worldwide. Bin Laden was well aware of the startlingly 
graphic reports of the carnage wrought in Qana by the Israeli Defense Force, and 
which had been widely circulated in the news media at the time. The extra-
ordinary coverage was due in part to the persistence of journalists like Robert 
Fisk,8 but also because it had in fact been a United Nations (UNIFIL) compound, 
in which Lebanese civilians had sought refuge, that had been shelled with appar-
ent impunity. Consequently, in the context of the mainstream news media deliv-
ery of sanitised, carefully edited and censored coverage of conflict (Theobald 
2004), implausibly grotesque images, like that of the Fijian UN peacekeeper 
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silently holding aloft a decapitated baby, appeared onscreen. These images and 
others, such as footage of residential apartment blocks in Beirut being levelled 
by F16s, were immediately seared onto audience memories, eliciting strong and 
angry reactions in parts of the Muslim world, not least of which included the 
radicalisation of Muhammad Atta. According to Lesch (2003: 523) Atta, the 
ringleader of the 19 hijackers on 9/11, committed himself to ‘martyrdom’ after 
witnessing these images from his dorm room in Germany, choosing to write his 
‘martyrdom will’ the very same day.
 For bin Laden these images were a means to corroborate the massacre, and 
attempt to evoke sufficient moral indignation and umbrage in his potential audi-
ence, and thereby giving credence to his narrative in a way that he could not 
possibly have envisaged for the list of other exotic sounding Islamic conflict 
zones that formed his litany of grievance. Conversely, he did not (and could not) 
point to ‘horrifying picture’ of ‘Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippine, 
Fatani, Ogadin’ et al., and without an evidentiary basis to substantiate these 
claims, he is vulnerable to accusations of propaganda and empty rhetoric. This is 
not to dispute or deny that massacres or serious human rights violations might 
have occurred in these places. Rather many of the conflicts occurring on the 
peripheries of the Muslim world,9 have been conspicuously, and from the per-
ception of Jihadists’ (al- Zawahiri 2001), wilfully neglected by the mainstream 
Western news media. Nevertheless, setting aside their veracity for a moment, the 
absence of commensurate images and reportage from these contexts attenuates 
the potency of the narrative in a staggeringly disproportionate manner. Taylor 
(2007) commenting on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, identifies the same asym-
metrical relationship between the effects of pictures and words. Taylor contrasts 
the unprecedented furore over the photos of prisoner abuse, and the prior image-
less reports of torture and serious human rights violations from Amnesty Interna-
tional which went virtually unheeded. Consequently, it is the mediated image 
that is the most effective modality for directing audience to the event that the 
photograph of video footage serves as an authenticator for.
 The beguiling notion that images embody truth (or put differently, ‘the 
camera does not lie’), also offers audiences an alternative to the apparent obfus-
cation of reality provided by mainstream media aphorisms: contractors as 
opposed to mercenaries; collateral damage as opposed to killing civilians; regime 
change as opposed to invasion and occupation. Of course, this is not to suggest 
that the camera does not distort the truth in even more mendacious ways. Instead, 
as Bracewell (2002: 66) commenting on the contemporary status of the image 
suggests, ‘there is now the sense that authenticity itself can be sculpted to 
suggest veracity as an image, in which truth remains ambiguous’.
The hyperreality of Jihadism
The circulation and flux of images is one indication of the capacity of the new 
media ecology to buttress ideologies and grand narratives, such as that offered 
by Jihadism. The unique multimedia environment of the Wold Wide Web in 
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particular lends itself to the construction of a hyperreality; the paradoxical notion 
of a mediated phenomenon that appears more real than the reality itself (Eco 
1987; Baudrillard 1983). This hyperreality can be envisaged as an enhanced 
reality that places the participant in a wholly mediated environment constituted 
by a surfeit of images, texts and videos, all filtered through the lens of Jihadism, 
and through which the individual unwittingly experiences reality by proxy. This 
cloistered ‘cocooning’ effect of Jihadist spaces in the new media ecology 
referred to in the previous chapter is immensely important in the construction of 
this hyperreality, particularly as it has enabled the Jihadists to assuage the dis-
cordance between the classical views of Jihad (as propounded by Azzam et al.) 
and the Jihad espoused by al- Qaeda and its ilk, particularly with respect to the 
nature and form that the Jihad can legitimately assume.
 In addition, the new media ecology enables the manipulation of all forms of 
content in a myriad disingenuous ways; a host of widely available editing tools 
allow producers to crop, resize, copy, paste, assemble, blur, airbrush, superim-
pose and generally alter textual and audio- visual content. These tailored depic-
tions enable the Jihadists to further validate the metanarrative, manufacturing 
legitimacy along the way. The veracity of the content is almost inconsequential, 
as the cumulative effect of this unremitting barrage of images and videos, and 
the selective framing of events, all presenting either a simulacrum of Muslim 
suffering or Jihadist success, can interact and mesh with other worlds or realities 
a person experiences, such as day to day discrimination, oppression, political 
inefficacy and so on, such that a dogmatic and singular set of causal beliefs or 
ideology becomes the sole perspective for making sense of the world. Hence, 
when these non- mediated conditions are in place, it can make sense to speak of 
media as ‘primary definers’ of social reality (Schlesinger 1991).
 Jihadists, recognising the immense potential of the new media ecology, have 
responded to these manifest opportunities with alacrity, churning out increas-
ingly sophisticated media productions, and employing professional techniques 
and methods of audio- visual production and dissemination, as well as shrewdly 
framing narratives and events in ways sympathetic to their cause. Much of this 
frenetic activity has taken place in prominent or ‘official’ Jihadist spaces, repre-
sented primarily by an ever- changing roster of Arabic forums (muntadayat) 
which have served as semi- official mouthpieces for al- Qaeda over the years, 
including a number of forums sponsored by the al- Fajr Media Centre (al- 
Qaeda’s key media wing) such as al- Ikhlaas, al- Firdaws, and al- Buraq, as well 
as other such as al- Hesba, al- Faloja, and Shumook al- Islam, and al- Ansar; and 
to a lesser extent ‘official’ blogs (such as the weblog of al- Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic 
State in Iraq).
 Despite the fact that these platforms represent early Web 2.0 technologies, 
which are ostensibly conducive to the ‘levelling’ of hierarchies of knowledge 
and power (Castells 2009; Bunt 2003), they have nevertheless been hierarchic-
ally organised and strictly regulated with actors (e.g. al- Qaeda in Iraq – ISI), 
producers (e.g. al- Furqan), distributors (e.g. al- Fajr), and specific forum posters 
controlling every stage of the process (Kimmage 2008; Awan and al- Lami 
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2009). By following broadcast- era paradigms of media production, with passive 
media consumers, and top- down media production and dissemination, Jihadists 
have in the past managed to retain control of the narrative and maintain ideo-
logical coherence to a large degree.
 However, the growth of Jihadist media has increasingly been shaped by the 
revolution in audience roles heralded by later Web 2.0 or post- broadcast tech-
nologies, where a wide range of second generation services on the Web have 
allowed users contribute as easily as they consume.10 Consequently, Jihadist 
media efforts have also included autonomous user- generated content, often 
without official Jihadist sanction. This diffuse dissemination of Jihadist content 
across Web 2.0 platforms, outside of the ambit of ‘official’ forums, has not 
necessarily been welcomed by Jihadist media organs, Indeed, in September of 
2006, al- Boraq Media Institute published a detailed policy document entitled 
Media Exuberance which sought to curtail the unsanctioned and ‘exuberant’ 
proliferation and production of unattributed Jihadist media by freelance ama-
teurs, which it felt was divesting key Jihadist media organs (as- Sahab, al- Fajr, 
Global Islamic Media Front and so on) of control over production, mediation 
and dissemination of Jihadist content. The principal concerns appeared to have 
been fears of unpolished and unprofessional content undermining the credibility 
of Jihadist media and diverting attention from ‘official’ sources (Kimmage 2008; 
Awan and al- Lami 2009).
 Nevertheless, despite the remonstrations of ‘official’ Jihadism, freelance 
media Jihadism has flourished. These media efforts avoiding the niche and 
strictly regulated platforms of ‘official’ Jihadism, have instead appeared on a 
range of new, more mainstream platforms, relying far more on emotive imagery 
and other affective content in engendering solidarity and allegiance to the coun-
terculture of Jihadism. Rather than present cogent theological or ideological 
arguments designed to appeal to one’s reason, polished montages of Jihadist 
images and video clips, accompanied by stirring devotional songs appealing to 
the senses, render issues of theological or ideological legitimation far less 
important, for some audiences perhaps even obsolete. This virtually mediated 
imagery and propaganda of the deed is crucially important to young web- savvy 
audiences, and non- Arabic speaking, diasporic Muslim audiences, both of whom 
contribute disproportionately to the Jihadist demographic (Awan and al- Lami 
2009). Indeed, as Bolt et al. (2008) argue, imagery does not respect linguistic 
barriers and has itself become part of the message.
 This has enormously important repercussions for Jihadist ideology in the 
twenty- first century too. The nexus between the new media ecology and the 
autonomous media Jihadist has not only facilitated the wider dissemination of 
Jihadist ideology, but significantly, outside its traditional ambit too. Mainstream 
file- sharing platforms like YouTube, which host Jihadist videos, such as the 
statements from al- Qaeda leaders and IED attacks on Coalition forces, have 
granted the material a considerably higher publicity profile than could have pos-
sibly been envisaged by traditional Jihadist media organs (Awan 2007b). The 
dissemination of the culture, ideology and media of Jihadism across communities 
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on social networking sites like Orkut and Facebook, and virtual worlds like 
Second Life, is significant in that these constitute novel arenas that have thus far 
proven to be beyond the scope of official Jihadist media organs. Consequently, 
the Jihadist message, intended for, or only available to, smaller parochial audi-
ences in the past, is increasingly being granted much more diffuse audience 
penetration (Awan and al- Lami 2009).
Real versus virtual Jihad
One of the underlying factors behind this increase in autonomous user- generated 
Jihadist media content has been the changing demographic of the Jihadist move-
ment itself. Jihadism today is generally understood to be a phenomenon associ-
ated with young males (Awan 2007a; Sageman 2004), and consequently many 
of the new generation of virtual media Jihadists are, following Prensky (2001), 
‘digital natives’ rather than ‘digital immigrants’. Prensky defines the former as 
native speakers of the digital language of computers, video games and the Inter-
net. Conversely, those who were not born into the digital world but have, at 
some later point in their lives, adopted many or most aspects of the new techno-
logy are, and always will be compared to them, digital immigrants.
 Consequently for many media Jihadists, there is little new about aspects of 
the new media ecology. Rather, it is the only media environment with which 
they are familiar. For this newer generation of Jihadists, much of their social and 
other interaction already takes place within a new media ecology, whether it be 
social networking, shopping, dating, playing videogames, watching movies, 
reading news, listening to music or learning. In fact any activity in the ‘real’ 
world now has a virtual counterpart that may appear to be more appealing to a 
certain age cohort that represents this ‘digital native’ and so it is unsurprising 
that their political activism should similarly take place within this arena.
Sanctioning the virtual media Jihad
One of the previous perennial debates in Jihadist circles had focused on the 
status of those who fail to physically engage in the ‘Jihad’. Such individuals had, 
in the past, been reproached for remaining behind and limiting their contribution 
to words or funds rather than deeds. During Ayman al- Zawahiri’s Open Meeting, 
he was asked by a questioner:
Our beloved Sheikh, what are the duties and obligations of those of us who 
support jihad but live in the non- believers’ lands, such as Europe and North 
America, especially those who have troops fighting in Muslim lands? Should 
we individually engage in jihad in whatever form we can, as our Sheikh Abu 
Musab al- Suri recommends, or try to set out to conflict zones by any means 
possible? Is our engagement in jihadi media [in these non- believers countries] 
a sufficient reason for us to stay behind, knowing that most of us pay these 
countries taxes that are used to arm their troops to kill Muslims?
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To which al- Zawahiri responded:
The best solution is for you to get in touch with the mujahideen in the safest 
way possible in order to coordinate your efforts with them. If you fail to 
make such communication, you have two choices: either you engage in 
jihad individually or in the form of small cells, or you yourself set out to the 
mujahideen. As for jihadi media, it is no excuse to stay in the land of the 
kuffar, unless it is upon the request/ instructions of the mujahideen.
Curiously, despite al- Zawahiri’s own earlier pronouncements on the urgent need 
for Jihadist media organs to counter ‘the media war on terrorism’ (Hammond 
2003), and mobilise the Ummah, he declares in no uncertain terms that media 
Jihad is not a legitimate endeavour for individual aspiring Jihadists to engage in. 
However, al- Zawahiri’s views do reflect an earlier, perhaps more quixotic atti-
tude, particularly as he perhaps best epitomises the early generation of Jihadists 
forged from the Soviet- Afghan war.
 Conversely, various other Jihadists have had no qualms about legitimising 
this activity, and have even drawn upon historical or religious precedents to do 
so. Abu al- Harith al- Ansari’s categorisation of the types of warfare sanctioned 
by the Prophet, for example, cites ‘media warfare’ as a legitimate endeavour,11 
whereas Muhammad bin Ahmad al- Salim’s highly popular text, 39 Ways to 
Serve and Participate in Jihad, extols ‘performing electronic Jihad’ as ‘a blessed 
field which contains much benefit’.
 He states that,
Believers are called upon to join the jihad by participating in Internet forums 
to defend Islam and to explain and recommend the duty of jihad to all 
Muslims. . . . Internet offer [sic] opportunity to respond instantly to false 
allegations and to reach millions of people in seconds; those who have inter-
net skills are urged to use them to support the Jihad.
This effort he suggests ‘can be divided into two major parts: discussion boards 
and hacking methods.’12
 Perhaps the most infamous recent jihadist ideologue to contribute to the 
debate is Anwar al- ’Awlaki, who gained notoriety after being implicated in the 
potential radicalisations of the ‘Fort Hood shooter’, Major Nidal Hassan, the 
‘Christmas Day bomber’, Umar Farouk Abdul- Mutallab, and the ‘Times Square 
bomber’, Faisal Shahzad. Al- ’Awlaki suggests in his 44 Ways to Support Jihad, 
‘Fighting the lies of the Western Media’. ‘Following the news of Jihad and 
spreading it’, and ‘Spreading the writings of the mujahideen and their schol-
ars’.13 Yet perhaps al- ’Awlaki’s most interesting contribution is number 29 on 
the list: ‘WWW Jihad’. According to al- ’Awlaki,
Some ways in which the brothers and sisters could be ‘internet mujahideen’ 
is by contributing in one or more of the following ways: Establishing 
discussion forums that offer a free, uncensored medium for posting 
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information relating to Jihad; Establishing email lists to share information 
with interested brothers and sisters; Posting or emailing Jihad literature and 
news; and Setting up websites to cover specific areas of Jihad, such as: 
mujahideen news, Muslim POWs, and Jihad literature.14
Contemporary Jihadist strategist and key proponent of a decentralised, leaderless 
Jihad, Abu Mus’ab al- Suri, even acknowledges the underlying reasons why this 
mode of action may be appealing in his seminal Call to Global Islamic Resist-
ance.15 Al- Suri concedes the existence of large numbers of individuals within the 
Jihadists’ ideological support base who are nevertheless unwilling to coun-
tenance or engage in violence on a personal level. Addressing these individuals 
directly, al- Suri articulates expanded opportunities for participation in Jihad for 
those individuals who may agree with the grand narrative, discourses and acts of 
Jihadism, but will not cross the threshold into violence themselves. Instead he 
proposes a number of alternative modes of non- violent action to support the 
Jihad, one of which entails the ‘media or informational battle’.16
 In some cases there may be pragmatic reasons for sanctioning a virtual or 
media Jihad. A posting on a Syrian Jihadi site in 2005, entitled ‘Advice to 
Brothers Seeking Jihad in Iraq’, rather pointedly stated that raw recruits offering 
only ‘enthusiasm or impetuousness or love of martyrdom’ were no longer 
wanted. The obvious implication was that untrained and ill- equipped volunteers 
actually posed a liability to the movement and should either prepare themselves 
or find some other method of aiding the cause.
 As a result of these varying legitimising mechanisms, the ‘media Jihad’ has 
gradually gained respectability as a legitimate endeavour in itself. A communi-
qué authored by the Ministry of Information for the Islamic State of Iraq and 
posted on several Jihadi forums in September 2007, for example, hails the uptake 
of the media Jihad as the ‘awakening’:
Praise be to God for [the mujahideen’s] great efforts in triggering the jihadi 
awakening among the children of the ummah. How great [are the] fingers 
which sit behind the computer screens, day and night, awaiting a statement 
or releasing a production for their mujahideen brothers in the forums.17
Moreover, the media Jihadists have taken these accolades to validate their long 
held, overinflated sense of self- importance and worth. Recognising the immense 
potential of these technologies and forums, and the considerable power it grants 
them, some media Jihadists have placed themselves on a par with real- life 
Jihadists, adopting the slogan ‘keyboard equals Kalashnikov’.18 Indeed in some 
instances, the work of the media Jihadists has even raised above “martyrdom” 
operations; for example, the prominent media Jihadist Younis Tsouli (aka 
Irhaabi 007 or Terrorist 007) is frequently lionised by fellow forum members for 
distributing Jihadist videos and messages, and thus having been highly instru-
mental in the successful radicalisation and indeed ‘martyrdom’ of many others. 
The implicit suggestion of course is that although Tsouli has not ‘achieved 
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martyrdom’ himself, he has been of far greater benefit to the Jihadist cause in 
enabling the ‘martyrdoms’ of many others in his stead.19 Tsouli, whose autono-
mous media efforts placed him in the virtual company of Jihadist ‘luminaries’ 
like al- Zarqawi and Abu Maysara al- Iraqi (Zarqawi’s highly regarded ‘press sec-
retary’), perhaps best understands the potency of the media Jihad,
Film everything; this is good advice for all mujahideen. Brothers, don’t 
disdain photography. You should be aware that every frame you take is as 
good as a missile fired at the Crusader enemy and his puppets.20
If ‘radicalisation’ is considered to include some reference to violence, can those 
drawn to virtual Jihad be characterised as radicalised? Do the attitudes of indi-
viduals who are unwilling to countenance violence themselves nevertheless pose 
a security risk, as Western security discourses about radicalisation claim?
 Perhaps what attenuates this characterisation to some degree is the employ-
ment of similar referential frameworks by those located firmly outside the Jihad-
ist movement. Yusuf al- Qaradawi, perhaps the most important living mainstream 
Islamic scholar in the Muslim world offers an intriguing broadening of the 
concept of Jihad, away from violence ‘to the realm of ideas, media, and commu-
nication’, which he calls the ‘Jihad of the age, a great Jihad, and a long Jihad’. 
He suggests the weapons of this Jihad should be TV, the Internet, email and the 
like rather than guns. Persuading Muslims of the message of Islam and the 
importance of this Jihad in the path of God, he argues, should be the first prior-
ity.21 Although al- Qaradawi is surely encouraging an entirely different form of 
political activism, it would perhaps be easy for policymakers or journalists to 
confuse or blur together various manifestations of virtual Islam per se with 
Jihadist sites inciting violence. Instead, what al- Qaradawi’s example shows, is 
that all aspects of social life are inevitably becoming mediatised (see introduc-
tion) including religion, and the Jihadist media vanguard may just be a smaller 
element within the broader dynamic of the mediatisation of religion.
The catharsis of the virtual/media Jihad
The sanction offered to the ‘media Jihad’ has proven to be particularly important 
as it also helps assuage cognitive dissonance in the media Jihadists themselves. 
Whereas in the previous chapter, the dissonance identified arose as a result of the 
discord between Jihadist actions and Islamic ethical and legal considerations, the 
dissonance here stems from the internal conflict arising from an inconsistency 
between the Jihadist’s own beliefs and actions. Thus, a Jihadist who wishes to 
contribute to the conflict, but is unable or unwilling to partake in actual warfare 
(for any number of reasons, ranging from inaccessibility to the theatres of con-
flict, to indolence or cowardice) is given a vindicatory rationale for this altera-
tive, entirely legitimate mode of action. Media Jihadists, for their part, have 
responded to these overtures with enthusiasm and unsurprisingly great relief 
–particularly in the knowledge that they are no longer relegated to their previous 
roles of voyeuristic passivity.
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 This cathartic function of the Jihadists’ new media spaces, which allows 
would- be Jihadists to be part of the broader Global Jihad, but crucially without 
engaging in direct violence, cannot be overstated. Indeed, the virtual or media 
Jihad has served an increasingly important function in subsuming diverse strains 
of political activism, unrest and dissent, thereby providing a purgative conduit 
and framework for its non- violent expression. Audiences can vent their anger 
and frustration at the various ills plaguing the Muslim world, or perhaps more 
importantly redirect their energies in an ostensibly useful way, without resorting 
to violent means.
 There is little doubt that the media Jihadists in these new roles have proven 
immensely useful to the growth of the movement and the dissemination of its 
ideology. One of the most celebrated virtual Jihadists, Younis Tsouli (as men-
tioned above, also known as Irhaabi 007), whose contributions to the Global 
Jihad may have been confined to media production efforts from a bedroom com-
puter in the United Kingdom, nevertheless received considerable acclaim from 
Jihadists around the world, including from prominent individuals such as Abu 
Mus’ab al- Zarqawi (the previous head of al- Qaeda in Iraq). The important role 
played by media Jihadists is acknowledged candidly in Tsouli’s exchange with a 
fellow forum member, ‘Abuthaabit’, who attempted to convince a self- effacing 
Tsouli of his immense contributions to the Jihad:
This media work, I am telling you, is very important. Very, very, very, very 
. . . Because a lot of the funds brothers are getting is because they are seeing 
stuff like this coming out. Imagine how many people have gone [to Iraq] 
after seeing the situation because of the videos. Imagine how many of them 
could have been shahid [martyrs] as well.22
The virtual media Jihadists have also increasingly understood that immersion in 
the virtual conflict does not necessarily render them immune to repercussions in 
the real world, such as arrest and prosecution under charges of materially abet-
ting terrorism, encouraging or glorifying terrorism, or disseminating terrorist 
publications (as proscribed at least in the United Kingdom by the UK Terrorism 
Act 2006, Part 1).23 The successful arrest and prosecution of a number of indi-
viduals in Europe on such charges have shown these to be genuine concerns that 
must be considered by media Jihadists before engaging in any potentially incrim-
inating activity. The case of Babar Ahmed provides one of the earliest examples 
of the serious dangers inherent in conducting ‘media Jihad’. A British IT support 
specialist, Babar Ahmed was arrested under the UK Terrorism Act 2000 in 2003 
in connection with running the ‘mujahideen news’ website azzam.com. He was 
severely brutalised in police custody before being released without charge, but 
then rearrested shortly thereafter following a US extradition request on charges 
of ‘providing material support to terrorists and conspiring to kill persons in a 
foreign country’. In a damning indictment of British justice, Babar Ahmad has 
now been held for almost six years without trial or charge by British authorities 
whilst awaiting his pending extradition.24
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 In addition to the dangers in the ‘real’ world, Jihadists online have also long 
been cognisant of the threat posed by the presence of security agencies and civil-
ian ‘spies’ within the new media spaces of the Jihad. Many Jihadist forums dis-
suade individuals from communicating sensitive information over the Internet 
and encourage users to employ methods for masking their identities online. A 
post on a Jihadist forum in 2005, dissuaded individuals from communicating 
sensitive information on the Internet, warning that ‘this forum, like the others, is 
under . . . surveillance; any information is obviously not secret, so any indi-
viduals you meet and correspond with on the forums cannot be trusted at all’.25
 For some, these elements of danger provide further justification that they are 
indeed engaging in a legitimate aspect of the conflict, evident from the ‘enemy’s’ 
usage of the very same spaces and from the personal hazards to which they are 
themselves exposed.
Gender
For the numerous young men drawn to the virtual or media Jihad, its appeal is 
not difficult to understand. Individuals unable or unwilling to engage in the phys-
ical or militaristic Jihad for any number of reasons can nevertheless continue to 
support the cause without leaving the comfort of their homes and without expos-
ing themselves to any significant danger. Moreover, with sanction from various 
Jihadist ideologues, providing crucial legitimation for these activities, there is 
little or no moral discordance in failing to travel to the frontlines oneself. 
However, we have not yet taken into consideration the appeal of the virtual 
media Jihad to women, particularly bearing in mind the various sociocultural 
restrictions placed upon women that prevent them from joining the actual Jihad-
ist frontlines.
 In the early 1980s, Abdullah Azzam attempted to convince the Muslim world 
of the obligatory nature of a defensive Jihad against the Soviet Union. He argued 
forcefully in favour of women being allowed to take part in the Jihad. In his 
Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Faith (1979), he writes:
a boy is permitted to go out to fight without his father’s permission, a wife 
without her husband’s, and he who is in debt without his creditor’s26
Nevertheless, perhaps in the face of criticisms from his generous, and more puri-
tanical, Gulf Arab benefactors, Azzam later tempered his progressive stance in 
Join the Caravan (1987) by stating that ‘Arab women cannot take part in fight-
ing, because Afghan women have not yet done so’.27
 Ayman al- Zawahiri’s Open Meeting, he is asked by a questioner:
Who is the highest- ranked woman in al- Qaeda? You don’t have to state 
names, but what are their positions in the organisation?
Al- Zawahiri responds by stating:
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There are no women in the al- Qaidat al- Jihad Organisation, but the wives of 
the mujahideen play a heroic role in managing their homes and sons despite 
the hardships of immigration, moving from place to place, fighting and 
expecting the strikes of the crusaders.
Others have similarly reinforced the notion that women traditionally do not 
partake in Jihad. Al- Zarqawi, for example, attempts to embarrass his audience 
into action by declaring:
if you [men] are not going to be chivalrous knights in this war, make way 
for women to wage it . . . Indeed, by God, men have lost their manhood.28
In light of these social and cultural mores that restrict access to theatres of conflict, 
women with inclinations towards Jihad have naturally gravitated towards online 
forums, where they can simply mask their gender or fail to disclose it completely. 
Increasingly, however, it appears that women are displaying increasing confidence 
in revealing their true identities, and expressing their femininity as can be evinced 
through the growing proportion of female usernames and avatars on Jihadist 
forums. Moreover, their disclosure in fact is often met with great respect and cour-
tesy by other forum members and they can enjoy what they consider to be permissi-
ble forms of interactions with fellow Jihadist males. Consequently, some women 
have welcomed access to media Jihad opportunities and proven themselves to be 
equally capable to their male counterparts in many arenas. For example, an article 
titled: ‘Jahid: Your Enemies Online’ in the April 2008 issue of the publication Jami 
of the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance had prominent contributions from Hiba 
Zakariya, described as ‘a female activist in electronic Jihad’.
 The growth in female media Jihadism was suggested in 2007 by the Dutch Intel-
ligence and Security services (AIVD) who reported there had been a clear rise in 
the number of women that participated in spreading radical material over the Inter-
net (AIVD 2008, pp. 46–7).29 This is corroborated by Awan (2007b) who has 
shown that at least 20 per cent of registered users on the now defunct Mujahedon.
net forum chose female- gender-specific usernames. Indeed, there have even been 
attempts by the Jihadist leadership itself to incorporate women’s voices. In Decem-
ber 2009 for example, al- Qaeda’s prominent media wing as- Sahab released a com-
muniqué entitled ‘Letter to My Muslim Sisters’ by Ayman al- Zawahiri’s wife, 
Umayma al- Zawahiri. The gendered aspect of Jihadist culture is absent from much 
media discourse around ‘radicalisation’; gender would add one more axis of uncer-
tainty, undermining stereotyped profiling of ‘vulnerable’ young men, contributing 
to the generalised condition of hypersecurity present in Western media- security dis-
course in the 2000s.
Transitions to the real Jihad
Despite the considerable means employed to legitimise the media Jihad, it would 
be imprudent to assume that the media Jihad will completely supplant the 
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physical Jihad, which has continued to prove irresistible to some. In fact, Jihad-
ist ideologues like Abu Musab al- Suri had almost always expected an inevitable 
transition from operating in a virtual capacity to a real capacity from those 
ensconced within the hyperreality of Jihadism. Al- Suri presciently described al- 
Qaeda’s role as that of an ideological vanguard: ‘al- Qaeda is not an organization 
. . . nor do we want it to be . . . It is a call, a reference, a methodology’.30 Con-
sequently he could propound a theoretical framework for autonomous cells and 
‘leaderless resistance’ which envisioned that the,
next stage of jihad will be characterized by terrorism created by individuals 
or small autonomous groups, which will wear down the enemy and prepare 
the ground for the far more ambitious aim . . . an outright struggle for 
territory.31
Others have also been quick to adopt this framework. The al- Qaeda magazine 
Muaskar al- Battar, or Camp of the Sword, wrote in its 2004 debut,
Oh Mujahid brother, in order to join the great training camps you don’t have 
to travel to other lands . . . Alone, in your home or with a group of your 
brothers, you too can begin to execute the training program.32
The first issue of al- Battar went on to outline its purpose:
because many of Islam’s young people do not know how to bear arms, not 
to mention use them . . . your brothers in Mujahideen in the Arabian penin-
sula have decided to publish this booklet . . . and [the young Mujahideen] 
will act according to the military knowledge in it.33
A number of resources have also long been available for enabling this transition 
and include the now infamous and continuously expanding 700 megabytes- size 
file known as the Encyclopaedia for the Preparation for Jihad (mawsu’at al- 
i’dad), which was first compiled during the 1979–1989 Afghan war. Indeed 
some virtual Jihadists appear to have focused almost entirely on Mention Nemo. 
Despite the sanction afforded to media Jihad endeavours, the considerable 
weight of expectation from ideologues and fellow members to act upon their 
putative Jihadist aspirations, appears to have compelled a number of individuals 
to become dissatisfied with their current roles.
 Despite garnering considerable acclaim in the virtual world, and being greeted 
on the forums as ‘The hero – God salutes you’, Tsouli nevertheless continued to 
harbour yearnings for ‘martyrdom’ on the ‘real’ battlefield. Although Tsouli was 
one of the most significant virtual Jihadists to emerge thus far, he nevertheless 
often lamented to his fellow forum users, ‘Hero? I am only half a man now . . . 
my heart is in Iraq.’34 Tsouli’s desire for ‘real’ Jihad appears to have led to his 
eventual demise; he was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment in 2007 for his 
involvement in a decentralised web of terrorist plots.35
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 Numerous other examples exist of successful transitions from the virtual 
world to the real world. The most celebrated recent case is that of Abu Dujana 
al- Khurasani (the nom de guerre of Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al- Balawi), a 
well- known administrator of the al- Hesbah Jihadist forum. Abu Dujana was 
at some point recruited by the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate 
(GID), but instead, serving as a double- agent, he conducted a suicide attack 
against US Camp Chapman near Khost in Afghanistan in December 2009, 
killing seven CIA operatives and a member of the GID. In interviews given 
by his wife after the event, al- Balawi is portrayed as someone ‘obsessed with 
Jihad’, who spent an inordinate amount of time on Jihadist forums:
He followed all of them, but from a distance. . . . He was constantly 
reading and writing. He was crazy about online forums. He would go 
onto them and write severe, extremely hardline comments. He would cite 
verses from the Quran that talked about the need for jihad, and then write 
very tough comments based on those verses or on the sayings of the 
Prophet.36
But despite his clear attraction to the Jihadist cause, and his considerable writ-
ings on the Jihadist forums, he was nevertheless left feeling increasingly guilty 
over his self- induced torpor:
My husband was also like them. He would talk and write about jihadi sub-
jects a lot. But when we talked with his family among ourselves, we would 
always talk about his conversations. We would say ‘he always talks but 
never does anything.’ Despite all [his] talks and writings he was always 
criticized for doing nothing.37
It appears that al- Balawi was at some point early in his online career, content 
with supporting the Jihadist cause virtually, as this post of encouragement to 
his fellow forum users following the concerted assault on Jihadist forums 
shows,
I say to my brothers in the jihadi media trench to rise up and support your 
mujahideen brothers with your pens, wealth, and time. Dust off the dirt of 
laziness, as the situation is not a happy one, and [the] Jewish Haganah dogs 
have attacked us, closed the forums, and have manipulated the download 
links of jihadi media productions – so is it that they are more patient and 
determined than you are? If you are familiar with your reputation amongst 
the mujahideen, then you would not sleep or enjoy living before you can 
reassure them with the return of the al- Hesbah, al- Ekhlaas, and al- Boraq 
forums, so will you do this now that you are aware?38
However, his own internal conflict over his inaction remained. This eventually 
precipitated the transformation to a real- world Jihadist:
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The point my husband mostly complained about was this: why do we not go 
toward jihad? He was focused on this point. ‘We always write, we always 
read but we do nothing,’ he wrote.39
His experiences resonate strongly with many Jihadists confined to the virtual or 
media arena, and perhaps al- Balawi’s eventual transformation may provide some 
form of vicarious validation for the media Jihadists’ own current passivity. Cer-
tainly, al- Balawi’s actions have been widely hailed within the virtual Jihadist 
community, with Abu Dujana quickly immortalised in videos, photo montages 
and even poetry, including an almost farcical ode to al- Balawi entitled ‘Our 
James Bond’.40
 Others appear content to remain within the virtual media sphere, enjoying the 
catharsis afforded by virtual action, unless of course they are compelled to leave, 
which may lead to actual physical violence and terrorism. The unprecedented 
attack on Jihadist media spaces from September 2008 onward, which included 
the disruption of major Jihadist web forums, severely curbed the opportunities 
for ‘media Jihad’.41 One forum member lamented,
with the closure of all our sites, you [the Crusaders and their agents] have 
left us with no choice but to physically join the caravan of Jihad. With no 
Jihadi sites through which we can support our brother Mujahideen, there is 
no point for us to stay behind. We shall join them. Your act has shamed us 
and caused us to think ‘what is left for us?’42
Ironically, individuals who may not have countenanced actual violence in the 
past may in the absence of these virtual arenas feel compelled to relinquish their 
virtual personas in favour of real- life Jihadist operations (Awan and al- Lami 
2009). Indeed, we might postulate that the disruption of the al- Hesbah forum in 
late 2008 may have even played some small role in providing the casus belli for 
Abu Dujana’s transition to the ‘real Jihad’.
Conclusion
The virtual or media Jihad has not only gained prominence and credibility as a 
wholly legitimate alternative to traditional conceptions of Jihad, but has also 
progressively outpaced the militaristic or physical Jihad in the modern era. 
While the ‘real’ Jihad continues to hold a certain level of aspirational appeal, the 
catharsis offered by the media or virtual Jihad has proven sufficiently efficacious 
to supplant traditional notions of Jihad for a new generation of Jihadists, unwill-
ing or unable to engage in actual violence themselves. Consequently, while the 
occasional transitions from virtual to real actions will remain a distinct and dis-
concerting possibility, they are unlikely to be adopted as praiseworthy prece-
dents by significant numbers of virtual Jihadists, despite whatever rhetorical 
validation they might be accorded publicly. Moreover, the uncertain dynamics of 
these processes, typically articulated as ‘radicalisation online’ or ‘virtual 
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radicalisation’ remain uncertain and contested, particularly as the linkage 
between words and acts online and deeds offline is exceedingly problematic 
(Awan 2007c; Stevens and Neumann 2008; Bergin et al. 2009).
 The nexus between Web 2.0 in particular, and the media or virtual Jihadist, 
has had enormously important repercussions for Jihadism in the twenty- first 
century, rejuvenating its ailing ideology, and facilitating the dissemination of its 
counterculture to new and diffuse audiences, many of whom are beyond the tra-
ditional ambit of official Jihadist media organs. Crucially, however, the ideology 
of Jihadism has to some extent been distorted and recast along the way, for a 
new generation. Although Jihadism has survived, albeit in somewhat attenuated 
form, and indeed spread unimpeded across other the new media platforms, the 
ideology itself has lost some of its coherence and cogency along the way, tre-
mendously warping the signal to noise ratio. Marshall McLuhan’s well- known 
and prescient maxim ‘the medium is the message’,43 can perhaps help us to better 
appreciate how the promotion of a virtual or media Jihad within the new media 
ecology has fundamentally recast the ideology of Jihadism in the twenty- first 
century, in order to retain its relevance to a new generation of ‘digital natives’.
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4 Media events
Televisual connections 2004–2006
Critical events trigger the most intense consideration of security, identity, and 
legitimacy. Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and more recently the 9/11 
attacks were each catalysts for reflection and reaction concerning national and 
personal security, who ‘we’ are and what ‘our’ values are, and what security pol-
icies would be a legitimate and efficacious response to the situation as under-
stood. Following the launch of the 2003 Iraq War, the UK then appeared to be 
beset with critical security events, each brought to citizens by media but which 
also directly affected many people’s lives. Here, our focus falls upon the 7/7 
London bombings of July 2005, the Forest Gate police raids on homes in June 
2006, and the transatlantic air plot that paralysed Heathrow airport in August 
2006. All involved apparently ‘radicalised’ individuals who committed or were 
believed to be about to commit violence. These events were part of a series of 
international attacks or counterterrorism responses presumed to constitute and 
lend narrative coherence to the ‘Global War on Terror’ and discourses of global 
fear, risk and resilience. Such incidents are crucial test cases for the assertion 
that radicalisation lies at a nexus of global Jihadist discourses and local security 
concerns, since we might expect to see the motives and background of Jihadist 
perpetrators made visible by mainstream media for audiences to understand who 
is carrying out the attacks being reported. If there is a nexus through which 
Jihadist discourses cascade from the Jihadist online world and translate through 
reporters and analysts into mainstream public understandings, it is through 
breaking terrorism events that such connections might occur.
 This chapter explains why mainstream television coverage of breaking news 
events connected to terrorism and radicalisation took on a certain consistent form 
and content. Edward Said noted the pun in the title of his book Covering Islam 
(1981). His analysis of Western media coverage of Islam and Muslims suggested 
such reporting obscured or covered as much as it made clear. We suggest media 
coverage is more than a matter of obscuring/revealing: media construct particu-
lar forms and audience relations to such forms, in order to create imperatives to 
keep watching. We must investigate such forms to begin to identify how audi-
ence understanding, concern and perhaps anxiety or insecurity might be gener-
ated. We find that, first, the form these events took in media were shaped by the 
representation of a certain temporality. These media events offered an ‘event 
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time’ (Gitlin 1980) characterised as an extended present (Nowotny 1994). The 
past and the future were represented as extensions of the ongoing crisis, the 
breaking news moment. The future was presented as an empty space or plane 
upon which the implications of the event would unfold, and the past was inter-
preted for ‘signs’ of danger leading to the present crisis. As news, the extended 
present created an imperative to keep watching and following the story. As news 
about terrorism, this format offered a representation of a future foreshadowed by 
the threat of similar or greater attacks to come. However, in addition to the 
extended present, television news presented the viewer with news they had 
already seen. In the first decade of the twenty- first century, the BBC offered 
regular drama- documentaries or simulations of security crises, with a programme 
each on a smallpox epidemic, transport catastrophe and terrorist attacks on 
London. Each of these ‘premediations’ was used to prepare citizens – and any 
policymakers, journalists and emergency response workers watching – for how a 
real crisis might unfold. Indeed, the ‘London under attack’ terrorist simulation 
featured the very ‘experts’ who were used for reporting actual terrorist incidents 
in the years to come, resulting in a merging of real and fictional representations.
 If the form of television coverage suggested a particular orientation to the 
past, present and future, the content of the coverage was shaped by discourses of 
security prevalent among security analysts, practitioners and academic analyses 
since the 1990s. A discourse is a set of practices thr ugh which certain state-
ments count as meaningful. Hence a discourse ‘constrains and enables what can 
be said’ (Barad 2007: 147). We examine how analyses of security and terrorism 
created discourses in which certain descriptions of terrorists, governments, cit-
izens and fear are presented as meaningful and valid. The ‘global risk’ analysis 
of Ulrich Beck presents a world of contagious threats generated by human activ-
ity but now beyond human control, requiring a fundamental shift in the arrange-
ment of world politics. A parallel ‘global fear’ analysis produced by scholars as 
well as journalists and some policymakers suggests we have entered a ‘post- 
9/11’ era, a distinct, dangerous new period, in which anxiety about threats is uni-
versal. Finally, television news coverage of breaking terrorist events is marked 
by a ‘resilience’ discourse, in which is it is assumed that public authorities need 
to instil resilience in citizens so that they are less vulnerable to mass panic or 
residual anxiety in the face of global risks and fears. Journalists and officials 
appearing in media coverage in the 2004–2006 period largely operated within 
these discursive parameters of risk, fear and resilience. Such discourses rein-
forced the temporal formats of the extended present and premediation, resulting 
in the projection of an understanding of the present and future as a ‘war without 
end’, thereby reinforcing – inadvertently – the ‘war on terror’ framework of the 
US and UK governments of the time.
 Jihadists are largely absent from mainstream media, however. Breaking news 
events around radicalised violence are marked by an absence of information. 
Either officials do have information but are slow to release it, or authorities have 
acted on the precautionary principle and do not have any confirmed information, 
having acted in response to an imagined or presumed threat to which the 
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consequences of not responding would be more catastrophic than taking wrong 
action. This creates a space for speculation about threats in general, and attempts 
to connect general theories to scraps of information about these particular events. 
We find the discourses of risk, fear and resilience shape what is said and how the 
events are conceived. Hence, the chapter identifies the nexus of discourses that 
enable radicalisation to be framed as a significant problem.
 After establishing the centrality of mainstream television to audience- cum-
citizens engagement with breaking security events, this chapter offers analysis of 
the 7 July 2005 London bombings, June 2006 Forest Gate police raids, and 
August 2006 Heathrow transatlantic bomb plot arrests.
Watching media events
When breaking news events such as terrorist attacks occur, audiences’ patterns 
of news consumption also break with routine.1 On an ordinary day, people con-
tinue to have news routines interwoven into their social lives. What news they 
consume depends on what they are doing, whether it is getting ready for school, 
going to work, eating dinner and so on. These consumption routines have been 
transformed to an extent by the advent of the Internet and the mobility afforded 
to digital media consumers. However, the hierarchy of use gets turned upside 
down when a major terror event happens, with TV suddenly the choice source, 
and then broadsheets for authoritative analysis the next day. Hence in this 
chapter we focus on mainstream television news as the primary medium con-
necting citizens to radicalisation- related events.
 In this period marked by critical security events, we must also situate the sub-
sequent analysis in terms of the experience individuals accumulated in making 
sense of such events. For instance, by the time we get to the transatlantic air plot 
arrests in August 2006, audiences have become familiar with actual acts of viol-
ence such as the 7/7 bombings and failed 21/7 bombings, as well as false alarms 
such as police raids on homes in Forest Gate, East London, in June 2006. Although 
the transatlantic air plot arrests led to convictions, the authorities’ actions on the 
day were met with some cynicism. For instance, in the following exchange from 
an interview the next month, a group of friends have been discussing the Israel–
Hezbollah conflict of August 2006 and its relation to the events at Heathrow. Alper 
is a Turkish sports journalist, age 25, living in London. He is a non- practicing 
Muslim. Raphael is an administrative assistant, age 24, born in Israel, he also 
speaks Turkish and lives in London. He is Jewish. Also present is Darren, a 
22-year- old London travel agent also Muslim, non- practicing, from Turkey:
ALPER: Yeah and, for example, during that conflict there was a bomb scare at 
Heathrow airport. And when that happened, I remember I even said to 
Darren, it came to the end of the day and I hadn’t heard a single thing of 
what was happening in Israel, and I thought the biggest bombings could 
have occurred there today but we haven’t heard because it has been pushed 
down the agenda by some fake bomb report. There may have been major 
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atrocities going on and it could have been a planned act to have this hap-
pening here to completely divert all the media attention which is exactly 
what it did. They just showed some planes standing on the runway for hours 
on end saying ‘bomb alert’ in complete Fox News style.2
Alper interprets the very happening of the Heathrow bomb plot as a ploy to 
divert attention of audiences away from the Israel–Hezbollah conflict. The 
British government, though not named, is presumably the actor behind this 
diversion, and ‘They’ refers to the mainstream media. Alper and Raphael link 
the Heathrow bomb plot coverage to a series of geopolitical events in the UK:
RAPHAEL: Same argument could be said when 7/7 happened, the London bomb-
ings happened, and a couple of days later [the] London Olympics, and then 
a day later the G8. Everything was perfectly set.
ALPER: Yeah exactly, I totally believe in that.3
The issue is not whether the connection Alper and Raphael make between these 
events is valid. Rather, in the 2001–2006 period, audiences, media and policy-
makers habitually made such connections. Such a series of apparently connected 
events became ‘schemata’ through which any new event, or imagined future events, 
could be interpreted (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2007). The period was marked by 
media events such as the 7/7 London bombings, the Asian tsunami, Hurricane 
Katrina and the Heathrow bomb plot. One thing these events had in common was 
blanket, 24-hour media attention. As such, the expectation of such events and the 
predictability of massive media attention created the possibility for the construction 
of an event so that, in Raphael’s terms, it is ‘perfectly set’ to receive blanket media 
coverage. The very predictability of media attention constituted a crisis for journal-
ists because they could easily be manipulated by policymakers who knew how to 
create a story fulfilling the news values that would compel journalists to cover it. 
Journalists had become weapons of both terrorists and governments.
 Hence the suspicion, even conspiratorial air, evident in this interview. It was 
this context of media events, spontaneous or constructed, within which the 7 July 
2005 bombings, Forest Gate raids and Heathrow bomb plot analysed below were 
made sense of.
 In our introduction we discussed several key discourses through which terrorism 
and radicalisation were discussed in this period, in which the concepts ‘risk’, ‘fear’ 
and ‘resilience’ were central. The chapter now identifies how these shaped the con-
sideration of a series of breaking news events related to radicalisation in the UK.
The 7/7 London bombings: premediation, the event, the 
retrospection
A year before the attacks of 7 July 2005, the BBC broadcast a drama documen-
tary or simulation, ‘London under attack’, which anticipated the eventual actual 
attacks with some accuracy. The programme was part of a string of simulations, 
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broadcast by the BBC, of catastrophes befalling the infrastructure of Britain. On 
13 May 2003, ‘The day Britain stopped’ was aired,4 a ‘what if?’ dramatisation 
depicting how transport gridlock caused by a train strike could cause unexpected 
effects on car and air travel, leading to a major air crash. A little over a year 
earlier, on 5 February 2002, the BBC had broadcast ‘Smallpox 2002’,5 a 
docudrama about the release of the smallpox virus by terrorists in New York and 
the contagious spread of catastrophe around the world that followed, including 
its effects upon London. These dramatic simulations ask audiences to consider 
whether they or their governments are prepared for such crises rather than how 
likely such crises are. The political nature of risk evaluation is subsumed by the 
logic of hypersecurity, the ‘war against contingency’ (Dillon 2007: 14). The pre-
sumed certainty is that since catastrophes can happen, they will. What is uncer-
tain is how citizens and governments will respond. Such programmes are 
presented as helpful premediations enabling awareness to be raised and contin-
gency planning to be thought through.
 The programme begins in the studio with the headlines at 8 a.m. from news-
reader Kirsty Lang, interspersed with comments from longtime BBC News pre-
senter Gavin Esler that what the viewer is watching is ‘well researched but 
fictional’. Over the morning we learn of three terrorist attacks on the London under-
ground train network, before a chemical tanker carrying chlorine is blown up releas-
ing a poison gas cloud into the streets later in the day and, finally, news that a 
second tanker is missing and possibly hijacked by what by then seems a co- 
ordinated terrorist group. By the end of the programme, over 3,000 people are dead. 
The studio is filled with assorted experts, including David Gilbertson (former Com-
mander, Metropolitan Police), Crispin Black (former intelligence officer), Ian Hoult 
(Emergency Planning Officer), Michael Portillo (former Secretary of State for 
Defence), Peter Power (former Metropolitan Police and government advisor) and 
Lance Price (former Deputy Director of Communications, 10 Downing Street). 
Each offers their diagnosis on what the respective branches of government should 
be doing as the crisis develops. Price and Portillo suggest opportune moments for 
the Prime Minister to use media to offer the public reassurance, both for the sym-
bolic value of illustrating the presence of a leadership figure and because it is pre-
sumed citizens would seek to be addressed in emotional terms, rather than simply 
being provided with information. Gilbertson considers the point when mobile phone 
networks should be commandeered for emergency services only. Hoult wonders 
how the state should deal with the ‘tens of thousands of people on the streets’ who 
cannot use public transport and may need to be evacuated. The focus, overall, is 
resilience, and Furedi’s analysis (see Chapter 1, this volume) that government 
understands resilience as something it must do, and that citizens are relatively help-
less, appears accurate. Indeed, when the actual 7/7 attacks occur a year later, the 
‘tens of thousands of people on the streets’ simply walked home. When the second 
chemical tanker goes missing, Price raises the question of emergency powers:
If there are now bombs going off above ground, in this case a lorry being 
attacked, it could happen anywhere, so the potential for mass panic across 
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not just the capital but the whole country is very much with us. I think there-
fore we need to look at more serious measures. We do have reserve powers 
in effect to take over the BBC if we were to wish to, and to get them to 
broadcast whatever we wanted them to broadcast. Those powers are there in 
the Broadcasting Act.
Price does later equivocate, ‘the public have got a greater capacity to deal with 
uncomfortable truths and uncomfortable possibilities and scenarios than perhaps 
we give them credit for’. Nevertheless, the thesis of the programme is that Brit-
ain’s emergency services and planning for multiple attacks is lacking; as such, 
the problem of resilience lies with better state organisation rather than improved 
social relations. This is demonstrated through interviews with anonymous 
London underground workers asserting they have had no training in emergency 
response, and the presentation of apparently damning, authoritatively sourced 
statistics scattered throughout the programme, including, for instance:
Metropolitan Police radios do not work in one third of the underground 
network.
Source: London Resilience
The Civil Contingency Reaction Force communications system is not com-
patible with those of the emergency services.
Source: House of Commons debate, October 2002
It has been estimated that it would take 12 hours to mobilise 100 people.
Source: Evidence to Defence Select Committee 2003
More than half of businesses in the UK have no emergency plans in place.
Source: Business Continuity Institute and Chartered Management Institute
The programme is notable for offering little analysis of who the perpetrators of 
the attacks might be. There is no explicit mentioning of radicalisation or ‘Jihad’. 
Instead, it implies the attackers must be Muslim as the studio experts warn about 
the possibility of reprisal attacks on Muslim communities and the need to consult 
Muslim community leaders. Almost exactly anticipating how Home Secretary 
John Reid would respond to the actual 7/7 attacks, Price suggests, as the attacks 
occur, ‘I think we have to look at getting people up on the media who are able to 
offer some degree of reassurance and try to explain that this isn’t a sort of 
Muslim attack against the West, that people need to be responsible and measured 
in the way in which they react to it.’
 The simulation ends by amplifying fear through the depiction of an extended 
present in which larger attacks are likely. The fictional killing of 3,000 people or 
the possibility of this actually happening means, for Gilbertson, that ‘the world 
changed’. ‘When we’ve got something like this, there’s no normality other than 
the new normality,’ Power adds, and ‘It’s going to have a resonance that will go 
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on for decades’. Gavin Esler concludes that ‘what we saw on film today might 
be at the lower end of the spectrum of what terrorists might on a good day 
achieve’.
 By the time of the evening of the 7 July 2005, BBC News at 6 p.m. began:
Londoners have been worried about an attack they hoped would never 
happen, but today it did. It was still rush hour when the attacks began. Police 
say there were four bomb explosions, three on the underground and one on 
a bus.
As with the 2004 ‘London under attack’ simulation, an early morning attack hit 
three tube trains and one vehicle above ground, in this case a bus. Acknowledg-
ing the premediation of the event, a BBC News 24 presenter added, ‘This was 
something the capital had rehearsed for but had hoped would never have to be 
implemented.’ The coverage then centred upon the theme of resilience. By 
focusing on the response of emergency services and citizens, London was pre-
sented as resilient. However, if such coverage contained terror, the subsequent 
analysis of the operations of al- Qaeda would go on to amplify the threat again.
 The question of resilience was raised in terms of the efforts of emergency 
services: their practical effectiveness, and the emotional effect on its workers. ‘It 
must be very traumatic for them’, a BBC reporter asked Brian Paddick, Deputy 
Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. ‘How do they cope with it 
all?’ Paddick replied:
It’s been very traumatic for our officers and for those people from the other 
emergency services. They are determined to do a professional job. Clearly 
we are going to give them plenty of support to make sure they can cope with 
the terrifying scenes that they’ve seen. But I have to say, the emergency 
services and the people of London have responded magnificently to this ter-
rible, terrible atrocity.
The BBC Home Correspondent Mark Easton reported that the emergency serv-
ices workers had ‘managed to suck the terror out of terrorism this morning’, and 
‘if indeed this was the work of al- Qaeda and they were trying to terrorise London 
and Londoners, my impression here . . . is that they’ve failed’. Would this mean a 
‘new normality’, as Peter Powers had suggested in ‘London under attack’? This 
suggestion was discounted in a discussion later on Channel 4 News between pre-
senter Jon Snow and Professor Michael Clarke, a security expert. Snow noted 
that Prime Minister Tony Blair, by this point in the day, had asserted that the 
attacks would not affect the daily lives of British citizens, but was part of a gov-
ernment looking to introduce identity cards and extended police powers. Clarke 
argued that identity cards would not have stopped that day’s attacks. Channel 4 
News also broadcast an interview with Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New York 
City during the 9/11 attacks. Giuliani also refrained from sensationalising the 
events:
873 04-Radicalisation-04.indd   72 18/11/10   12:30:08
T &
 F 
Pro
of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Media events  73
PRESENTER: Is our way of life inevitably going to be affected?
GIULIANI: Uh, yes, it will be affected but not in a draconian way or a dramatic 
way. Honestly, there isn’t too much more that you can do. Yes, there are a 
few things more you can do, but the reality is that in a city as large as 
London or New York or Washington or Paris you can’t have perfect secur-
ity. I mean it’s just never going to exist. In fact in life we don’t live without 
risk, so you can’t create perfect security in the city.
Nevertheless, imperfect security could be interpreted as a permanent risk of ter-
rorism. And rather than containing the drama of the attacks, Giuliani proceeded 
with an analogy that inflated the historical significance of the day:
But people of London are very calm. They seem very measured and very 
determined. They remind me very much of their parents, uh, grandparents 
and great- great grandparents whom they must’ve inherited this from, this 
sense of strength because they had to live through the Battle of Britain, 
which is far worse than anything we’ve had to face.
Imperfect security marked by periodic events reminiscent of ‘the Blitz’ suggests 
a ‘new normal’. Sky News presented a visual sequence of attacks in Bali in 
2002, Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and finally London in 2005 (Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin 2007, Chapter 5). Sky also presented ‘Terrorism Expert’ Nick 
Kochan, who suggested authorities should be ‘looking for a group of sleepers. 
People who have been here [in the UK] for many years, who have given no evid-
ence of criminality or suspicion, who would have been accumulating money and 
accumulating material of some kind. But, um, behaving in a normal way and 
merging with the rest of the Muslim community’ (italics added). A clip is shown 
from 2004 of Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London, saying ‘It would be incon-
ceivable really that one day some [terrorists] will not get through’. Earlier, BBC 
News asked Professor Jose Ignasio Torablanca about the security implications of 
the Madrid attacks and parallels with London. Torablanca replied:
Yes . . . this shows that nobody is safe, that public transportation [is] very 
easy to hit. You have a feeling that after this second attack on London that it 
could happen to you again, that there’s nothing you can do to stop it if the 
terrorists set the target on you. So there is a sense of helplessness, of being, 
you know, unable to do anything.
Such comments reinforce the global risk and fear discourses, presented terrorism 
as unstoppable and both governments and citizens as passive victims with no 
choice but to wait to be attacked.
 Here, at last, the nexus with Jihadist discourses of violence becomes apparent. 
The perpetrators were by now described as potential sleeper cells, merging into 
British Muslim communities, their actions fitting the template of previous al- Qaeda 
attacks. In the Channel 4 News studio filmmaker Paul Eedle, who had been 
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tracking communications on Jihadist websites at the time, noted that no credible 
al- Qaeda actor had claimed responsibility for the attacks but this was common; no 
responsibility had been claimed for the 2004 Madrid bombings. Professor Michael 
Clarke argued that the attacks had a political point: ‘to indicate that even in the 
middle of a G8 summit they can get bombs going off in the middle of London. 
That’s the point’. The Sky News Political Editor, Adam Boulton, argued that ‘the 
attacks have in a way succeeded’ because world leaders at the G8 summit were 
forced to respond. In a significant slip from the official register of solidarity 
between civilised nations presented at the G8, Boulton said the attackers had:
got this very fierce response, uh, united response from all the world leaders, 
which has of course elevated the publicity for the story and the public atten-
tion to a new level around the world.
World leaders had amplified the impact of the 7/7 London bombings, with Sky, 
the BBC and others also providing the very publicity he mentions. Media and 
political actors acknowledged and thereby offered credibility and potentially 
authority to the then- unknown perpetrators of the act and to al- Qaeda, whether 
as a direct co- ordinator or indirect inspiration for the attacks. The terror of the 
attacks had been partially contained by praise for the resilience of Londoners 
and emergency service workers. However, despite remaining invisible and rarely 
mentioned in those terms, on the 7 July 2005 Jihadist violence was a central 
matter of concern, and the potential for future attacks was presented as inevit-
able, unstoppable and diffuse.
 Three days later, on 10 July 2005, BBC One broadcast a new documentary 
presented by Peter Taylor called – confusingly – ‘London under attack’. Taylor 
had been investigating al- Qaeda in the year previously, and presented the inter-
views and research he had compiled. As with the original ‘London under attack’ 
and the coverage on the day of 7/7, the thesis of the report was that future attacks 
were inevitable. This was because intelligence services were ‘blind’, unable to 
trace the sleeper cells highlighted by Kochan. Taylor interviewed the former 
head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, Michael Scheuer, who claimed ‘al- Qaeda’s 
first role is inciter and instigator rather than command control’. ‘That may 
explain why the cell got under the wire’, said Taylor. ‘There was not a scrap of 
intelligence. No tell tale “chatter” over the airwaves’.
 That attention to sleeper cells entailed some analysis of the radicalisation 
process. Taylor noticed the lack of pattern to who had been radicalised at that 
time. Sajid Badat and Richard Reid had planned to attack aeroplanes, but Badat 
was ‘a middle class grammar school boy’ whereas Reid, the ‘shoe- bomber’, had 
a less affluent background. Turning to how radicalisation happened, Taylor fully 
implicates the Internet:
TAYLOR: Some jihadi supporters have twisted the news coverage of Thursday’s 
attacks to their own propaganda advantage. And the Internet carries their 
message that it’s revenge for Iraq.
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  And it’s the Internet, the World Wide Web, that drives the radicalising 
power of Iraq. Few attacks take place without a camcorder, computer and 
Internet access – to send the images spinning around the world. In Britain 
there’s an audience too.
EVAN KOHLMAN (US Government Advisor): While a picture may be worth a 
thousand words, a video, uploaded to an Internet site, is worth 10,000.
TAYLOR: Evan Kohlman studies the Internet traffic from Iraq for clients that 
include the US government.
KOHLMANN: Show a video of someone blowing themselves up, killing Ameri-
cans, spreading American blood. That has an incalculable effect in terms of 
recruiting future terrorists.
Taylor does not scrutinise these claims. For instance, a sceptical viewer might 
ask: who are the Jihadi supporters? Is it the Internet ‘driving’ the ‘radicalising 
power’ or people using the Internet? Attacks are recorded and sent ‘spinning 
around the world’, but most aspects of social life are now recorded – think of 
family events, or even routine uploadings – so why remark that the attacks are? 
It would be more surprising that they are not, and it seems like Taylor is part of 
a generation of journalists, policymakers and ‘experts’ who find remarkable a 
media ecology which to younger generations is taken for granted. Is a video 
‘worth 10,000’ words? Is there any evidence that moving images have a quanti-
fiably measurable impact on, say, potential supporters or terrorised publics? And 
then, after have a 10,000-word impact, the viewer is told such videos have ‘an 
incalculable effect’. In sum, such a report is not informative to citizens. It per-
petuates several myths about dangerous technologies and media effects that 
might feed into audience anxieties or simply increase mistrust in BBC reporting. 
Indeed, these ambivalent responses are what we find in analysis of audience 
engagement with such news in Chapter 6.
 Taylor points to the Internet as a source of information on how to commit 
violence as well as a source of material that inspires violence. This is represented 
as an easy, routine opportunity; if Beck points to global risks such as terrorism 
as the ‘dark side’ of globalisation, then the Internet is a central mechanism:
TAYLOR: . . . there would have been no need for Thursday’s bombers to travel to 
learn how to make explosives. Would- be jihadis just have to log on. Train-
ing videos are there at the click of a mouse, with detailed instructions of 
how to make and detonate bombs, carry out kidnappings and make home- 
made weapons. These images were found on the hard drive of a suspect 
allegedly to be connected to the Madrid conspirators. The train bombs were 
detonated by alarms on mobile phones.
KOHLMANN: Even at home you have a how- to guide to terrorism available at the 
touch of a button, how to build a suicide bomb vest, how to build a suicide 
car bomb, the motivation and the tools to commit terror.
SCHEUER (Former Head, CIA Bin Laden Unit): They mounted a great number 
of these things, one of them called the Encyclopaedia of Jihad, it’s 
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apparently about 12,000 pages long, based primarily on US and British 
Special Forces and Marine Corps manuals. You can now, in the comfort of 
your home download those parts of the manual you want to study, whether 
it’s bomb making or small unit combat tactics [. . .]
TAYLOR: It’s like a jihadi do- it-yourself correspondence course.
The Internet becomes a source of insecurity but also a space of danger, in which 
terrorists lurk:
KOHLMANN: In fact, it is the terrorists who have the technological advantage 
when it comes to the Internet – it is the terrorists who were able to mysteri-
ously move through the Internet without being detected, without being seen 
by law enforcement, and able to distribute these materials in many cases 
without any consequences happening to them.
The BBC’s primary analytical response to the attacks of 7 July 2005 amplified 
the danger posed by creating a tenuous connection between technology and ter-
rorism. Taylor closed the programme by noting that the recovered computers of 
the Madrid bombers contained plans for ‘future, high profile targets – like Real 
Madrid’s stadium’. However, the bombers blew themselves up rather than face 
arrest by Spanish police. Did the London bombers – their identity still unknown 
at that time – plan future attacks or would the police find them first? For Taylor, 
‘No one knows what will happen between now and then’.
The Forest Gate raid: ‘if you grow a beard, you’re a 
terrorist’
On Friday 2 June 2006 Metropolitan Police raided two houses on a street in the 
Forest Gate area of East London, arresting the brothers Mohammed Abdul 
Kahar, 23, and Abdul Koyair, 20. Police were acting on intelligence that a chem-
ical weapon was being hidden in one of the houses (BBC News 2006a). The men 
were released without charge on 9 June 2006, and the police apologised (BBC 
News 2006d). The police said they had ‘no choice’ but to act once ‘specific intel-
ligence’ had been received (BBC News 2006b), and Prime Minister Blair reaf-
firmed the precautionary logic: ‘You can only imagine if they fail to take action 
and something terrible happened what outcry would be then, so they are in an 
impossible situation’ (BBC News 2006c). It was significant that one of the 
brothers, Kahar, was shot in the shoulder in what an independent police report 
later declared was an accidental shooting. On 22 July 2005, following the 7/7 
London bombings and failed 21/7 bombings, a Brazilian plumber, Jean Charles 
de Menezes, had been shot by police on the London underground while boarding 
a train after he was wrongly identified as a suspect from the previous day’s failed 
attacks. Armed police had until then not been a feature of UK society, and the 
use of firearms by police had become a matter of public controversy. The 
misidentification of de Menezes raised the possibility that one might be shot for 
873 04-Radicalisation-04.indd   76 18/11/10   12:30:09
T &
 F 
Pro
of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Media events  77
‘looking Muslim’ as well as knowledge that police make mistakes with fatal 
consequences for innocent people. This was the context for the Forest Gate raids. 
We analyse coverage of the day from 10 a.m. until 10 p.m. on BBC1, ITV, Sky 
News and Channel 4 News.
 Officials had not released information about the intelligence being acted upon 
on the day, so the possible presence of a chemical weapon is absent from the 
news coverage. At 10.45 a.m., the BBC correspondent decodes the information 
made available for the viewer by focusing on what kind of incident officials say 
this is and is not. Note that the viewer is not told where this information is from, 
only a mysterious ‘security world’:
Going back to the seriousness of this raid, when a question is asked and it’s 
early days yet, a man’s in custody who hasn’t been charged, but when asked 
‘well, what’s this all about’, the answer from people in the security world is 
that this is an anti- terrorist raid. It relates to international terrorism, that’s 
the code for not Irish terrorism, and if there were targets involved then those 
targets were here in the UK. In other words, they are not talking about 
people who might have gone off and fought overseas. So clearly, no sugges-
tions of who may or may not be guilty of anything. But what the police are 
dealing with are suspicions of international terrorism with targets in the UK 
and that’s the indication of why it’s being taken so seriously.
In this information vacuum, attention is focused on the brothers and how they 
might have been radicalised. The primary theme is that the two brothers had 
gone through a sudden transformation following the 11 September 2001 attacks. 
Neighbours and local people commenting on the street remarked that the 
brothers had grown beards, started wearing Muslim clothing, and regularly 
attended mosques. This speculation is not about whether those commenting 
thought the brothers could be involved in terrorism or if they had shown any 
behaviour that might indicate activity related to terrorism, but instead focused on 
them becoming religious. It is as if a turn to religion is a proxy for turning to 
terrorism. On Channel 4, a young female witness who had previously appeared 
on BBC and ITV said, ‘One of them used to go to my school and before 9/11 he 
was pretty normal looking, you know, Western clothing. And suddenly after 
9/11 I saw the boys with beards and hats [skullcaps] and stuff and I thought that 
was weird’. This connection is refuted on BBC News at 9.03 p.m., where one of 
a group of Muslims being interviewed said, ‘Basically freedom of speech doesn’t 
apply to Muslims. If you grow a beard, you’re a terrorist’. ITV news addresses 
that apparent connection between religiosity and terrorism, its Security 
Correspondent James Mates summarising the views of the brothers’ ‘families 
and friends’: ‘one thing they all agree on is that none of the three mosques they 
attended were radical mosques and there was nothing in these men’s lives that 
suggested in any way that they were connected with terrorism’.
 How did media represent the reactions of the local community on this day 
in mid- 2006, a year on from the 7/7 bombings and the Jean Charles de 
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Menezes shooting, a climate in which British Muslims and other ethnic and 
religious minorities felt securitised and racialised while a majority of British 
citizens supported increased police powers, a more aggressive foreign policy, 
and felt the ‘war on terror’ would last over 20 years and 44 per cent ‘beyond 
their lifetimes’ (Gillespie and O’Loughlin, forthcoming)? The way in which 
television operates privileges the visual, and across the channels analysed, on 
the surface there appears a relatively tranquil scene. Against a split screen 
backdrop depicting policeman in one screen and emergency services, vans and 
forensic tents extending down the street to the houses, the BBC News corre-
spondent says:
it’s a beautiful sunny day in East London and the atmosphere is very, very 
relaxed. You might think there would be tensions in an area like this when a 
raid like this happens, but that certainly has not been what we’re seeing this 
morning . . . there’s a level of curiosity, people are fascinated about the fact 
that this has happened in their community . . . People who lived on the street 
whom we’ve been speaking to say that these were fairly normal people who 
lived in this house . . . this is not a tense feeling and certainly not one of 
imminent danger from anything that might be down the road there.
The people being interviewed appeared to represent what ITV described as, ‘a 
very lively mixed area . . . Pakistanis and Bengalis are communities living side 
by side’. Young people stand around, several laughing, some talking on mobile 
phones. Some are shown playing tennis next to the cordoned off area. At this 
apparently calm stage in the day, BBC News interviews former Metropolitan 
Police officer Peter Power, who featured in the ‘London under attack’ 
simulation- documentary-premediation a year before the 7/7 London bombings. 
He describes the ‘new normal’:
PRESENTER: Peter. If I said to you ten years ago it would be perfectly normal to 
see police and NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] suits on streets in East 
London and it barely raises an eyebrow, what would your reaction have 
been?
POWER: It means what when we go to Heathrow or Gatwick airports, we’re now 
thoroughly used to seeing heavily armed officers walking around . . . Well that 
proceeded seventh of July. The fact is now, when I talked about crossing that 
Rubicon, that officers have to wear this level of protection if they’re going to 
succeed in their task in the front end . . . and it is going to be more frequent. It 
isn’t an everyday occurrence, let’s not get carried away with that. But when 
you say people don’t bat an eyelid, that’s largely true, that’s the way it’s 
going.
  So it means that when we get stopped by police in [the] future and if 
they’re wearing that sort of protective clothing and carrying guns now we 
do what the police officer says for fear of being shot. In the old days we 
stopped when a police officer asked us because we recognised his legitimate 
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authority to stop us. So there are subtle changers here and the police are 
very aware of them. And frankly, what choice have they got?
Powers presents this as an imperfect situation, but an unavoidable one; police 
officers would prefer to be recognised because of their authority, not because of 
mortal fear, but if one accepts the diagnosis of a diffuse terrorist threat then 
‘what choice have they got’?
 As the day proceeds, Channel 4 News begins to note ‘pockets of anger . . . 
fears of a backlash from the Muslim population’ who felt victimised. The Vice- 
Chair of Forest Gate Mosque, Mohammed Zaki Ahmed, told a reporter, ‘There 
is no radical in this Newham borough. It’s very clean and peace- loving people’. 
Sky News interviews a teenage boy who describes hearing smashed glass, 
screams, then looking out of his window to see police with ‘gas masks’. A head 
teacher adds, ‘I think the community at large is quite nervous’. In the Channel 4 
News studio, Azad Ali of the Muslim Safety Forum is interviewed and directly 
addresses the comments of the young female Muslim interviewed earlier who 
claimed to have gone to school with the brothers. Ali said:
Well, one of the shocking statements that was made by one of the persons 
that were interviewed was that they described [the brothers] as normal 
before and weird later on, and that’s blatant Islamophobia. It just goes to 
show the perception of the Muslim community that’s been created by differ-
ent sectors of the community, media included.
Television news does not report what is hidden, and it possible that many people 
stayed indoors after the police raid. Previous research indicates the individuals 
from marginalised or stigmatised communities retreat from public spaces 
(Gillespie and O’Loughlin, forthcoming). Unhappiness at the police action 
became evident in the aftermath. On 18 June, following the brothers’ release and 
appearances in news media, nearly 5,000 people from across different local com-
munities protested at Forest Gate Police Station at the violent nature of the police 
actions (BBC News 2006e).
 In sum, in the absence of official information, journalists interview local 
people who report signs of radicalisation. These alleged signs included a turn to 
religious appearance and behaviour, not signs of involvement in terrorist activ-
ities. This does not help inform audiences about what is happening, and perpetu-
ates a stereotype about the appearance and behaviour of ‘dangerous’ people. 
This model of radicalisation is contested by one TV interviewee, who protests at 
the logic of inference: ‘If you grow a beard, you’re a terrorist’. There is much 
attention on the counterterrorism response, and whether such incidents are part 
of a new normal. The event is interpreted through a schema connecting Forest 
Gate with 7/7 and the mistaken shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes. Ultimately 
the police actions are contested, on screen and in the coming weeks. There is no 
discussion of al- Qaeda or connection of the brothers to terrorist networks, only 
that police acted on suspicion of ‘international terrorism’.
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The transatlantic bomb plot: ‘it’s precautionary rather than 
based on any intelligence’
On 10 August 2006 police arrested a number of men in connection with an 
alleged plot to blow up a number of airlines flying from Heathrow airport in 
London to a number of airports in Canada and the US. Here we analyse news 
coverage on the day of the arrests from BBC in the UK and Fox News in the US. 
The focus of the day was Heathrow. As ‘BREAKING NEWS: TERROR PLOT’ 
rolled across the BBC news screen, cameras lingered on planes idle on runways 
and crowds of passengers standing talking to each other in the departure areas. 
The voiceover adds, ‘these pictures say it all, people waiting, waiting for 
information, knowing they won’t be travelling anywhere anytime soon’. It is 
reported that flights are delayed or cancelled because police had uncovered a plot 
to smuggle liquids in handbags onto planes to assemble and detonate bombs 
mid- flight, and that 18 people had been arrested in London and the Thames 
Valley region. However, the journalist voiceover notes the absence of further 
information. Home Secretary John Reid announces ‘police believe the alleged 
plot [would have threatened] a considerable amount of life’. As for the reporting 
of the Forest Gate raids, as a breaking news story about security, the Heathrow 
bomb plot story is dependent on official sources for concrete information since 
officials are the actors determining the course of events by making the arrests.
 Speculation fills the empty space of the rolling news: journalists begin to inter-
view each other. The BBC presenter in the studio exchanges vague statements 
with BBC Security Correspondent Gordon Corera. First, just as the first question 
in the Forest Gate coverage concerned ‘how serious’ the events were, they seek to 
offer a measure of the significance of the story. The presenter says, ‘This seems 
to have been a very ambitious plot’, to which Corera replies, ‘Very ambitious 
indeed. It seems to be one of the biggest we’ve seen’. He adds, ‘It is important to 
understand the scale of this plot and how close it was to being carried out’. 
However, without concrete information made public about the scale of the plot or 
how close it was to being carried out, these judgements lack meaning.
 However, Corera then acknowledges this lack of information and what this 
might imply: ‘The question is will they find any evidence . . . this is very import-
ant after Forest Gate’. This connection is important. It suggests that after the false 
alarm of the Forest Gate raid, then the default assumption now may be until there 
is evidence made public, the journalist and viewers cannot be sure evidence will 
emerge. Moreover, it links the event to the precautionary principle that is part of 
the response to global risks; if there is a 1 per cent chance of an event happening, 
authorities must presume it will happen and act to stop it, even if the danger never 
arises. A few minutes later Peter Power, the former Metropolitan Police officer 
who appeared in the original ‘London under attack’ simulation and who is now 
appearing live as an expert to analyse this real, unfolding event, said:
unlike the IRA where we used to wait and wait until the bomber put the 
explosives in the car to make your arrest so you’d have tremendous evidence 
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to convict, in this case I’m pretty sure the police erred on the side of caution. 
There may not be strong evidence to associate all those people arrested so 
far with the crime. But had they committed it and carried it out, the risk was 
so great that they had to trigger some [police response] right now. The threat 
was very real. (Italics added)
The relationship between knowledge of the risk or threat in question and communi-
cation about the risk or threat in question is in tension throughout the coverage. 
Early in the coverage, the BBC’s correspondent in Washington, DC, John Kay, 
reports that the US has ‘announced that all flights coming from the UK go up to 
the highest security threat level, which is known as severe or red . . . this will have 
a big impact.’ This impact is illustrated visually by continual footage of people 
standing around, in particular a woman who is holding a child, and interviews with 
airlines consultants who warn about a dire economic impact for the airport owner 
BAA. Later in the day, the Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague is inter-
viewed by the BBC and announces, ‘I think the government is right to have taken 
precautionary measures’. He is challenged by the reporter, who asks whether this 
‘alarms people unnecessarily’. What this tension points to is the emotional or ‘neu-
rotic’ governance Isin pointed to (Chapter 1, this volume): that government some-
times (and increasingly) addresses citizens in emotional terms, offering reassurance 
and support rather than facts or information. Security Correspondent Gordon 
Corera acknowledges this. Following a joint press conference between Home 
Secretary John Reid, the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, the 
Transport Secretary and the Chief Executive of BAA, Corera reports:
I picked up a few messages. One was reassurance saying security measures 
have taken place, as a precautionary step, saying they believe they caught 
the major players involved in this plot. Of course they can’t be sure of that 
and thus they feel they have to raise the security and threat level, but making 
sure it’s precautionary rather than based on any intelligence that they know 
someone is out there planning to attack.
The message is the mood. Government is signalling to citizens – at home and 
abroad – that it is aware there are threats out there and that it is willing to act to 
keep citizens secure. Returning to the ‘London under attack’ simulation, the 
experts advising government presume citizens would be looking for reassurance 
and the impression of leadership under the circumstances now happening.
 A second dilemma reflecting assumptions of the global risk discourse concerns 
the status of al- Qaeda and its relation to the planned attacks. Live coverage of the 
events provided by UK news coverage and Fox News in the US contain frequent 
references to al- Qaeda from its own journalists and, particularly in the US, from 
politicians. Taking a lead from the UK government, the BBC and Sky news do 
not seek to label the alleged attackers as part of any religious group, presumably 
so as not to antagonise British Muslim viewers anxious about casual connections 
being made in media between Islam and terrorism. But the first public response 
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on the day from President Bush, covered on all channels, is to remind his people 
that, ‘this nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy 
our love of freedom’. When this is broadcast on BBC News, the presenter 
reminds the audience twice that Bush used the term ‘Islamic fascists’ (not the 
BBC). Bush immediately connects the (at this stage) alleged plot to a global 
threat. Later, on Fox News, US Congressman Peter Hoekstra notes the role of 
teamwork between US, UK and Pakistani intelligence agencies and argues the 
arrests show ‘the benefit of international coordination and cooperation in the 
global war on terror’. But what is the nature of this apparently global threat? The 
BBC report that the plot ‘follows warning from al- Qaeda that involvement in Iraq 
and Afghanistan as well as recent developments in Lebanon were likely to bring 
further attacks to Britain and the United States’. But in the Sky News studio, 
security analyst Michael Goodman suggests those arrested are ‘likely to be a self- 
radicalising group . . . this is unlikely to be an al- Qaeda related event.’
 If it is the case that the viewer is presented with an unco- ordinated global risk 
of terrorism, is this more threatening than the notion of an al- Qaeda hierarchy 
that is tangible and could potentially be destroyed? Self- radicalising individuals 
would be hard to detect. The very possibility of self- radicalising individuals 
could be used to justify universal precautions, since anybody could be a risk! 
The Sky News presenter asks, ‘Muslim extremists, home grown . . . is this the 
new wave of the future?’
 Like the Forest Gate coverage, rolling news on 10 August 2006 offered little 
information about the arrested men. Journalists sought neighbours to interview. 
Again, it was not clear the neighbours knew the men involved, but their impres-
sions were reported anyway. Around one area cordoned off by police, one said, 
‘there was always people coming and going in there, sort of changing hands all 
the time . . . [I was] never actually knowing who was there’. Some local people 
added, ‘large lorries would pull up every couple of days and load some crates 
and take them round the back . . . certainly there was lots of activity around here’. 
These vague descriptions could apply to many neighbourhoods, presenting 
nothing unusual or exceptional. Officials were keen not to connect the arrests to 
Islam or Muslims, and Metropolitan Police Deputy Commissioner Paul Stephen-
son made a statement concluding, ‘I wish to stress that this is not about com-
munities. It’s about criminals and murderers . . . This is about people who might 
masquerade within a community behind certain faiths’. However, this simply 
implies that murderers or criminals might be masquerading among certain faith 
communities, from which is could be implied that these communities might help 
identity them to the authorities. Indeed, Stephenson confirmed there had been 
‘extensive dialogue with community leaders’. So while Stephenson managed to 
avoid mentioning Islam or Muslims, we might expect viewers to infer he was 
referring to Muslim communities in which murderers were hiding.
 Despite greater attempt to offer restrained reporting, news from both the US 
and UK on the day of transatlantic air plot arrests is characterised by uncertain 
and indefinite spatial and temporal boundaries to the threat; and the possibility of 
‘home- grown’ radicalised bombers undermines the relevance of boundaries 
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anyway. Live news coverage again offers an ‘extended present’ promising a 
future featuring self- radicalising individuals, more ‘Forest Gate- style’ raids on 
Muslim homes, and reassurance from government. This future is brought into 
the present, but does it create fear among the audiences who watch it? ‘The 
future is’, writes Nowotny (2008: 2), and ‘[i]ts content, its shape, and its fullness 
– the images we construct of it – always have significance only in the here and 
now’. An analysis solely of the mediation of the future alone cannot tell us its 
significance, so we turn in Chapter 6 to examine audience understandings of rad-
icalisation, terrorism events and the discourses of risk, fear and resilience.
Conclusion
Broadcast media like television and radio contribute to an extended present, a 
representation of unfolding events as a singular series of ongoing crises within 
an global war on terror of indefinite and unknowable duration. This continuity- 
of-the- moment was reinforced by premediations in which broadcasters joined 
with state and unofficial ‘experts’ to simulate and anticipate – rather accurately 
it transpired – actual attacks to come. Such coverage inadvertently sustains dis-
courses of global fear and risk which may contribute not only to the legitimate 
government counterterrorism strategies predicated on the global war on terror, 
but not necessarily help constitute the ‘reality’ of al- Qaeda as a meaningful 
entity. This discursive reinforcement depends on two factors. First, there is a 
lack of verifiable information journalists can report about the suspected perpetra-
tors and nature of the incident, which creates a vacuum filled by speculation by 
unreliable neighbour testimonies, expert analyses and by security correspondents 
themselves. Second, concepts of global fear and risk are sustained by the lack of 
a clear understanding of what ‘radicalisation’ might be, how the presumed radi-
calisation process operates, or how al- Qaeda may be connected to these specific 
incidents. This absence enables the broader condition of ‘hypersecurity’ in the 
post- 9/11 period, the sense of uncertain, contingent but generalised threat. Yet, 
even without naming al- Qaeda or individual suspects, reference to the need to 
engage Muslim communities in the aftermath of these breaking security events 
offers an identity to the threat if only by implication.
 Mainstream television becomes the primary news source at times of cata-
strophic security events, but media literate audiences and policymakers are 
reflexive about how such events are constructed, staged or contested for political 
ends. Nevertheless, the features we find central to the form taken by television 
coverage of security events adds considerable nuance to the basic questions of 
legitimation of Jihadists or counterterrorism strategies. Media representations of 
normality, temporality, social identities and resilience, and the role of the Inter-
net will, we suggest, contribute to how audiences make sense of radicalisation as 
a real, credible, verifiable phenomenon; how audiences then confer legitimacy 
can only be ascertained once these basic or underlying understandings of the 
media- security nexus are identified.
873 04-Radicalisation-04.indd   83 18/11/10   12:30:09
T &
 F 
Pro
of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
5 The mainstream nexus of 
radicalisation
The 2008–2009 Gaza conflict
In our opening chapter we set out the context for our investigation into the rela-
tionship between media and radicalisation, namely the new media ecology. It 
would be misleading to think the of development of this mediatised environment 
as a shift from so- called ‘old’ to ‘new’ media. These categories do not serve an 
understanding of the dynamics of our new media ecology but rather serve to 
obfuscate the connectivities through which media content and forms are ‘reme-
diated’ (Bolter and Grusin 1999) through both established and emergent media, 
and through what Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2007) conceive of as a ‘renewal’ of 
mainstream media. Indeed, that which Dan Gillmor (2006) calls ‘Big Media’ 
such as the BBC, CNN, New York Times or Le Monde, remain dominant and all 
have invested significantly in their digital and online presence. Instead, the new 
media ecology involves a struggle between the established and relatively ordered 
regime of mainstream news – particularly television news – and an ‘ordered dis-
order’ of information that is potentially much more diffused.
 Part of the new equilibrium of this ecology is the ways in which the Internet 
and other digital media are both conceived of and inhabited by increasingly 
entrenched ‘mainstream’ news cultures. Entrenched, that is, as they are often 
demarcated and defined in contradistinction with that which is ‘outside’ or 
beyond the mainstream, the alternative, the unregulated and limitless domains of 
the Internet. And it is precisely the uninhabited (by those in the mainstream) 
zones of the new media ecology that are often represented (in mainstream news 
discourses) as the central incubator and harbinger of the evils of the digital: radi-
calisation, terrorism, and paedophilia, for example. Moreover, across our 
projects exploring radicalisation and language of extremism, consumers of main-
stream news consistently saw themselves as exempt from or immune to the influ-
ences or ‘effects’ of such evils, whether more ‘directly’ consumed via unofficial, 
amateur or ‘radical’ sources or as mediated through and translated by Big Media. 
In terms of the potential of any media to radicalise or to promote extremist views 
and violence, we found a clear disjuncture between a perception of the vulnera-
bility to persuasion of ‘other’ individuals and groups, against a sense that the 
individual self being interviewed is impervious.
 In this way, we can map a mainstream/non- mainstream distinction as one of 
the critical characteristics of the new media ecology, operating in at least two 
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key dimensions. The first is the multiple ways in which mainstream news media 
represent, translate and remediate that which it takes or constructs as inhabiting 
media- in-the- wild: all that which is amateur, unofficial, unregulated, and espe-
cially that which it self- censors as not being appropriate for its imagined main-
stream audience (too explicit, graphic or violent, for example). For the purposes 
of this chapter, we will mostly refer to this dimension in terms of ‘translation’ 
and also take it at its literal meaning in relation to the extraction and translation 
of online extremist texts in Arabic into Western English mainstream news. The 
second dimension is the distinction routinely made by mainstream news consum-
ers that they individually possess a particular reflexive awareness (as noted 
above), such that they are not vulnerable to mainstream or non- mainstream 
media influences. This awareness extends to a capacity to identify mainstream or 
non- mainstream audience ‘types’ that were vulnerable. We call this the ‘other-
ing’ of the mainstream. Both of these mainstream/non- mainstream distinctions, 
developed partly in response to the rapid emergence of the Internet, have been 
vehicles for the comprehension or otherwise of the discourses of radicalisation 
in our new media ecology. In this chapter we use some examples of translation 
and othering drawn from different contexts to illuminate the significance of the 
mainstream in the mediatisation of radicalisation.
The mainstream nexus of radicalisation
One of the characteristics said to be distinctive of the contemporary thoroughly 
mediatised era is that of saturation, of the pervasiveness or ubiquity of media 
and digital technologies. If one then takes media as the life blood of terrorists in 
terms of the velocity and penetration of the terrorist message and threat, then as 
we set out in our introductory chapter, the media themselves have become 
weaponised. In this way the potential threat posed by those who advocate and 
undertake violence has taken on a persistent co- presence through the very ‘infor-
mational infrastructure’ through which everyday life in the developed world is 
experienced. The condition of connectivity – the connective turn – has facilitated 
a shift from when nodal conflicts and threats to civilisation punctuated the twen-
tieth century to today’s seemingly perpetual connection with wars and the threat 
of terrorism (cf. Shaw 2005). Of course, there are important qualifications that 
can be made to this statement in terms of the ‘chicken- and-egg’ constitution of 
this relationship, as well as a need to avoid technological determinism. But it is 
not just an infrastructure of media that has ushered in this sense of a continuity 
and pervasiveness of threat, it is also a mainstream news culture of insecurity, 
that which we identified as hypersecurity in our opening chapter, that has accel-
erated as a response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States. Richard Grusin identifies one of the key dynamics of this news culture as 
‘premediation’ (see also Chapter 4). This he defines as ‘a form of medial pre- 
emption’ and he argues: ‘Premediation works to prevent citizens of the global 
mediasphere from experiencing again the kind of systemic or traumatic shock 
produced by the events of 9/11 by perpetuating an almost constant, low level of 
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fear or anxiety about another terrorist attack’ (2010: 2). So, in the wake of 9/11 
(but also amplified by the seeming succession of terrorist attacks over the past 
decade including in London, Madrid and Mumbai) mainstream news generates 
continual speculation as to the possibility, nature and timing of another terrorist 
attack, so that there is a consistent level of preparedness to mitigate the effec-
tiveness in terms of surprise, shock and related trauma, if and when such an 
attack takes place. This is more than simply the premeditative simulations such 
as the BBC’s ‘London under attack’ broadcast before London was actually 
attacked; Grusin is referring to a broader social orientation to the future which 
cuts across any issue, not just security.
 Furthermore, the constancy of the premediated news discourse on terrorism 
functions to diminish journalists’ responsibility (and the responsibility of other 
public agents of speculation in their contributions to these discourses) for the 
impact of such events should they occur in the future. In contrast, 9/11 was 
seen as effective terrorist attack partly because of the unhindered and paradox-
ically unmediated means through which the shock and trauma was delivered 
live and direct into the homes and lives of mass audiences, in other words an 
exemplar of the weaponisation of the media. The frames, vernaculars and 
formats through which news is routinely packaged and that constitute news 
mediation broke down; viewers were presented simply with footage, as jour-
nalists did not know what to say; thus the containing function of news 
mediation failed. In this way some culpability for the immediate but also the 
extended impact of the 9/11 attacks was attached to or felt by the principal 
conveyors of the mediatised experience, namely journalists and other news 
workers, hence their subsequent strategy of premediation. And it is this strat-
egy of premediation that is both responsive to the apparent pervasiveness and 
continuity of the new media ecology connectivity of terrorist threat, but also 
that perpetuates it. This kind of double bind parallels the ‘radical ambiguity’ 
that we set out in Chapter 1, namely that ‘western societies themselves gov-
erned by terror in the process of trying to bring terror within the orbit of their 
political rationalities and governmental technologies’ (Dillon 2007: 8). In other 
words, mainstream news media are entangled in and spin further the very same 
web of hypersecurity through the very strategic speculation and premediation 
they undertake which functions to contain such future events and to render 
them ‘reportable’. This contrasts with the mainstream news media’s default 
but latent containment of terrorist and other catastrophic events through repeti-
tion as a key mechanism of amelioration, as was so readily evident in the 
hours, weeks and months following 9/11 (cf. Silverstone 2002; Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin 2010b).
 In terms of the cross- cutting dimensions of the mainstream identified above, a 
fundamental paradox, and thus problematic for any inquiry into contemporary 
discourses of and about radicalisation, is the fact that the mainstream is often 
conceived of as a relatively benign node in the new media ecology. So, emergent 
discourses on and responses to the nature of the threat(s) posed by the rapid 
establishment of the Internet, for example, are distracted from a focused 
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consideration of the significance of the role or potential role of the mainstream 
in amplifying and/or assuaging such threats of violent extremism or terrorism. 
Put differently, the consequences of the discursive ‘translation’ of terror mes-
sages, their (re)presentation in and through so- called mainstream media (includ-
ing on the Internet) and their interpretation by audiences and ‘users’, is 
significantly overlooked by those who are charged with the very study of radi-
calisation. For instance, the Change Institute’s comprehensive Studies into 
Violent Radicalisation, commissioned by the European Commission, aimed to 
explore ‘the beliefs, narratives and ideologies that underpin violent radicalism 
with a view to developing a much deeper understanding of the causes and reme-
dies for violent radicalisation as part of an ideological response to the main ter-
rorist threat facing Europe’ (2008: 4). However, despite the considerable 
resources invested in the organisation and the undertaking of ‘145 stakeholder 
and primary fieldwork interviews in four Member States’ (ibid.) and also in an 
extensive ‘analysis of the content and imagery of terrorist rhetoric and propa-
ganda found on the internet’ (op. cit.: 8) this research excluded consideration of 
other mainstream news media and the role of its agents (i.e. commentators, jour-
nalists, ‘experts’) in translating and remediating ‘the beliefs, narratives and ide-
ologies’ that it sought to understand. In what follows, we will illuminate some of 
these components of the mainstream, seemingly disregarded or not assumed as 
significant in such studies.
 To begin with, a significant proportion of extremist discourses that circulate 
online, for instance from the group seen as the most prominent of which the ‘war 
on terror’ was being waged against, al- Qaeda, is at least originally in Arabic. A 
critical question interrogated through our New Security Challenges and CPNI 
research projects was: what is the means by which extremist ‘messages’ are 
translated from Arabic, for instance from online postings, videos, and discussion 
groups, into a version available to and/or by the English news mainstream? It is 
the systemic and institutionalised nature of the dynamics of translation that 
appear to be overlooked in terms of an understanding of the iterations and pene-
tration of extremist messages in our new media ecology. We found that there are 
two dominant sources or modes of translation. The first are the terrorist groups 
themselves. So, to take al- Qaeda as an example, this organisation became more 
active over the period 2008–2010 than previously in providing translations for 
the main ‘productions’ from their media wing within days of their release. Many 
videos, such as as- Sahab productions, are released with English subtitles and 
there appears to be a continuing improvement in the quality of these translations. 
The main translation providers include as- Sahab, the Global Islamic Media 
Front (GIMF ), and the Jihad Media Battalion.
 Whilst the communication wings of terrorist groups are becoming more 
mainstream- savvy in their attempts to maximise the reach of their outputs, over 
the same period the number of ‘terrorism monitoring groups’ has increased. 
These monitoring organisations tend to provide translations for statements by 
senior al- Qaeda figures, rather than regular Jihadist propaganda, and their 
services are often not freely available but are paid for by those in or representing 
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the mainstream (news, security services, academics). These groups include: the 
SITE Intelligence Group (analysts/academics), LauraMansfield.com, and The 
Nine/Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation (which provides full access 
without subscription). It is these ‘translation gatekeepers’ then who are poten-
tially one of the principal determinants of the meaning of extremist messages for 
Western audiences, journalists and policymakers. Our investigation of how these 
translations enter into and are remediated through mainstream discourses found 
a simple, consistent but significant disjuncture: those producing and shaping 
mainstream security discourses are often not working with the original terrorist 
texts, but with translations. These translations often obfuscate or lose altogether 
what is significant to much of the meaning conveyed in the original texts, since 
they only translate one figure’s words within a whole multimedia production. 
One significant consequence of this is a potentially pervasive and diminished 
understanding of why terrorist discourses might have resonance with those indi-
viduals and groups who can consume the original text with a full command of 
the complete richness of various songs, poems and other modes of attunement to 
the mood of the text, which are routinely and often entirely omitted from 
Western mainstream news reporting. So, in sum, mainstream security journalism 
reports on terrorism in a way that retards public understanding of al- Qaeda and 
its sympathisers (see Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010b) and much more work is 
required to reveal the differential consumption of extremist messages by main-
stream news publics.
 We now turn to provide an example of mainstream news translation or rather 
speculative remediation of the threat posed by terrorism, and British government 
responses to it. The example is a discussion on BBC Radio 4’s Today pro-
gramme between the news programme’s anchor, Sarah Montague, and her studio 
guests. These are Ed Husain who is a self- declared ‘former radical’ and co- 
founder of one of the mainstream translation organisations, the anti- extremism 
think- tank the Quilliam Foundation, and an academic, Dr John Gearson from 
King’s College, London. In Box 5.1, we have set out our transcription of this 
exchange broadcast live on the morning of the 8 September 2009.
 Husain, as an expert on the subject of radicalisation given his claims to have 
‘travelled a journey’ of radicalisation and then de- radicalisation, might be 
expected to possess a readily demarcated and well- honed account of this phe-
nomenon. Yet, his lengthy opening response is notable for the extensive scope 
he affords radicalisation and the range of its constituents including extremist 
websites and the ‘digital ghetto’ of satellite television channels. The media he 
indicts here appear as relatively obvious and direct radicalising influences and 
there is a fast- emergent history of the use of niche digital channels or pro-
grammes both as tools of extremist propaganda as well as counterterrorism. 
Whereas, our position is that it is precisely the ways in which messages and texts 
are routinely translated, conceived of and diffused across the mainstream media 
(including in this very same Today programme) that demands greater attention 
in understanding the trajectories and the reception of the discourses of 
radicalisation.
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Box 5.1 Today programme BBC R4 broadcast Tuesday, 8 September 
2009
SARAH MONTAGUE [M, BELOW]: It’s clear from the details of the trans- 
Atlantic bomb plot that a huge terrorist attack was averted by police back in 
August 2006. So does it suggest that our counterterrorism approach is 
working? Ed Husain [H, below] is a former radical who co- founded an anti- 
extremism think- tank, the Quilliam Foundation. He joins us from Westmin-
ster and we’re also joined by Dr John Gearson [G, below] who’s reader in 
terrorism studies at King’s College London and Director for the Centre for 
Defence Studies. Good morning to you both.
H: =Good morning
G: =Good morning
Ed Husain, do you think this shows that we’ve got it right?
H: Mm well, yes and no, um it shows that we’ve got this one particular operation 
right, thank God. But um I can just sit here and refer you to much of our 
research but also my own thoughts on the fact that we have you know lots, I 
don’t want to say millions, but tens of thousands of Muslims who live in 
Britain physically but psychologically were connected to Pakistan or other 
Muslim- majority societies. Evidence of that is the fact that we’ve got a huge 
radicalisation problem in in in the prison service, ten thousand Muslims in 
prison, a disproportionate number to any other minority community, erm 
sharing space with a huge number of terrorism convicts, s- private seminaries 
erm. That’s the second point, private seminaries that have literalist rigid 
mind- set from the Deabandi?? School, y’know the school that produced the 
Taleban- run h- – several institutions across the north produce huge amounts 
of imams that will be taking over mosques in years to come. A third issue will 
be websites which provide virtual communities for extremists to reject the 
kind of news that came out yesterday as news from unreliable sources and 
continuing to plan the kinds of things they plan. Fourth would be the dis-
placed Somalians that don’t feel part of the British Muslim community nor 
part of Somalia nor part of Britain and what we saw with the al- Shabab move-
ment recently in Somalia gives every rise for concern there. A fifth concern 
would be the satellite television channels that we’ve got on on what one might 
one might call the digital ghetto
M: OK . . .
H: I mean I could go on,
M: yea-
H: the problem is ubiquitous an- and it remains with us.
M: Dr John Gearson and the fact that Ed Husain could go on, suh- would suggest 
that the problem’s got worse in the last few years
G: Yes, I think in intelligence and policing terms we can be quietly satisfied so far 
that we’ve averted major attacks erm in many cases and and only one signi-
ficant attack, 7/7, has been successful. But that said I think even people within 
the government would accept that the PREVENT strand of their counter- 
terrorism strategy that is to to undermine radicalisation has not made as much 
progress and the problem here is that we still have not managed to, I believe, 
coherently link our domestic counterterrorism struggle with what we’re doing 
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overseas to prevent terrorism getting a foot- hold in countries like Afghani-
stan. We have not articulated other than saying it’s linked properly how these 
these two strands go together, but more importantly we haven’t co- ordinated 
the two strategies in reality. We’ve got a police and intelligence service pro-
tecting us and we have frankly a military campaign and mostly American- led 
which is not always in synch with our domestic measures.
M: How do you link them?
G: Well you you start trying to identify the linkage between counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism to try to understand rather better than we have to date how the 
activities that you undertake in Pakistan and in Afghanistan may have an effect. 
But that’s not to say that you will not re- continue to have a residual rump of 
people who are already radicalised and and recruiters trying to take more people 
into that. What we need to do is target the majority of Muslims who have got 
grievances which perhaps can be undermined by better explanations. But that- 
that’s not to say that there will not be people who will be continue to be 
radicalised.
M: Right. Ed Husain, the government always tells us that the reason we’re in 
Afghanistan is to prevent terrorism here, there’s almost an argument from lis-
tening to what both of you say, that actually you’re more likely to prevent ter-
rorism here by not being in Afghanistan.
H: That’s a valid criticism and that’s a valid argument but but your point and Dr 
John Gearson’s point both refer to foreign policy a- a- in response I would only 
say that we have, y’know, in excess of about four million Muslims living in 
America and America is quote unquote at war in Afghanistan, in occupation in 
Iraq. And yet we don’t have that kind of radicalisation among American 
Muslims that want to blow up fellow Americans. The question is why. My 
answer is that there’s a greater sense of belonging, integration, shared participa-
tion between Muslims in America and wider society. We don’t have that here 
yet. And therefore this is just a centre-
M: But there- but there’s talk of that and that talk of the PREVENT element 
which Dr John Gearson says hasn’t made as much progress, is it making any 
progress?
H: It’s making progress, but Dr Gearson is right, it’s not making a- as much 
progress as it should because we’ve got Muslim leaders and community 
groups that are in denial about the nature of the problem much rather blame 
foreign policy and government than admit that we’ve got an infrastructural 
institutional ideological problem in our midst.
M: Dr John Gearson would you also point the finger towards Muslim groups 
rather than erm the host community shall we say and the government?
G: Well I don’t think it’s about pointing fingers. I think it’s more about identify-
ing how the enemies of this country exploit grievances, not to attack those 
grievances necessarily but to under- undermine that ideology as best you can. 
But also let’s let’s be a little bit honest about what we face. Er the British had 
tremendous intelligence about the threat from
M: Just briefly
G: the the IRA for twenty- five years and it didn’t stop all attacks because 
[y- something]
M: Dr John Gearson and Ed Husain we must leave it there, thank you.
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 The apparent imprecision as to the relative weight, order of priority, or relation-
ship between the elements of radicalisation listed by Husain supports our argument 
as to the sheer scope of the term having increasingly ‘gone wild’ as we set out in 
Chapter 1. Furthermore, the sense of a pervasive condition of hypersecurity (also 
introduced in our opening chapter) is reflected in the programme anchor’s inter-
vention, halting Husain’s list from growing longer, and he then reflects ‘I mean I 
could go on . . . the problem is ubiquitous and it remains with us’. This oft- stated 
yet ill- defined sense of the pervasiveness of radicalisation serves to enhance its 
unquantifiable character and thus the uncertainty of the threat it poses, in terms of 
timing, place, frequency or other scalable attributes. This in turn makes the pros-
pects for its neutralisation difficult to grasp: if ‘radicalisation’ is not understood, 
not even understandable, how can ‘de- radicalisation’ policies be effective?
 It is only at the time of the identification of suspects of planned or actual ter-
rorist attacks or, as with the example of this radio extract, when bomb plotters 
are prosecuted, that news discourse or indeed policymakers are available to side-
step the significant unknowns and unknowables of radicalisation. This may seem 
initially an obvious point to make, but it is precisely because the process of radi-
calisation in this context can only be successfully defined in relation to a violent 
act or attempted violent act. In this way, the ultimate and only definitive measure 
of someone having been radicalised – actual attempts at violence – sets a very 
high threshold for its attainment and labelling. So, in the context of pervasive 
speculation and premediation, these few moments of clarity and fact are neces-
sarily a retrospective action.
 Mainstream news media are very effective in assembling these stories. Tele-
vision and radio news and documentaries have a commanding capacity to digit-
ally stitch together biographical details of the radicalised with ‘choices’ they 
were faced with at different stages in relation to radicalising influences (people, 
places and events), interspersed with ‘witness’ commentaries, ‘warning signs’ 
(and security services’ apparent failure to notice or to act sufficiently in response 
to those signs) to produce and package a chronological process which retrospec-
tively accounts for the violence or attempted violence of an individual or group 
as the end consequence of their ‘radicalisation’. And it is this assemblage of rad-
icalisation that can be seen as a process of ‘retrospective premediation’ (Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin 2009), a retrospective coherence afforded to various signifiers 
of radicalisation that can only be illuminated through a working back from the 
final act, but which can then enable a narrative arc that suggests those concerned 
were ‘always going to’ be vulnerable to radicalisation. It is in this way that the 
vagaries of the ubiquity of the ‘huge radicalisation problem’ (Husain, above) and 
its tangible manifestation create a discursive disjuncture or even credibility gap 
that policymakers have found increasingly difficult to fill.
The 2008–2009 Gaza conflict: the perfect storm
However, where Western mainstream news could be seen to have the greatest 
potential for impact, or for being ‘weaponised’, in the translating and amplifying 
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of the discourses of radicalisation, is in ‘event time’ (Gitlin 1980; Hoskins 2001, 
2004a, 2004b). This is the time during which the news reporting on an ongoing 
event has the potential to feed, or is increasingly represented as feeding into affect 
or shape the event itself. There is a wide spectrum of intensities to this ‘effect’ 
depending upon the nature and duration of the event and also the scale of the 
coverage. Typically, television has been seen as the pre- eminent medium in 
shaping events which it depicts, and increasingly so over the past 20 years as news 
channels have become much more competitive and promotional in positioning 
their own correspondents ‘into’ the stories being covered. This construction of an 
authorial relationship to events involves a televisual news discursive shift from 
‘here is the world’ to ‘we bring you the world’, and even to ‘we shape the world’ 
(cf. Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2007). In the context of translation by mainstream 
news discourses in event time, this can be characterised not as retrospective pre-
mediation but ‘speculative remediation’, which refers to how news content from 
numerous sources – professional and amateur, factual and entertainment – are 
stitched together in real- time to establish meanings of an ongoing event which tel-
evision itself is bringing us, the viewers. We now turn to explore a key example of 
speculative remediation to assess the relationship between online (non- mainstream) 
discourses of radicalisation and their articulation (and non- articulation) in the 
mainstream relating to an ongoing event. This event is the Israeli military assault 
on Gaza launched on 27 December 2008 and which c ntinued for 22 days.
 In this chapter, we focus on this conflict as an exemplar of potential radicali-
sation. This was due to the nature and extensiveness of news reporting around 
the globe of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza, particularly in rela-
tion to the availability of a steady stream of images of Gazan civilian suffering, 
and especially of children. In addition, reporting focused on a sense of an 
absence of a response from Western governments and other organisations pro-
portionate to the media coverage. As we find in the analysis below, these two 
aspects were expected to raise anger among Muslim audiences, even to ‘radical-
ise’ some. First, we give an overview of some of the controversies of the British 
broadcast media reporting of the conflict to provide an insight into the nature 
and intensities of the debate in its Western mainstream context. Second, we 
explore online extremist discourses using the plight of Gazans (and the also 
absence of intervention by the West) to legitimise a call for global Jihad. And, 
finally, we focus on how a mainstream news programme in the UK – BBC2’s 
Newsnight – represented the relationship between images of apparently 
unchecked Israeli destruction of Gaza and its people on the one hand, and a 
process of radicalisation in UK communities and online on the other; in other 
words, a case of speculative remediation.
 The Israelis claimed their offensive was in response to rocket attacks from 
Hamas in Gaza on their population. At the end of the almost three- week long 
assault, the death toll had reached over 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, with a 
great deal of the Gaza strip left in ruins and tens of thousands made homeless. 
The Israeli government prevented access to most foreign journalists wishing to 
enter the conflict zone. As a result, most had to report from the Israeli- Gaza 
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border in the absence of individual journalistic co- verification of accounts. Nev-
ertheless, there was nonetheless a steady stream of images and video of injury, 
death, and destruction, available for their reports and played out across news 
media around the globe and online.
 UK mainstream broadcast news became embroiled in a series of controversies 
over their coverage of the Gaza conflict. Notable of these was Channel 4 News 
film reports of alleged attacks on or near (and that distinction became just one 
point of controversy) UN- run schools in Gaza. The incident that dominated some 
of the reporting – and continued to with post- conflict recriminations and accusa-
tions and Israeli, UN and journalistic investigations – was the killing of 43 
people (initially reported as 30 people) by an Israel Defence Force (IDF ) mortar 
on 6 January 2009 just outside the UN- run al- Fakhura primary school at the 
Jabalya refugee camp. On Channel 4 News that evening Alex Thompson, report-
ing live from Jerusalem, introduced a report by their foreign affairs correspond-
ent Jonathan Rugman on the Gaza border: ‘Much of the footage of the carnage 
of the school is far too graphic to show on British television at this hour in the 
evening. But his report does contain distressing images from the start’. The 
video footage includes scenes of the panic and destruction following the incident 
at Jabalya, including the carrying away of bloodied civilian wounded and dead, 
including children. Thompson states in his introduction, and also repeated twice 
more in the recorded report, that the UN gave the GPS co- ordinates of its schools 
and other buildings to the Israelis, and hence these are locations where Palestini-
ans had sought shelter. According to the IDF these are also where Hamas fighters 
seek cover, from where they launch mortar shells into Israel. Channel 4’s report-
ing of the IDF ’s use of a variety of weapons, especially white phosphorous, pro-
voked the Israeli government into taking to the airwaves to fiercely challenge the 
channel’s reporting of the conflict and accusing the programme’s reporter, 
Jonathan Miller, of being ‘strong- armed’ by Hamas.1
 This was just one example of Israel’s attempts to learn lessons from its public 
relations failure after its attacks against Lebanon in 2006. This time, initially at 
least, Israel was much more effective in mounting a real- time global news pres-
ence by providing official spokespeople to as many international broadcasters as 
possible (Gowing 2009: 58). However, for Gowing (ibid.) it was the ‘informa-
tion doers’ that significantly shifted the balance of support away from Israel in 
terms of the media messages of the conflict. He argues:
Despite all the detailed planning to counter the new information transpar-
ency, Israel had largely failed. Too much digital data and imagery flowed 
from Gaza on multiple platforms in a host of ways that defied all Israel’s 
control measures. None of what emerged helped the Israeli case to justify its 
operation to smash Hamas’s military capability. Instead it undermined their 
claims, especially because of the way the IDF ’s official statements appeared 
to be tailored more for propaganda purposes than to make a realistic repre-
sentation of what took place, including on apparent targeting errors.
(Gowing 2009: 59)
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Whilst the Israeli cause appeared to be suffering via digital information flows 
and their seemingly propagandistic responses, in the UK it was not only Channel 
4 News that was caught up in the fierce mediatised climate over the legitimacy 
of the Israeli offensive in Gaza and the politics of news coverage. For example, 
the BBC was subject to intense public and political pressure, receiving more 
than 10,000 complaints following its decision not to air an appeal by the Disas-
ters Emergence Committee (DEC) to raise emergence funds for humanitarian aid 
for Gaza. This pressure also manifested itself in a widely reported mass placard- 
waving rally of protestors outside the BBC’s Broadcasting House. A BBC 
spokesman explained the Corporation’s rationale for their decision not to air the 
DEC appeal, as owing to: ‘question marks about the delivery of aid in a volatile 
situation and also to avoid any risk of compromising public confidence in the 
BBC’s impartiality in the context of [a] news story.’2 Meanwhile, ITV, Channel 
4 and Channel 5 all broadcast the appeal, and Sky News did not. In a message to 
all Sky news staff, John Ryley, Head of Sky News, explained:
the nature of an appeal is that it sets out to provoke a specific response from 
the viewer. We don’t believe that broadcasting such an appeal on Sky News 
can be combined with the balance and context that impartial journalism 
aims to bring to the highly charged and continuing conflict in Gaza.3
 In sum, the intensifying disjuncture between the global news mainstream’s 
often graphic depiction of the suffering of Palestinian civilians at the hands of 
the IDF and the apparent lack of a meaningful response or intent to intervene 
from Western governments in full sight of this humanitarian disaster fed a crisis 
of military, political and journalistic legitimacy at a number of intersecting levels 
in the new media ecology. For instance, the BBC’s claims as to ‘impartiality’ in 
deciding not to broadcast the DEC Gaza appeal attracted more of a conspirato-
rial clamour than would other broadcasters who made the same decision (such as 
Sky) who do not have similar historical, political or institutional status, nor com-
parable global reputation and reach. In this way, the Gaza conflict was a perfect 
storm in its event- time connectivity of various sets of grievances that could man-
ifest in a powerful legitimising of a global Jihad (against Israel and her allies). 
We now turn to explore evidence of attempts to harness this perfect storm in 
online extremist discourses, before concluding this chapter with our examination 
of the Newsnight speculative remediation of these discourses.
The 2008–2009 Gaza conflict: legitimisation of global Jihad
Following the launch of the Israeli offensive on Gaza on 27 December 2008, post-
ings to and discussions on Jihadi online forums quickly became almost entirely 
focused on the conflict, and the actual volume of traffic also significantly increased. 
For example, compared with an average of 8–13 postings per day on the al- Faloja 
forum, the Gaza crisis triggered an increase to an average of 60–65 postings per 
day and a ten- fold increase in the number of pages of content. Jihadi forums placed 
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large banners across their home pages with declarations of support for Gazans and 
images of civilian casualties. For example, one such banner on the al- Faloja home 
page read, ‘There is no good in a life in which honour is violated and men’s digni-
ties trodden on by the enemies of Allah. Don’t the images of your sisters [refer-
ence to female Palestinians] crying out for help move you?!’4 Most of these 
messages were attributed directly to senior Jihadi figures, including from al- Qaeda. 
Messages urged violent attacks against Jews, ‘crusaders’, and those countries seen 
to be allied to them, particularly the US. The calls for and postings seeking to 
legitimise a global Jihad on Jihadi forums following the opening of the Israeli 
assault on Gaza were comparable in their intensity and extent to those that fol-
lowed the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.
 As early in the conflict as 29 December, al- Faloja member Jundallah posted 
some points explicitly detailing acts on ‘How to Support Gaza’5:
1 Target all Jews on Muslim land [This provides religious legitimacy for such 
attacks];
2 If you don’t have weapons, buy them or get them through targeting police 
or security forces [This provides legitimacy: them being ‘apostates’ and 
‘serving tyrant rulers to crush Muslims’];
3 Fight individually or in groups, kill [them] individually or in groups [This 
echoes Abu Musab al- Suri’s teachings];
4 If you decide to publicise the operations/attacks you carry out, make sure to 
accompany the news with pictures . . . Only report/publish suitable news. 
For example, do not report the targeting of apostates and their soldiers [i.e. 
Muslim police/security] but only that of Jews and Christians. [This is signi-
ficant in the jihadists’ efforts to legitimise their acts and avoid publishing 
material that could incriminate them. However, the writer contradicts 
himself. First he explains, resorting to Sharia, why it is legitimate to target 
Muslim governments and their soldiers. He then asks jihadists to keep 
private news or images on the targeting of these ‘apostates’.]
5 Do not say:
a I am not prepared [for jihad];
b I am not sure of the legitimacy of this matter;
c Do it [jihad] yourself rather than preaching about it [which the author 
himself seems to be doing].
Following the legitimacy crisis al- Qaeda faced at the time (see Chapters 2 and 3) 
advocates of the Salafi- Jihadi ideology in general focused on ‘defensive Jihad’, 
or Jihad in conflict zones, to avoid accusations of wrongful killing of civilians. 
Explicit calls for Jihad in peaceful countries in general and in Western ones in 
particular had been relatively absent in Jihadist media. However, the Gaza offen-
sive transformed their approach. For example, proponents of the Salafi- Jihadi 
ideology no longer shied away from calling for an all- open Jihad against not 
only aggressors but those who support them (or are perceived to do so) or who 
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do nothing to stop them. By early 2009, vague calls for Jihad had been replaced 
by strong and daring calls for Jihad against Israelis, Westerners, Arab rulers and 
their militaries.
 Several Jihadi media major productions were released on forums explicitly 
legitimising as well as promising attacks against the West. On 22 January, as- 
Sahab released a video statement by top al- Qaeda ideologue Sheikh Abu Yahya 
al- Libbi in relation to Gaza. In his speech, al- Libbi named Britain as the main 
reason behind the misery and sufferings of Palestinians, thus seeking to legiti-
mise attacks, and even promising such attacks ‘soon’. He mocked political 
efforts being made by Britain to secure a cease to hostilities over Gaza: ‘a wolf 
is a wolf even if dressed as a lamb’.6 On 18 January, as- Sahab released a video, 
in German, of a ‘mujahid’ German- Muslim who promises a great attack in 
Germany soon, saying that Germany did not take lesson in the July 2005 bomb-
ings in London.7 On the same day,8 al- Fajr circulated an article written by one of 
al- Qaeda’s top writers Sheikh Attiyatallah (appeared in one as- Sahab video 
alongside al- Zawahiri) in which he strongly justifies the killing of Western civil-
ians, ‘just as our civilians are being killed. An eye for an eye’.9
 After an absence of nine months, al- Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden released a 
statement on 13 January 2009 entitled A Call for Jihad to Stop Aggression 
Against Gaza.10 Bin Laden began his statement by showing how political efforts 
by Arab states and groups, even those claiming to want to liberate Palestine, have 
all failed from 1948 onward. Such failures, he explains, have led to the past and 
present ‘massacres’ of Palestinians at the hands of Israelis and humiliation and 
subjugation of Muslims. The futility of past political or semi- political efforts 
serves to justify the call for Jihad as the only solution, a slogan that Muslim 
masses in the Arab world would themselves recognise and raise. ‘Our duty today 
is to incite the Muslim youth to engage in Jihad and enrol in Jihadi brigades to 
fight the Zio- Crusade alliance and its agents’, he said, ‘rather than having them 
[youth] exhaust their energy in unarmed demonstrations and protests.’ A good 
proportion of his statement stressed that present Western democracies did not 
obtain their rights through ‘peaceful means, as they wish to preach us to follow 
today,’ but through armed struggle, hence legitimising Jihad. The part of Bin 
Laden’s statement that members on Jihadi forums found intriguing and discussed 
was his hinting to the opening of new Jihad fronts. Members speculated about 
where these fronts might be located. Guesses included Eastern and Western 
countries.
 On 6 January, Ayman al- Zawahiri, second in command of al- Qaeda, released 
a statement titled, Gaza Massacre and Siege of Traitors.11 Al- Zawahiri’s words 
were more indicative of global Jihad rather than a defensive Jihad restricted to 
Palestine. In his statement, which was divided into three parts, each addressing a 
different audience, al- Zawahiri repeatedly urged Muslims to target ‘the Crusader–
Zionist alliance wherever and through whatever means possible and available’. 
The Amir of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, or al- Qaeda in Iraq) Abu Umar al- 
Baghdadi issued a statement dated 9 January titled, [All] Believers are Brothers.12 
To incite Muslims to fight, he started his speech with the following words:
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The brothers of apes and pigs13 are pouring lava on our people in Gaza. They 
have killed women, the elderly, and destroyed houses over their occupants. 
They became more extravagant in their tyranny and went further to blow up 
homes of Allah, the mosques. All this they did before the whole world through 
the media. And what have you done in response O Muslim ummah?
He goes on to stress that Jihad today has become ‘fard ayn’ (obligatory) and that 
Muslims who do not partake in it today to defend Gazans will be complicit in 
their killings and held responsible for them ‘in this life and the one after’. Unlike 
Bin Laden and al- Zawahiri, al- Baghdadi, who allegedly leads a group of mili-
tants himself, offered practical advice on how to go about this crisis:
1 wise men should lead the angry masses in neighbouring countries towards 
Gaza, cross the borders by force and join the Gazans in their Jihad;
2 soldiers and officers in Muslim armies must help by at least smuggling 
weapons outside their units or providing information to allow others to do 
so [to support Jihad in Gaza];
3 all those fighting for Allah’s sake today in Gaza must unite under one 
umbrella and forget differences;
4 Palestinians all over the world, and you are many in every country, you have 
the duty of supporting your people. You are known for your military and 
technical savviness and therefore you have the duty to strike Jewish and 
American interests wherever in the world.
In the early days of the Israeli attacks, al- Qaeda supporters eagerly awaited a 
strong al- Qaeda response to set an example for ‘true Jihad’. Days passed and al- 
Qaeda released no statement. This embarrassed supporters, especially given that 
strong condemnations of the attack and calls for support of Gazans came from 
all over the world. For Jihadists, the greatest fear was that a strong response, 
especially an act, would come from their rivals, the Shiites, namely Hizbollah or 
Iran. Ironically, while al- Qaeda and supporters did nothing to support Gaza, on 
forums they constantly attacked Hizbollah for its ‘cowardice’ and ‘impotence’ 
and considered its inaction to ‘reveal its agency’.
 On Jihadist forums, members rushed to justify the absence of an al- Qaeda 
response (a topic repeatedly raised in moderate forums such as Aljazeeratalk). 
Some of the main excuses included: al- Qaeda was plotting something big, logistical 
difficulties, security constraints on al- Qaeda senior figures and thus difficulty in pre-
paring and disseminating messages, and neighbouring countries and groups had the 
main responsibility given their geographical advantage. Later, al- Qaeda’s presence 
returned, issuing several strong statements, all calling for Jihad, as supporters had 
hoped. However, it was not different from the many helpless or autonomous groups 
around the world who had all called for Jihad as well. Despites its inciting Jihad, al- 
Qaeda itself was physically absent from the conflict zone and showed no signs of 
having any leverage there. This sparked a lot of debates on moderate forums such 
as Aljazeeratalk where many accused al- Qaeda of being full of empty words.
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 Given the recent legitimacy crisis of al- Qaeda in the Muslim world, 
members of Jihadi forums believed this was the best opportunity for al- Qaeda 
to clear its name. Faris Dawlet al- Islam, a member of al- Faloja, posted an 
article on 5 January in which he stressed that this was a golden opportunity for 
al- Qaeda because ‘the whole world is watching’ and whatever operation al- 
Qaeda will carry out against the Israelis, it will be considered legitimate and 
carry people to publically cheer and support al- Qaeda.14 But al- Qaeda has been 
and continues to be absent from the most important Muslim front, Palestine, 
and this absence could be seen as costing it much of its popularity in the Arab 
world.
 To summarise, the Israeli assault on Gaza and the apparent failure of any 
political (or other) pressure from Israel’s allies or enemies to slow, pause or stop 
the IDF ’s 22-day military offensive, and the mass mainstream and non- 
mainstream remediation of the images of suffering, injured and dead Palestini-
ans, did not result in a wholesale radicalisation, despite attempts by Jihadists and 
their supporters in the calling for violent responses. The fact that no such 
response was forthcoming was very much inflected in the frustrations played out 
in the online forums our projects examined, which, in turn, could be seen as 
increasing the pressure for such a response. Yet, this unfolding scenario – a mili-
tary assault on Gaza, a failure of so- called democratic governments to respond in 
a significant way, and key Western and Arabic news medias whilst documenting 
this conflict at the same time perceived also to be legitimising its continued 
waging – was also reflexively played out in the mainstream through the specula-
tive remediation of news discourses, and we now turn to consider this main-
stream holding up a mirror to this crisis and to itself as inextricable instruments 
of this perfect storm.
The 2008–2009 Gaza conflict: speculative remediation on 
Newsnight
Newsnight is a 45-minute current affairs programme broadcast at 10.30 p.m. on 
weekdays on BBC2 in the UK. It has a reputation for ‘quality’ rather than 
‘tabloid’ coverage, providing more in- depth and investigative analyses of issues 
than other UK free- to-air news and current affairs programmes, and it does not 
always follow their headlines or prioritisation of stories. On 12 January 2009 at 
around the peak of the intensity of the global attention attracted by the Gaza con-
flict, ‘peak’ in terms of both mainstream news and extremist discourses we have 
set out so far in this chapter, Newsnight devoted their headline piece to this story. 
The channel’s continuity announcer warned viewers of ‘some graphic scenes 
from the start of the programme’ and the programme opened with video of blood 
being hosed away from a Gazan street and a casualty being hurriedly carried to 
an ambulance. Newsnight’s anchor Kirsty Wark introduces the headline story 
over the opening VT: ‘The bloodshed in Gaza is being used by extremist Islamist 
groups in the UK to radicalise British Muslims. How dangerous is this?’ 
Following the programme ID Wark continues:
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KW: Tonight here in Britain fears of the radicalising impact of the conflict in 
Gaza. Newsnight has uncovered evidence of propaganda and recruitment 
efforts. The Communities Secretary tells us of her fears.
HAZEL BLEARS (Communities Secretary): I am very concerned indeed that the 
events in Gaza could well be used by those people who want to peddle per-
nicious extremist views to draw particularly vulnerable young people into 
that kind of extremism.
KW: Good evening: United Nations is reporting that more than 900 people have 
died in Gaza as a result of the fighting, almost 300 of them children. It’s 
statistics like this which the British Justice Minister Shahid Malik says is 
having a profoundly acute and unhealthy effect on British Muslims. Today 
the Communities Secretary and the Foreign Secretary met Muslim leaders 
to discuss their fears that Gaza is having a radicalising impact here in the 
UK. Tim Whewell today discovered that these fears are well- founded.
WHEWELL: For two weeks now they have been seeing images like this on their 
TV screens [visual stills from the Gazan conflict shown include a bloodied 
child being held by an adult] and now protestors at London University are 
outraged that the death toll in Gaza is still rising.
Whewell’s report is a compressed package of speculative premediation. It com-
bines a series of statements from or interviews with politicians, the security 
services, Muslim community leaders, London university student protestors and a 
survivor of the July 2005 London bombings, with an assortment of events 
including noisy and aggressive crowds protesting against Gaza and confronting 
police on the streets of London and ‘extremist Islamic websites’. It is these con-
tributions from that which we are calling a ‘consortium of witnesses’ that offer a 
powerful example of speculative remediation. We will focus on two of 
Whewell’s interviews to develop this point. First, Usama Hasan, an Imam of 
Masjid al- Tawhid as one of a group of ‘British Muslim representatives’, was 
invited to meet the Foreign Secretary to discuss concerns about the risks the con-
tinuation of the war in Gaza posed for Britain. He is introduced by Whewell as 
‘he understands the psychology that leads young people into violent Jihad. Years 
ago he himself went to fight in Afghanistan and he’s seen renewed attempts to 
promote Jihad here in recent days’.
UH: We thought we were winning the battle actually against violent extremism. But 
if there’s anything which will inflame people’s emotions and anger and actions 
more it’s perceived . . . it’s the perception that the British government is siding 
with Israel in this conflict. So, for example, in my local area, posters went up 
over the weekend saying ‘Jihad – the only solution for Palestine’, and by that 
they mean terrorism or armed conflict forever rather than peaceful negotiations.
The contributions by the consortium of witnesses are woven together to provide an 
authoritative and compelling narrative of a connected set of external conditions 
and events shaping an inexorable trajectory of radicalisation – of young British 
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Muslims – to a point where ‘Jihad’ or ‘terrorism’ is likely. But again the precise 
factors or events required in terms of a threshold for Jihad to take place, as with 
the general mainstream discourses of radicalisation we have examined, remain 
undefined. Instead, the Whewell report and the broader Newsnight programme is 
an example of the routine but effective compression of speculations into vague but 
nonetheless hypersecuritising narrative on the prospects of radicalisation.
 At the same time, Whewell’s introduction to the contribution by Hasan (‘he 
understands the psychology that leads young people into violent Jihad’) reflects 
the widely mediated idea that for an individual to be radicalised, they must 
possess some predisposition – a particular mindset for instance. It is this notion 
that feeds (and is fed by) the demand for ‘former radicals’ to appear as experts in 
the British mainstream media. For example, regular contributors to British news 
and documentary programmes have included Ed Husain (see the BBC Radio 4 
Today extract, above), a self- declared ‘former radical’, and Maajid Nawaz who 
became a leading member of Hizb ut- Tahrir – a political organisation whose 
goal is a pan- Islamic state or caliphate – before undertaking a ‘journey’ to even-
tually contest the theological foundation of ‘radical’ interpretations of Islam (see 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2009).
 The affordances of ‘expertise’ to media commentators and other contributors 
employed as security ‘experts’ sometimes functions to construct or bolster narra-
tives of radicalisation connecting terrorist events and the prospects of future 
events from occurring. This is particularly the case when the contributor is 
directly associated with the terrorist event, for example as a member of the 
security services charged with preventing or responding to terrorism or as a 
bystander/witness or survivor of a terrorist atrocity. In this respect, the second 
interviewee of Whewell’s Newsnight report we want to focus upon is Rachel 
North, who survived the July 2005 London bombings (at Kings Cross). In the 
recorded report North speaks in a considered fashion, choosing her words care-
fully. Box 5.2 below presents an extract from this report.
Box 5.2 Extract of Tim Whewell report incorporating interview with 
Rachel North, Newsnight broadcast 12 June 2009, BBC2
[shot of North (sitting next to Whewell) looking at computer screen beginning with 
page open at ‘Hizb ut- Tahir’ site with headline: ‘UK government guilty of aiding 
the preparation and commission of Israeli terrorism’]
TW: Rachel North is a survivor of the 7/7 terror attacks in London. Now in her 
spare time she monitors Islamist websites.
RN: The anger is widespread and intense. The anger is legitimate I think but it 
provides cover. It’s a sea in which people who bring their anger to the point 
of violence swim.
[shot of extremist message posting on screen]
TW: And in some recent messages posted on the Web on other sites she finds 
chilling echoes of the sentiments of the London bombers.
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The use of the London bombings as an interpretative news frame is an example 
of a ‘media template’ (Kitzinger 2000; Hoskins 2004a, 2004b; Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin 2007, 2010a), notably, ‘a crucial site of media power, acting to 
provide context for new events, serving as a foci for demands for policy change 
and helping to shape the ways in which we make sense of the world’ (Kitzinger 
2000: 81). However, the deployment of Rachel North as a ‘memory arbiter’ of 
7/7 and thus the status invested in her as a co- present witness and survivor of the 
London Bombings affords her a particular kind of authenticity and authority to 
speak. This attributes a powerful resonance to the template comparison being 
applied to the online radicalising discourses in response to the conflict in Gaza. 
North is, in effect, inextricably bound up in the media template.
 Less convincing in this piece of speculative remediation is the mainstream 
commentary, provided here by North, and the expertise that is at least inferred 
upon her role as a ‘monitor’ of ‘Islamist websites’ that she undertakes in her 
‘spare time’. Her reading of ‘recent messages posted on the Web’ and the credi-
bility she attaches to them – and the emphasis this report affords them (orally 
and visually) – does not appear to be based on any evidence presented or referred 
to in the programme. In other words, the particular expertise and systematic 
examination of online Jihadist discourses one would expect to be required to 
substantiate the comparative claims being made through this media template 
appear absent, with the evidence base for these claims instead being wholly 
reliant on the survivor/eyewitness status of North. This is not to undermine the 
terrible experiences of North or show anything other than complete admiration 
for her ability to cope and to acknowledge her media- defined role as a kind of 
unofficial spokesperson for the bereaved and survivors of 7/7. Rather, it is the 
rapid mediatisation of her experience of and since 7/7 that involves an ‘external 
media logic’ (Brown and Hoskins 2010) insinuating itself in the processes of 
speculative remediation shaping the contemporary condition of hypersecurity.
RN: When I look at the Internet now when I look at what’s been written. I see 
phrases like [video cuts to head- and-shoulders shot of North speaking seated 
in studio] ‘we must rise up’, ‘they are murdering us’, ‘they are raping our 
women’, ‘they are killing us, they are killing our children’. And it reminds 
me. Exactly. Of what Mohammed Sidique Khan said in his last video when 
he said ‘This is a war and-
TW: The ringleader of 7/7.
RN: The ringleader of 7/7
TW: He said ‘This is a war and I am a soldier, and until you stop the bombing, 
raping, gassing, and torturing and imprisonment of my people, you will know 
no rest’.
TW narrative continues over Gaza conflict video images of: a small child’s body 
wrapped in white being carried by an adult, an injured baby being attended to by 
medics, and another injured child being hurriedly carried to presumably receive 
treatment.
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 North’s contribution to the Newsnight programme is also noteworthy in her 
articulation of the critical distinction in defining radicalisation in delineating the 
actual ‘tipping point’ from the process of radicalisation to the violent act. North 
(above) describes the online responses to Gaza she has monitored: ‘The anger is 
legitimate I think but it provides cover. It’s a sea in which people who bring 
their anger to the point of violence swim’. This is an interesting identification of 
a significant body of people inhabiting online spaces who are seen to articulate 
extremist and violent views but who nonetheless do not appear to translate their 
anger into actual violence.
 It is the programme’s articulation of the co- present crowd, the extremists 
posting threatening and inciting violence messages to various websites, message 
boards and social networking sites, and various ‘communities’ (represented here 
by ‘Muslim leaders’, for example) that constitute that which Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin (forthcoming) call the ‘new mass’. This is the ‘mass’ conceived of 
and represented through an emergent set of iterations connected through the new 
media ecology, including how the times and spaces of the Internet are consti-
tuted by and incorporated into the mainstream. The multiple layers of the new 
mass: the local and the global, the proximate and distant, the real and the virtual 
are radically connected through the radicalisation narrative weaved through the 
programme. And it is through connecting the new mass that provides the basis 
for the perfect storm of the diffused but also variously concentrated (in various 
time and spaces) powerful radicalising effects as synchronised by Newsnight in 
the here- and-now of event time. We can thus conceive of this example as a nexus 
of radicalisation that is powerfully assembled and connected around unfolding 
events and which serves as a powerful legitimising force, despite and even partly 
because of, the ambiguities of the term radicalisation documented above.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have set out some of the complex iterations of the discourses 
of radicalisation as shaped and connected – and also not connected – by and 
across mainstream news cultures in the UK. We have highlighted the importance 
of the ways in which the mainstream routinely conceives of and translates from 
the non- mainstream, that seen as inhabiting media- in-the- wild (the amateur, 
unofficial, explicit, illegal and unregulated). We have argued that radicalisation 
is a construct and a threat that is easily subject to mainstream speculative reme-
diation, partly owing to the way that its inherent unpredictability sits easily with 
the amorphousness of the medium seen as its key harbinger – the Internet.
 However, the extent to which mainstream news audiences are actually con-
vinced by the mainstream assemblage of the threat posed by radicalisation and 
also the legitimacy of the advocating of violent extremism (if not actually the 
undertaking of violent acts) is difficult to discern although we have indicated 
some scepticism from our limited audience findings. For example, across our 
projects and at workshops, symposia and in focus groups consisting of academ-
ics, journalists, Home Office personnel and lay people, we have shown edited 
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Mainstream nexus of radicalisation  103
and full versions of the Newsnight programme on radicalisation and the Gaza 
conflict. We found a clear consensus from participants that the programme does 
not provide a balanced view of either the Israel–Palestine conflict nor of the 
nature of Islam, though we are not suggesting possessing either systematic data 
or thus having a systematic assessment of these viewings and responses. There 
was significant criticism from our focus group and workshop members of the 
quality of the journalism, partly owing to its limited critical analysis of the UK 
government’s position concerning the conflict and the alleged consequences of 
the conflict on domestic politics, but also, as we have suggested, the affordance 
of particular expertise and authority to the contribution made by Rachel North.
 The mainstream translation and presentation of the discourses of radicalisa-
tion demand much more attention for an accurate and comprehensive under-
standing of the ways in which violent acts and the calling for such acts are 
legitimised in the context of the new media ecology. This requires an interroga-
tion of the dynamically configured ‘nexus’ of radicalisation through the under-
taking of a ‘nexus analysis’ (Scollon and Scollon 2004) approach, as set out in 
our opening chapter. Having explored the connectivities between Jihadist and 
mainstream media cultures, in the next chapter we investigate how audiences 
make sense of this nexus.
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6 Audience uncertainties
Imagining the mainstream and 
extremes
How do ordinary citizens understand radicalisation? Our concern is not simply 
with whether or not citizens are scared of terrorism or trust government counter- 
terrorism policies. More important is the way citizens think about issues like 
radicalisation – issues where there is little concrete reliable data in the public 
domain, issues that may involve thinking about a complex set of further prob-
lems (immigration, religion, multiculturalism, policing), and issues where should 
a problem be established, then any response would involve trade- offs of political 
values like liberty, equality and security. Climate change is another such issue: 
the science is (said to be) contested, any solution would involve domains of 
energy, economy, and science and technology, and such responses would entail 
difficult normative trade- offs based on what values we prioritise over others. By 
asking not just what citizens think but how they think about radicalisation, we 
open up the processes of deliberation and negotiation – with themselves, and 
with others – through which citizens engage with complex political problems. 
Indeed, explaining these processes has been identified as one of the key chal-
lenges for political analysis today (Stoker 2010: 60). If one aim of this book is to 
understand why different groups in different cultural contexts connect with dis-
courses of radicalisation, then such an approach is absolutely essential.
 Finding out how citizens think about issues like radicalisation is much more 
difficult than finding out simply what they think. Opinion polls and surveys offer 
regular updates on ‘the public mood’. These snapshots offer timely guides to 
general sentiments, but can easily obscure as much as they reveal. For instance, 
public opinion polls in the UK in recent years have offered many seemingly 
contradictory views held. In August 2006, a Yougov/Spectator poll1 indicated 
that 53 per cent of British citizens wanted the Blair government be ‘tougher and 
more aggressive’ in its foreign policy approach to ‘the terrorist threat’. A month 
later, a Yougov/Sky News poll2 showed that 77 per cent of the same population 
thought ‘Tony Blair’s policies towards the Middle East have made Britain more 
of a target for terrorists’. Would a tougher foreign policy have made Britain less 
of a target? Similarly, in the August poll, a majority supported 90-day detention 
of those only suspected, not charged, with terrorist offences, tougher controls at 
airports, and increased police profiling. These were the very policies that were 
making British Muslims feel insecure and alienated from Britain (Gillespie and 
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O’Loughlin, forthcoming). Did the public offer support for further alienating the 
very community from which ‘the threat’ is considered to emanate? The approach 
taken in this chapter begins to open up how such apparently contradictory posi-
tions can be held.
 Connectivity, certainty (or lack of ), and contradiction are the three charac-
teristics of citizen understandings of security in Britain, according to recent 
analysis by Gillespie and O’Loughlin (2009). Connectivity: different discur-
sive ‘realities’ from personal experience, religious beliefs, media consumption 
and the statements of political leaders can inter- lock and mutually reinforce 
one another to produce an understanding more determined than if supported 
only by one; Certainty: uncertainty is a problem for citizens as well as policy-
makers, trying to piece together information about risks and threats; such 
uncertainty including learning how to ‘modulate’ and deal with the very fact of 
uncertainty itself; and Contradiction: in this context it is perhaps unsurprising 
that some individuals come to hold ambivalent and often contradictory percep-
tions of threats and the role of state and media in representing and responding 
to threats.
 Jarvis and Lister followed with a briefer study3 of whether people in the UK 
feel more secure as a result of counter- terrorism policy. Based on a series of 
focus groups in London, Oxford and Swansea, they found participants held a 
range of views on what security means, from simple human survival to content-
ment, hospitality, equality and freedom. This range was also reflected in vari-
ation in how people thought about security. Those who equated security with 
survival presumed others held the same narrow view as them; it was just 
common sense. Others held more complex and multi- layered ways of under-
standing security, especially those individuals who could hold several under-
standings of security together at once. They were more inclined to think how 
others might reflect on different forms of security too. In addition, a person’s 
conception of security shaped their evaluation of recent counter- terrorism policy. 
Hence, there is policy value as well as scholarly interest in addressing not just 
what but how people think about security.
 Gillespie and O’Loughlin’s analysis draws upon used collaborative audience 
ethnography as a research method to find out how ordinary people understand 
security (Gillespie 2006, 2007). The Media and Radicalisation project developed 
and extended this method, conducted audience ethnography in four countries, 
England, France, Denmark and Australia. A total of 67 interviews were con-
ducted. Eight ethnographers were recruited to conduct, transcribe and pre- 
analyse the interviews. Five of them conducted interviews in England. The 
population of research participants was broad, with news audiences of different 
generation, gender and faith (see Appendix I). Participants initially recruited 
were part of the social networks of the ethnographers, with further participants 
recruited through snowballing. In addition to the interviews, two focus groups 
were conducted: one focused on a specific episode of BBC’s Newsnight on the 
Gaza crisis, another on citizens’ anxieties around media technologies. The 
analysis of the interviews was first organised through their coding into Nvivo8. 
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Categories for coding were designed in relation to this strand of the Legitimising 
project and to other strands, to achieve integrated analysis across the project of 
key themes such as legitimacy, violence and visuality. Concrete examples were 
mobilised in the interviews in order to elicit reactions as to whether or not they 
can meaningfully be described as instances of radicalisation. In this approach, 
what is constituted as not being related to radicalisation is as important as what 
is construed as being related to it. Close ethnomethodological analysis of the 
transcripts was then undertaken (for a full explanation of our methodological 
approach to the audience analysis, see Appendix II).
 A key objective of the Legitimating the Discourses of Radicalisation 
project was to identify, map and evaluate mainstream news public under-
standings and interpretations of political violence and the term ‘radicalisation’ 
and its associated terms, contexts and discourses. Hence, our interviews were 
designed to create a space in which radicalisation is made sense of. How, if at 
all, do audience members who constitute mainstream news publics understand 
the term radicalisation? If they felt comfortable using the term, did they use it 
to refer to the same processes or individuals as official or media discourses 
refer to? In a context of disconnection between the understandings of political 
leaders and citizens in the UK (Couldry et al. 2007; Gillespie 2006; Moss and 
O’Loughlin 2008) we sought to explore whether the introduction of the new 
radicalisation concept would create a further distance between official and 
public understandings of security, and to investigate the role media played in 
this relationship. If government was using a discourse to describe security 
concerns that made little sense to citizens, achieving legitimacy for policy 
would be difficult. In this article we analyse data from interviews in France 
and the UK.
 The central idea underpinning the audience research is that the meaning of 
radicalisation, like the meaning of any other word, is ordinary. Minimally, this 
means that there is no need for a specialised language, academic or else, for radi-
calisation to mean anything; it is an expression belonging to the ordinary lan-
guage and hence that makes sense within this ordinary language. It does not have 
a meaning outside its practical uses, for instance, when ‘talking about the news’, 
or ‘talking to the academics’. The interviews were not organised so as to decide 
what ‘radicalisation’ ultimately means but to elicit the ‘way’ people talk about 
radicalisation and media. Such an approach is informed by ethnomethodology 
but is not properly speaking ethnomethodological. For instance, we do not 
analyse the grammar of ordinary language in this article. Additionally, our treat-
ment of interview talk as ordinary language differs from recent discourse and 
interpretive work in security analysis (Altheide 2007; Campbell 2007; Debrix 
2008; Giroux 2006; Hansen 2006; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2007; Jarvis 2009; 
Mirzoeff 2005) by demonstrating the understandings held by individuals not by 
identifying the terms or concepts they use but by analysing the way they talk 
about these issues.
 The analysis that follows concentrates on the relationship between radicalisa-
tion and the media from the point of view of the interviewees.
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‘You hear it on the news’: the ambience of official and media 
discourses of radicalisation
Our starting point is to ask where individuals say they have heard the term radi-
calisation mentioned. Individuals’ responses to this question offered insights to 
their implicit understandings of presumed or imagined news publics that they 
might include themselves within and other groups they exclude themselves from, 
such as ‘the media’ or ‘elites’ or ‘Muslim youth’ (O’Loughlin et al. forthcom-
ing). It must first be stated that a minority of interviewees appear to have been 
acquainted with radicalisation independently of the media; that is, independently 
of media coverage of the radicalisation of Muslims or of terrorism more gener-
ally. These interviewees seem to share characteristics as to their political 
outlook: they all refer to (and inscribe themselves into) a tradition of political 
radicalism. For them, not only is radicalisation a question of radicalism but it is 
also something that is not found in media.
 However, a majority of interviewees had heard about radicalisation through 
news media. This was witnessed both by responding to the question ‘Have you 
heard of the term radicalisation’ with answers such as ‘On the news, news-
papers’,4 but also by the way some interviewees talk about radicalisation.
 RF5 illustrates this point:6
JK: In what context have you heard of it [the term radicalisation]?
RF: It was more in a political context. In terms of Kurdish question. There are 
talks that Kurdish people became radicalised over the years because of 
ethnic discrimination towards Kurds and ethnic conflict in Turkey. Plus in 
Turkey also Islamic radicalism. We heard that extreme Islamism groups 
became powerful in Turkey. In the world stage we heard after 9/11 Islamic 
radicalism.
JK: In the context of the UK when did you hear the term of radicalisation and in 
which context?
RF: In the UK, after September 11 attack. This attack happened a year after I 
arrived to the UK. I heard in that context that Muslim youths are getting 
more radicalised. Not the Muslim society, but Muslim youth they were 
saying. Muslim youths there were born and bred here getting radicalised. I 
heard it in this context. This is their understanding of certain incidents: July 
the seven bombing or some suspects arrested in the UK linked with Islamic 
extreme and armed groups in the Middle East.
In his first answer, he cites a number of contexts in which he has encountered the 
term ‘radicalisation’. He introduces these contexts in a peculiar way, by prefac-
ing them with ‘there are talks’ and ‘we heard that’. Whatever his positions 
regarding the links between these contexts and radicalisation, this way of intro-
ducing them indicates that he refers to some debate and discussions that exist 
beyond and independently of his judgements about them. This is manifested in 
part by the reference to ‘we’: it is not only him as an individual who has heard of 
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these contexts being connected to ‘radicalisation’ but also and primarily a larger 
group of people. With ‘we’ he includes himself in such a group. ‘We heard’, of 
course, has a loose connection to the media as the sites in which political ques-
tions are discussed and shared with an audience; ‘we hear’ things in the news. 
So, his acquaintance with ‘radicalisation’ was mediated through the news. In 
addition, his description of himself and the audience group which he presumes 
he belongs to parallels Scannell’s conception of media as ‘for- anyone-as- 
someone structures’ (2000).
 The interviewee’s second answer extends this point. Whilst he switches to ‘I 
heard’, the reference to the media as the place in which the radicalisation of 
Muslims was mentioned is still present. This is because the interviewee also 
refers to an unknown ‘they’: ‘Muslim youth they were saying’ and ‘this is their 
understanding of certain incidents’. This reference to ‘they’ is important in that 
it shows that the association between radicalisation and Muslim youth in Britain 
is not something that he himself created but instead that he is reporting it as 
having been created elsewhere and by others. Whilst ‘they’ remains non- specific, 
elements to identify them are nevertheless provided: ‘their understanding’ and 
‘what they were saying’ has been ‘heard’ by the interviewee. Again, the fact that 
it has been ‘heard’ makes a connection to the media. So, these views about 
Muslim youth and radicalisation that he reports were heard in the news. For a 
public to be constituted, for members to consider themselves a public and for 
members and those outside it to address it as a public, a series of communica-
tions is required (Barnett 2003; Warner 2002). So, we might also speculate that 
the interviewee has heard this more than once. There can be no public of a single 
address or text, so the interviewee must be familiar with hearing this expressed. 
However, this series conception blurs the specificity of when he ‘heard’ the term 
radicalisation in the UK; our data indicates the term was almost unused in UK 
media before 2005, suggesting he is re- constructing his memory of his familiar-
ity with the term.
 This way of talking about radicalisation – as something everyone must be 
aware of, where everyone is a general mass of people cohered by ambient media 
– is also evident in an interview with FB7:
MD: What comes to mind when you hear about radicalisation, any kind of events 
or people or images or anything like that?
FB: Radicalisation is used most commonly with regards to Islam. That’s the 
most common context in which you hear it. It is hard to dissociate. That is 
its primary association and it is hard to break that and see that applicable to 
anywhere else. But of course that is going on elsewhere, people become 
radicalised. It is a media issue and I am sure there are struggles going on all 
over the world that aren’t reported on and yet that is the same polarisation 
of ideology that is going on.8
Let us focus on the first two sentences in FB’s answer, which illustrate further 
how interviewees establish their distance from the context in which they hear 
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about radicalisation. The first interesting feature of the beginning of his answer 
is the use of the passive voice: ‘Radicalisation is used most commonly with 
regards to Islam’. Here, the passive voice entails the deletion of the acting 
subject: we are not told who uses radicalisation in relation to Islam. Neverthe-
less, the sentence is perfectly intelligible as it is. In fact, the very deletion of the 
subject in this sentence indicates that it would be redundant to identify it in so 
many words. Moreover, the generality that it conveys is exactly what is charac-
teristic of the use of radicalisation in this way: it is an obvious and common 
thing to do. Thus, the use of the passive in this sentence without any specifica-
tion about the subject of the action not only does not pose any problem of intelli-
gibility (there is no urge to ask ‘who?’) but in addition, and in fact, it constitutes 
this subject as so general and pervasive that there is no need to clarify the ‘who’. 
Moreover, this sentence is the beginning of the answer about what the inter-
viewee thinks of when he hears about radicalisation. Both the question and the 
first sentence of the answer imply that ‘radicalisation’ appears in some public, or 
publicly available, locations. The fact that FB does not find it necessary to 
specify not only who uses radicalisation in this way but also where it is used 
constitutes this location as obvious and as commonly shared. Specifically, as this 
answer occurs in the context of the interview, it is shared by the interviewee and 
the interviewer, but the common or shared nature of this location extends beyond 
these two people. The generality and pervasiveness of the use of radicalisation in 
relation to Islam, conveyed by the use of the passive voice, suggests that it is not 
just FB or even the interviewer who can find this connection but anyone sharing 
their experience of hearing this connection.
 The second sentence of FB’s answer buttresses and adds further properties to 
the context specified in the first sentence through the expression ‘you hear it’ 
(‘that’s the most common context in which you hear it’). This expression 
unproblematically and immediately refers to the news. This is unproblematical 
and immediate in the sense that one thinks of the news as one reads or hears this 
expression. In English the news is something that one hears which everyday sen-
tences such as the following illustrate: ‘have you heard the news?’; ‘I’ve heard 
in the news that an Air France aircraft disappeared off the Brazilian coast’; ‘I’ve 
heard that General Motors has gone bankrupt’. Whether one finds one’s news on 
the radio, on television, in newspapers, online, on one’s mobile phone or else-
where does not matter: in English it is a common way of talking about the news 
that one ‘hears’ it. The expression FB uses (i.e. ‘you hear it’) shares some 
common properties with the passive voice in the first sentence. Thus, it creates a 
similar sense of generality about the origin of where the thing is heard. Again, in 
English the pronoun ‘you’ can be used not only to refer to an interlocutor (or 
interlocutors) but also to speak in a generic way about everyone’s experience. 
(Indeed, used in this way it constitutes a form of membership and shared inter-
subjective world and experience.) So when ‘you’ hear it, in fact everyone does 
as well. Finally, an expression such as ‘you hear it’ also removes the origin of 
what has been heard (just like the passive voice does), which also conveys a 
sense of generality.
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 This is indicative of the dynamics of media consumption in, but also a significant 
methodological challenge in researching and making claims about, the new media 
ecology. Whereas, when the disciplines of Media and Communication Studies grew 
at the pace of the television programming and audiences they sought to understand 
in the 1970s, the ‘mass media’ was relatively containable as a corpus (numbers of 
channels on television, rigid schedules of news programming, and the lack of altern-
ative sources). More recently news has been characterised as ‘ambient’. Ian Har-
greaves and James Thomas (2002: 44), for instance, suggest that it is ‘like the air we 
breathe, taken for granted rather than struggled for’. Moreover, media and news 
today is increasingly diffused, hybridised with other genres of media, and ‘remedi-
ated’ 24/7. Radicalisation as a term and as a phenomenon is understood and misun-
derstood through its radical diffusion, if you will. Our approach identifies and 
interrogates the meaning of radicalisation as fundamentally ongoing, constantly 
negotiated and renegotiated in renewed times and spaces. As with the news media’s 
modulation back- and-forth, seeking past contexts to impose old frameworks of 
meaning on emergent events, consumers of these discourses operate in a similar 
way; piecing the fragments, images, and narratives of mediated pasts together to 
shape their understanding of radicalisation today (for RF, above, from Turkey and 
the UK). Moreover they do so even and especially when denying that they are a 
constituent consumer of the very same ‘media’ that affords them much of the 
content as well as the context of being able to speak ab ut ‘radicalisation’.
What does radicalisation mean to people?
We have established how ordinary people talk about radicalisation, and that aware-
ness of such news issues gives people a sense of being part of a news public. We 
asked interviewees next what radicalisation meant to them. They were asked in 
particular if they know personally anyone who has gone through a process of radi-
calisation. Twenty of them answered positively and gave some details concerning 
these people. To be sure, radicalisation in this question was interpreted differently 
according to the interviewees and therefore the twenty examples of personal know-
ledge of radicalisation are as eclectic as is the list of examples that the interviewees 
gave to illustrate their conception of radicalisation.
 Here are the 20 examples:
 1 Activist friend
 2 Anarchist friend
 3 Animal rights activists
 4 Best Muslim female friend
 5 Converted friend (to Islam)
 6 Feminist cousin
 7 Feminist women
 8 Friends in Iran in gay, women, left rights movements
 9 Gay rights activists
10 Jewish friends
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11 Maajid Nawaz
12 Muslim friend
13 Muslim kids he works with
14 (French) New Anti- capitalist Party activists
15 Orthodox Jews
16 priest brother
17 (French) Socialist Party activists
18 Someone in the US
19 Song writer Muslim friend
20 Wahabist friends
This list exhaustively compiles the 20 cases mentioned in the interviews. In this 
shape, it does not seek to organise the specific examples into general categories. 
Of course this does not mean that a systematic ordering of these cases cannot be 
accomplished, but in showing these examples in their brute and concrete charac-
ters the point of this list is to bring attention to their uniqueness and exemplarity. 
As a second step, it is nevertheless possible to classify these cases into overarch-
ing categories. The following is such an attempt:
1 Islam
1 Best Muslim female friend
2 Converted friend (to Islam)
3 Friend in the US
4 Maajid Nawaz
5 Muslim friend
6 Muslim kids he works with
7 Song writer Muslim friend
8 Wahabist friends
2 Rights movements
1 Animal rights activists
2 Feminist cousin
3 Feminist women
4 Friends in Iran in gay, women, left rights movements
5 Gay rights activists
3 Left- wing politics
1 Activist friend
2 Anarchist friend
3 (French) New Anti- capitalist Party activists
4 (French) Socialist Party activists
4 Other religions
1 Jewish friends
2 Orthodox Jews
3 priest brother
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Seen in this way, the cases of personal knowledge of radicalisation show that 
Islam is the category that generates the most cases. Islam is a category distinct of 
other faiths. If they are collapsed together, however, religion in general accounts 
for the majority of cases of radicalisation (11 out of 20). All the same, given the 
emphasis on Islam in official and media discourses of radicalisation it is import-
ant to keep it separate from other religions in assessing its relative presence in 
these examples. Rights movements and left- wing politics also generate a number 
of cases; thus supporting a claim made previously concerning the omnipresence 
of political interpretations of radicalisation. There would be a valid basis for 
bringing categories 2 and 3 together as all the cited examples of rights move-
ments pertain to left- wing politics. However, they are kept distinct from one 
another because rights movements are not always politically connoted or associ-
ated with the left.
 In order to make sense of all these examples, it is important to delve into the 
details that the interviewees give about them. In doing so, it is possible to bring 
together some of the cases in each categories on the basis of their similarities. 
Table 6.1 accounts for them.
 First, three of the eight cases of Islamic radicalisation refer to the sudden 
adherence to strict religious views and practices: people who use to enjoy a 
Table 6.1 Summary of experience of radicalisation
Categories Examples Meanings
Islam Best Muslim female friend Strict Islamic views and 
practicesMuslim kids he works with
Converted friend (to Islam)
Friend in the US Understanding Islamic violence
Maajid Nawaz Radicalised and deradicalised
Muslim friend Sudden hatred of Jews
Muslim songwriter friend Justify retaliation against racism
Wahabist acquaintances
Rights movements Animal rights activists Use of bombs
Feminist cousin Radical feminist, etc., views
Feminist women
Friends in Iran in gay, women, 
left rights movements
Gay rights activists
Left-wing politics Activist friend Contestation and delegitimation 
of world order
Step further to the left 
Anarchist friend
(French) New Anti-capitalist 
Party activists
(French) Socialist Party activists
Other religions Jewish friends Turn to violence against 
Muslims
Orthodox Jews ‘Wacky beliefs’ but not violent
Priest brother Transformation of one’s life
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range of activities all of sudden stopped them and began to condemn them on 
religious grounds. One of them refers to the fact that a Muslim began to under-
stand and legitimate violence committed by other Muslims. Another one began 
to develop hatred towards Jews, including towards his close Jewish friend. Two 
cases are rather unusual. The first one is the reference to the song- writer. The 
interviewee who brings it up explains that a Muslim friend of his had written a 
song in which he justified violent retaliation against those who had been racist 
towards him. This song was found in a library and consequently he was inter-
viewed by the police to account for it. The second one is a reference to the 
current head of the Quilliam foundation, Maajid Nawaz, a government anti- 
radicalisation think- tank. The interviewee, who met Nawaz whilst a student at 
SOAS, suggests that Nawaz was first radicalised and was a member of Hizb ut- 
Tahrir for a decade. After spending time in prison in Egypt, he was de- 
radicalised which led him to his current post.
 Second, four of the five examples share similar features whilst the last one 
stands apart from them. The examples of feminist acquaintances and gay rights 
activists all share the basis that people are radical because they advocate views 
which, according to the norms of a society, can be seen as progressive. The 
meaning of the last example, animal rights activists, departs from these four in 
that the interviewee insists on the turn to violence within the movement in order 
to describe its radical turn. This makes his view partly in line with official and 
media discourses of radicalisation that insist on violence that some Muslims are 
led to embrace and seek out.
 Third, the examples under left- wing politics all share similar features 
despite referring to diverse fractions within the political left. In three 
instances, reference is made to specific political parties or movements: the 
liberal, parliamentary left; the French Socialist Party (a centre- left party); the 
French New Anti- capitalist Party (a revolutionary left party); and anarchism. 
In all these cases, the interviewees indicate that the persons they know radi-
calised their views and practices by moving from one position within left- 
wing politics to a more radical one. So, the Socialist Party activists moved 
from voting for this party to joining it and campaigning for it; the New Anti- 
capitalist Party activists became militants for this party; the anarchist friend 
moved from holding liberal, parliamentary views to anti- parliamentary and 
libertarian views. In addition, common to these examples is the insistence on 
the fact that these people are radical in that they contest the established order 
(whether it be social, cultural, political, economical, etc.) and that they carry 
out certain activities in order to make their contestation known and to help its 
diffusion.
 Fourth, in all three cases of religious radicalisation (other than Islam) the 
interviewees insist on the transformations that occurred in their acquaintances, 
transformations which are grounded in their religious beliefs. So, one of them 
saw his French Jewish childhood friends expressed violent ideas against 
Muslims (it is legitimate to engage in acts of violence against them in order to 
protect Israel); another one knows several Orthodox Jews who have radical ideas 
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about their religion and Israel but who do not engage in violence; and finally the 
last one saw her brother dropping his studies in order to join the seminary to 
become a priest.
 To summarise, radicalisation was understood to mean political action against 
the presumed mainstream society and established political order. The statements 
analysed so far indicate that ordinary people identify certain social logics. Even 
when discussing different contexts, these logics are still present. But what is 
particularly interesting is that “the mainstream” or “established order” is not just 
liberal democracy, because some aspects of liberal democratic politics fall within 
the social logics with which radicalisation is associated.
 This was reinforced in discussions in which some interviewees were asked if 
they thought that calls for violence could ever been legitimate. Twelve of them 
thought such calls could never be legitimate whilst twenty- four think that there 
is room for legitimacy in inciting to violence. Those believing calls for violence 
could never be legitimate felt little need to offer reasons. They expressed a sense 
that in democratic societies violence should not exist either because it is not 
useful or because other means of expressing views should be preferred, such as 
discussion and via parliamentary means. In other words, refusing to grant any 
form of legitimacy to violence is a way to protect the values and properties of 
democracies. At the same time, this refusal shows that these interviewees think 
about calls for violence only in the context of Islamic terrorism: attacks like 7/7 
– i.e. by British citizens against other British citizens – cannot be justified 
because the perpetrators should have used other means to express their disagree-
ment with the government.
 On the other hand, twenty four interviewees thought that calls for violence – 
and violence itself – can be legitimate. When saying so, it is important to stress 
‘can’: for all of them it is not a matter of saying that calls for violence are always 
and everywhere justified but that there may be circumstances under which it can 
become so. In all cases, these circumstances have to do with contexts broader 
than the British society. So, two interviewees use the argument expressed above 
that violence cannot be accepted in democratic societies, but instead in advanc-
ing a purely negative answer to the question they mitigate theirs by referring to 
situations – i.e. non- democratic societies – in which this can be. Indeed, the ref-
erence to dictatorships and any forms of oppression is what motivate most of the 
interviewees to say that violence can be legitimate. Nazi Germany and the Apart-
heid regime in South Africa are the two prime examples of what such circum-
stances might be. For example:
DL: Can calls for violence be ever legitimate?
TH: I mean history has shown us that the calls for violence . . . can be legitimate. 
The call for violence against the Nazis was legitimate. Nobody wanted a 
Nazi regime in Europe. People would have liked to achieve that aim, at not 
having a dominant or prevalent Nazi force in Europe, by means other than 
violence, but that was not possible. So, that’s a clear example when violence 
was legitimate.
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And:
JK: Can calls for violence ever been legitimate?
FD: As I said, as I was saying, it depends on what type of violence, if it’s not 
against people, I am only thinking about little bit of history I know, I am 
thinking again about South Africa, so if they were . . . I don’t know like 
damaging electric . . . but you know without damaging, without actually 
killing people or things like that, yes I can understand that sometimes all 
like, the way Zimbabwe now, I think you need to use some, you know, not, 
maybe, if not violent force, you know but, I don’t know if violence it 
depends what you mean, you know if you mean killing people
Necessarily, to argue that calls for violence and violence can be justified in some 
circumstances requires presenting these circumstances as essentially violating 
human life and as demanding violence in last recourse. In other less extreme cir-
cumstances, it is not so easy to find an answer to this question. Hence, calls for 
violence in democratic societies such as England, France, Denmark or Australia 
were considered illegitimate.
Should we feel concerned by radicalisation?
Whether or not interviewees thought radicalisation was something to be afraid of 
depended on the relationship they had to official and media discourses of 
radicalisation.
 Amongst the 49 interviewees who have answered the question ‘Is radicalisa-
tion a phenomenon that concerns you or are you largely indifferent to it? Why?’, 
16 say that they are not concerned by this phenomenon and 23 say that they are. 
Within the 16 who give a negative answer, five give a definite ‘no’ and the 
remaining 11 indicate that they are ‘not really’ concerned by the phenomenon.
 Not surprisingly, whether the interviewees advance a positive or negative 
answer to the question their answer partly follows from their conception of radi-
calisation more generally. Thus those who tend to view radicalisation as a posit-
ive thing are not necessarily concerned about it, and in fact welcome it. 
However, some of those for whom radicalisation is a positive, progressive thing 
then answer subsequent questions indicating they are concerned about radicali-
sation. This contradiction arises because the interviewees appear to answer ques-
tion about being ‘concerned’ in terms of the media and official conception of 
radicalisation, that is, as being a phenomenon that affects Muslims and that is 
made sense of in relation to contemporary issues of Islamic terrorism. Accord-
ingly, these instances are just one manifestation of the difficulties that some of 
those who offer alternative conceptions of radicalisation have to sustain their 
views against the (powerful) assumptions about this notion that our own inter-
view schedule conveyed.
 First, for five interviewees radicalisation is not a phenomenon of concern. The 
reasons advanced are very disparate. Two of them simply state that they tend not 
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to be worried about things like that; the world is full of events that could poten-
tially be a source of concern and it is best to avoid pondering on them too much. 
Another interviewee thinks that Islam ought to be considered as a peaceful reli-
gion first and foremost and hence issues of radicalisation cannot be a source of 
concern. In other words, the reality of Islam and its overwhelming practices and 
manifestations should not be overshadowed by a few cases of violence and 
killing; one must not let the forest be hidden by the tree. The other two inter-
viewees justify their position in relation to the meaning they give to radicalisa-
tion. For one of them, the radicalisation of Muslims (in France) means that some 
Muslims are in the process of defining their identities, strong religious identities. 
According to this interviewee this process is only normal, indeed all the more 
normal in a society and world where strong identities are lacking. For him, it is 
an important and essential aspect of being human to define one’s identity. For 
the last interviewee, radicalisation is not a source of concern because she sees it 
as an inherently positive thing in that it brings social and political change, in that 
it is associated with people’s rights and liberation’s movements. There is, con-
sequently, no reason to fear radicalisation; instead it should be actively 
cultivated.
 Second, 11 interviewees indicate that radicalisation is not really a source of 
concern for them. At one level they relate to those of the preceding category in 
that they formulate a negative answer to the question. However it is important 
to keep them separate because the degree of negativity is not the same. In 
saying ‘not really’, they introduce an element of uncertainty. Two of them do 
not justify their position and another one says that he does not know enough 
about the phenomenon in order to formulate a more definite judgement. One 
reason shared by four interviewees is that they do not feel concerned about 
radicalisation on a daily basis. Thus, when a terrorist attack happens some-
where in the world, and especially in London or closer to home, they may 
reflect on them and feel worried about Islamic terrorism. However, outside 
these circumscribed moments they do not think or worry about the radicalisa-
tion of Muslims that could lead to other such attacks. Two extracts can illus-
trate this way of thinking:
MD: Are you concerned about issues of radicalisation?
JDB: I’d say no.
JE: Not on a day- to-day basis. It’s not something that I worry about massively.
MD: Why aren’t you hugely concerned about radicalisation?
JDB: Well literally my own life keeps me occupied.
JE: It just doesn’t affect your daily life.
JDB: Yeah.
JE: Only when there is a big news story on and you hear it, you’re being bom-
barded with stuff about it, you start to think about it more. But then, once 
it’s not in the news as much, it just goes to the back of your mind. Unless 
someone brings it up and then you start thinking about it again.
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And:
MD: Is it something that concerns you at all or are you generally indifferent to 
it?
VP: It concerns me is so far as I live in London, I travel on the tube and periodi-
cally I think once upon a time there was somebody on the tube just like me 
and look what happened to them. However, it wouldn’t stop me travelling 
on the tube. At the time when the IRA bombs were much more common 
that didn’t stop me going into the West End and travelling. So, I obviously 
can’t be that concerned, because there are people and there were people then 
who wouldn’t. On the other hand I did work in a school and the head- 
teacher said I’ve just had a phone- call and someone has said there is a bomb 
in school and he said I think we can safely assume that’s a hoax. I said I’m 
not prepared to assume that’s a hoax, there’s a thousand kids here. So, I 
would take it seriously at that level. Someone said about the IRA, they have 
to be lucky once and the police have to be lucky all the time. Therefore, that 
means there is always a risk that you or someone you know or that you are 
close to will be hurt. So at that level it’s a concern.
What these three interviewees express in their diverse terms is that the phenomenon 
of radicalisation and the bomb attacks that it is tied to are a source of worry only 
when they explicitly think about them. However, everyday life is organised in such 
a way that these issues do not intervene or interfere; therefore they cannot be treated 
as real source of concern. For two other interviewees, the fact that they are not over-
whelmingly concerned about radicalisation comes from what they see as an issue 
being hyped by the media and therefore they refuse to succumb to this media- led 
ambient paranoia. Like the previous interviewees, they can nevertheless express 
worries – if they think about the issue – because they are either aware of the lack of 
state’s resources to prevent radicalisation or aware of the potential domestic con-
sequences of international events (e.g. the war in Afghanistan). Finally, a last inter-
viewee insists on the fact that he is not afraid of radicalism – because he sees it as a 
positive and good thing – but that he is afraid of Islamic radicalism when it takes 
the form of calling for violence and perpetrating bomb attacks.
 Third, twenty-three interviewees express their concerns about radicalisation. 
Twelve of them either do not provide any justification for their view or refers to 
their distaste for violence in general. One of them makes his view a bit more spe-
cific when he suggests that since bomb attacks have already been perpetrated 
recently in London there is a chance that similar ones could happen again. For 
people who live in London, according to him, it is difficult to ignore this possibil-
ity. In the same vein, another interviewee insists on the fact that bomb attacks are 
perpetrated by mad people, in which case radicalisation is a source of concern 
because their actions can never be predicted. Another interviewee suggests that 
any form of radicalisation is dangerous, not just the Islamic one. Thus Animal 
Front Liberation activists are also a source of concern to him in that they also go 
on to perpetrate violent actions. In a similar, albeit different, fashion another 
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interviewee indicates that he feels concern by all forms of religious fundament-
alism; again, Islamic fundamentalism is not singled out but is instead made sense 
of amongst other forms of religious extremism. Finally, two more reasons that 
depart from the previous ones are advanced to support the view that radicalisation 
is a source of concern. On the one hand one interviewee expresses his concerns 
not in the phenomenon itself but rather in the detrimental consequences of the 
focus on this phenomenon on the Muslim community as a whole:
DL: It is a phenomenon that concerns you or are you largely indifferent to it? 
Why?
OL: It concerns me because of the danger that the media and non- Muslims living 
in the west will be unable to draw distinctions between radicals who do use 
violence against civilians and simply ordinary Muslims. And because now I 
cannot walk into a room without individuals suspecting me, because I cannot 
get on the subway without individuals suspecting something if I had a back-
pack on . . . or got onto a plane that people might think twice about sitting next 
to me . . . being seated next to me. That is why the word radical is so important 
because unfortunately it has become associated with all Muslims. And I 
should say that I grew up in the UK . . . I was born here . . . you know in the 
70s and the 80s discrimination was more based on the fact that I was brown. It 
wasn’t based on the fact that I was Muslim. It was because I was brown . . . I 
wasn’t White. Okay and . . . discrimination took place. Now it has become 
something else . . . Islamophobia. It is a fear of a particular group. But the 
thinking is that brown people are usually Muslims or can be Muslims so . . . 
now is this growing fear of brown people and of Muslims in particular. Which 
is different from the prejudice and the discrimination of the 70s and the 80s . . . 
that was dislike, that was prejudice, that was discrimination, now its fear . . . 
that’s a different emotion altogether. And that’s much more worrying.
On the other hand two interviewees think that radicalisation is a source of 
concern because it manifests itself in state terrorism including in England. This 
is perhaps the most unexpected answers. Here are the relevant extracts from the 
two interviewees:
DL: Is it a phenomenon that concerns you, or are you largely indifferent into it 
. . . why so?
GA: No, it concerns me. I think it affects me in a very, very, very deep level. If 
you look at states that live with terrorism, Israel for instance, England . . . 
It’s come back to England now, I mean police armed to their teeth standing 
around with big guns. You can’t walk into a bank without worrying about 
things that are on your head . . . certain freedoms get washed away. I mean 
Look at the de Menezes case, it’s unthinkable a few years ago, that you can 
walk into the tube and get shot by a policeman without being asked for your 
hands up first. Without at least running for the door, but that’s exactly what 
happened, and that is an erosion of all of our liberties. We have Britain 
873 06-Radicalisation-06.indd   118 18/11/10   12:30:16
T &
 F 
Pro
of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Audience uncertainties  119
acting in a very small way, like a very, very undemocratic tin pot country, 
that the justification of protecting ourselves against radicalism, and that’s 
erosion of our liberties.
And:
DL: Is it a phenomenon that concerns you, or are you largely indifferent into it 
. . . why so?
VB: I am definitely concerned by it, I . . . and the reason I am concerned by it is 
that . . . in one, I happen to be an ethnic group is targeted by the state terror, 
which is, the state itself is funded by . . . other governments that could 
control the world  . . .
Like OL, the fact that both GA and VB are of Islamic culture and of ethnic 
minority background is highlighted as one of the sources of their concerns: they 
feel that Islamophobic, and more generally xenophobic, sentiments are directly 
threatening them. Both interviewees refer to state terrorism, but GA is more 
detailed about its manifestations in England. The police, according to him, play 
a central role in the organisation of such terror given the way they have 
developed over the decades as a heavily armed force and as consequently carry-
ing violent actions. Thus, violence associated with radicalisation is first and fore-
most encapsulated by the organisation and activities of the police forces.
 In sum, whether interviewees are concerned by radicalisation depends on 
their conception of radicalisation more generally. Even those concerned about 
radicalisation are thinking about a range of issues together, rather than al- Qaeda 
inspired terrorism. Several interviewees were uncertain about the nature of their 
concerns, and did not offer justifications. Others managed their own concerns by 
only thinking about radicalisation when large- scale media events grabbed their 
attention. This again highlights the importance not simply of what people think, 
but how they choose to think about an issue.
 This connections to our argument, earlier, about the way in which audiences 
speak about radicalisation as a concept anyone would hear, but also speak as 
someone, as not- your-typical- viewer, as more cynical or independent- minded than 
others in the presumed news public they position themselves within. Interviewees 
contested or dismissed official and media discursive connection of the concept rad-
icalisation and the sole context of Jihadist- inspired terrorism. We have suggested 
that such understandings may serve various functions for individuals, such as 
establishing or maintaining a political identity or membership of a news public. It 
may also allow them to achieve a measure of certainty and ontological security 
amid conditions of hypersecurity (O’Loughlin et al. forthcoming).
Should we be afraid of calls for violence?
Interviewees were also asked whether they felt personally threatened by calls for 
violence. If radicalisation is to be seen as negative and as something to avoid, as 
873 06-Radicalisation-06.indd   119 18/11/10   12:30:16
T &
 F 
Pro
of
120  Audience uncertainties
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
official and media discourses would have it, then statements that incite violence 
and that value terrorist attacks may be found as being not only dangerous but 
also threatening.
 Thirty-six interviewees answered this question: seven of them say that ‘do 
not’ feel threatened by calls for violence; seven that they ‘do not really’ feel 
threatened or that they do to a certain extent only; and an overwhelming major-
ity, 22, ‘do’ feel threatened by such calls. The seven interviewees who do not 
feel under threat by calls for violence tend to answer the question by substitut-
ing ‘threatening’ by something else, for instance ‘stupid’ or ‘unnerving’, as in 
the following extracts:
YP: All right. Do you find this call for violence threatening?
EW: Uhm.
YP: Or the actual acts, the call for violence?
EW: I find them offensive, but I don’t know that I feel threatened as such.
And:
MD: Do you find calls for violence threatening?
JR: I don’t find them threatening, I just find them sad and stupid and 
unnecessary.
What these examples show is that ‘threatening’ does not appear to be the ade-
quate way to frame the issue. This means that, for these interviewees, the ques-
tion of threat is not the most relevant one and that others are in fact more 
important. The seven interviewees who do not really feel that these calls pose a 
threat share some views similar to the previous seven, but they also tend to 
emphasise the fact that they do not feel under any particular personal threat. 
That is to say, unlike those who do not feel threatened at all by calls for violence 
because they do not see them as threatening in themselves, these seven inter-
viewees recognise that the calls can be threatening in themselves but they do not 
personally identify with such threats. This is the way in which to interpret the 
following remarks:
MD: Do you find these calls for violence threatening at all?
IB: Personally, I don’t find them threatening personally. Post 7/7 it kind of can 
be, but when people make these comments, they make that comment but 
then nothing is going to happen for a while. But then there is a police 
seizure on a house and they’ve found x amount of weapons and something 
was about to go off i a nightclub, Tiger, Tiger or something in London. So 
yes it was quite shocking – there was a car park outside with a 50 lb bomb in 
it. It can be.
Finally, 22 interviewees claim that they do feel calls for violence threatening. 
For many of them, the reason is that they know that many of these calls will not 
873 06-Radicalisation-06.indd   120 18/11/10   12:30:16
T &
 F 
Pro
of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Audience uncertainties  121
materialise into acts but some will do and the actualisation of these calls always 
possesses an element of randomness, unpredictability. What is interesting about 
these 22 interviewees is that they almost all answer the question as if it were an 
odd one. This is manifested in the following examples:
CS: Do you consider calls for violence to be threatening?
JP: Of course I do.
And:
CS: Do you find calls for violence to be threatening?
ME: Doesn’t everyone?
In these two extracts, both JP and ME make it sounds like the answer ‘yes’ to the 
question is the most obvious, natural and hence the only possible one to exist. In 
the first instance the surprising and odd character of the question is made clear 
with the use of ‘of course’. There is a difference between answering ‘yes, I do’ and 
‘of course I do’: the latter produces a judgement about the question itself and it 
creates a generality about the sentiment of threat. With this second point is meant 
that in answering the question in such a way, JP renders his answer not only valid 
for his own personal experience but for anyone living in this society. ‘Of course’ 
conveys a sense of obviousness and naturalness and these characteristics are such 
only if they are shared by an ensemble of people, by people considered as being 
members of a same group (in this case British society). Both these points are also 
present in the second extract, and the second one more explicitly. Again, the fact 
that ME answers the question by asking another one ‘Doesn’t everyone?’ suggests 
that he thinks his answer should be obvious on the very basis that it is the answer 
that everyone in this society should make to such a question.
Conclusion: the mainstream
This chapter has illuminated how ordinary people understand radicalisation, its 
representation in media, and its relationship to their feelings of security. We find 
that
1 awareness of news about radicalisation gives people a sense of being part of 
a news public, and that radicalisation is assumed to be something ‘everyone 
hears about’ even if its precise meaning is not clear;
2 that although radicalisation has a very diverse range of meanings – inter-
viewees give twenty in our study – these meanings all express an under-
standing of a relationship between a mainstream democratic society and 
marginal or extreme figures who contest that society, in some cases through 
calls for, or use of, violence. In other words, to talk about radicalisation is to 
talk about social logics that transcend particular cases or contexts, including 
al- Qaeda inspired terrorism;
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3 Even those concerned about radicalisation are thinking about a range of 
issues together, rather than solely al- Qaeda inspired terrorism. Several inter-
viewees were uncertain about the nature of their concerns, and did not offer 
justifications. Others managed their own concerns by only thinking about 
radicalisation when large- scale media events grabbed their attention. This 
again highlights the importance not simply of what people think, but how 
they choose to think about an issue;
4 finally, a majority of interviewees said they felt threatened by calls for viol-
ence. They assumed everyone must feel threatened, just as ‘everyone hears’ 
about these threats, and that this was a natural reaction. A minority rejected 
the framing of ‘threatening’ in the first place, saying radicalisation was more 
stupid or sad than threatening.
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7 Conclusion
The new media ecology model
Our empirical research has allowed us develop a model of the new media 
ecology, represented vis- à-vis radicalisation in Figure 7.1 below. Through vari-
ants of this model, we can understand how phenomena such as radicalisation, 
war (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010a) and memory (Brown and Hoskins 2010; 
Hoskins 2011) operate.
Experience, discourses
•  The product of processes below
•  Feed back to give meaning and define action
   towards the processes below
Jihadist media
•  Professional and amateur
•  Multilingual
Media grey zones Translation agencies
Mainstream
news media States
Audiences/citizens
•  Increasingly diffused
•  Target of propaganda
•  Confer legitimacy
•  Varying levels of media
   literacy, tendency to
   participate and remediate
• Site, NEFA
• Only translate
   verbal not visual
• Governments, security
   agencies, police
•  Al-Jazeera Talk
•  Social media, discussion
   forums, video upload sites
•  Big media (BBC, CNN)
•  Amateur content 
   blended into professional 
   news sites
•  Multilingual
•  Subject to regulation
Information infrastructure
•  Technical apparatus
•  Emergent and unplanned but largely durable and reliable
•  Political, legal, economic and scientific drivers
Figure 7.1 The new media ecology vis-à-vis radicalisation.
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	 The	new	media	ecology	is	dependent	first	and	foremost	on	the	classification,	
circulation and organisation of ‘information’, which together forge an ‘informa-
tion infrastructure’. Bowker and Star, for instance argue that this infrastructure 
involves an increasing convergence of ‘standards, categories, technologies, and 
phenomenology’ (1999: 47). In terms of radicalisation, the information infra-
structure affords not just a framework through which actors, institutions, and the 
practices of these groups and the relationships between them can be mapped out, 
but	rather	a	more	dynamic	configuration	of	 the	nodes	and	networks	ushered	in	
through the connective turn. The ‘structure’ is in multiple ways self- (as well as 
institutionally	 or	 ‘externally’)	 configured	 through	 the	 connections	 or	 linkages	
individuals and groups make between and across the infrastructure already trav-
elled. For more on this aspect of the new media ecology model we can draw on 
the development of the phenomenon of ‘emergence’. For instance, Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin (2010a) develop this idea in relation to work on complexity (see 
Urry	 2005:	 5)	 with	 emergence	 defined	 as:	 ‘the	 processes	 whereby	 the	 global	
behaviour of a system results from the actions and interactions of agents’ 
(Sawyer 2005: 2), or put differently as ‘collective phenomena that are collabora-
tively created by individuals, yet are not reducible to individual action’ (op.
cit.: 5). Emergence then is one of the key ways in which the information infra-
structure is continually ‘renewable’ through its relations with the other elements 
of the new media ecology mapped out above.
 In Figure 7.1, the key actors in respect of radicalisation are Jihadist media, 
mainstream news media, states, translation agencies, and audiences/citizens who 
can confer legitimacy on the others and hence are the target of appeals in the 
form of propaganda or public diplomacy from the others. Through the interac-
tions of this set of agents a number of discourses (on and of radicalisation) and a 
range of experiences (fear, anxiety, mistrust, uncertainty) emerge via a diffused 
information infrastructure. These discourses ‘modulate’ in intensity and exten-
sity, for instance around key events as we demonstrated in our nexus analysis (in 
Chapter	5)	of	the	mediatisations	of	the	Gaza	conflict.
 Nexus analysis has allowed us to trace the constitution of the new media 
ecology around the phenomenon of radicalisation. The creators of nexus anal-
ysis, Scollon and Scollon (2004), suggested an important aspect of the approach 
is mapping the scale and scope of any nexus, what they called circumferencing. 
This	refers	to	the	identification	of	the	past	origins	of	action;	its	future	direction;	
its expanding circles of engagement with others near and far; the timescales on 
which the action depends and the layers of geopolitical discourses in which it is 
embedded. Using this approach, the temporal trajectories and trends of radicalis-
ing discourses and discourses about	 radicalisation	 were	 identified,	 as	 well	 as	
their	spatial	connectivities,	and	local	and	global	influences.
 We have theorised the interactions of agents in this model in terms of medi-
atisation, the process whereby social relationships are subsumed within, or 
dependent on, the media and their logics. The particular media logics that drive 
interactions examined in this book have included premediation (the anticipation 
of a range of potential future scenarios to prevent traumatic surprises), retrospective 
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premediation (media reports which represent individuals’ life trajectories depict-
ing incidents in their youth as signifying that they were always bound to be radi-
calised), and speculative remediation (translation of extremist discourses through 
mainstream news discourses in event time). These media logics operate along 
the dynamic axis of chaos versus control (cf. McNair 2006) through which the 
tension between professional and amateur media has unfolded in both Jihadist 
and mainstream media.
 It must be noted that the sets of actors represented in the diagram are by no 
means discrete. Some private terrorist monitoring agencies and translation agen-
cies are funded by states, others by individuals who feel it is their civic duty. 
There have always been suspicions that some Jihadist media were organised by 
intelligence agencies in order to monitor Jihadist communication, and we now 
know that al- Hesba was actually run by the CIA. Audience members may have 
shifting engagements with news about radicalisation, for instance if a terrorist 
attack occurs or they have a personal experience connected to what they feel is 
radicalisation. We have also included a category, ‘grey zones’, to indicate where 
discourses of radicalisation are present but not necessarily in ways planned by 
Jihadists or in spaces where such ideas are subject to contestation and debate.
	 In	 this	 concluding	 chapter,	 we	 review	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 book	 and	 their	
implications for security, terrorism and media.
The uncertain connectivities of media and terror
‘Radicalisation’	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 has	 emerged	 in	 the	 early	 twenty-	first	
century because the new media ecology enables patterns of connectivity that can 
be harnessed by individuals and groups for practices of persuasion, organisation 
and the enactment of violence. The very possibility of this happening but uncer-
tainty about how it happens created a conceptual vacuum which ‘radicalisation’ 
filled.	 The	 case	 of	 Jihadist	 radicalisation	 has	 depended	 on	 these	 conditions.	
Often, however, this feared connectivity does not happen, or happens in ways 
not predictable and controllable by those seeking to incite, direct or carry out 
violence. Hence, Jihadist networks have seen shifts in the organisations’ form, 
practices of legitimation and relation of ideology to action, shifts which have 
often	challenged	and	defied	Jihadist	 leaders.	Yet	 the	spectre	of	successful	con-
nectivity by Jihadists – a spectre given material form by a string of attacks 
around the world since the 1990s – has allowed the formation of discourses of 
global fear, risk and hypersecurity, created, perpetuated or adapted by Western 
security agencies, political leaders and mainstream news media.
 While the development and proliferation of digital media is the condition for 
these processes, they have not determined the emergence of Jihadists per se or 
war on terror responses. The political interests, grievances and ambitions driving 
these forms of response would require studies of regional politics, religious 
debates and the changing character of war that are beyond our scope of explana-
tion here. Our focus in this book has been on how digital media have enabled 
connectivities that amplify or contain the dispersion of radicalising discourses 
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and discourses about radicalisation. What marks these connectivities is a pro-
found and intrinsic contingency. As a result, we have witnessed a series of 
attempts to conceptualise political actors such as al- Qaeda in the last decade, for 
instance the horizontal ‘leaderless Jihad’ proposed by Marc Sageman (2006) or 
the religious- ethical entity that ‘acts without being an actor’ described by Faisal 
Devji (2008). In the context of the contingent connectivity our study has docu-
mented, Knorr Cetina’s conception of ‘global microstructures’ seems helpful. 
She	 writes	 that	 the	 ‘world	 of	 Al	 Qaeda	 appears	 to	 be	 fluid,	 processual	 and	
aterritorial’:
As	the	flow	of	events	into	which	Al	Qaeda	members	are	plugged	is	continu-
ously reiterated, updated and extended, the various temporal and other coor-
dinates of this world are continuously articulated and changed as operational 
goals are adopted, religious commentary and messages are interpreted, new 
decrees are issued, and the activities of various ‘enemies’ are observed and 
decoded. The very accoutrements of this non- institutional timeworld change 
as new events take place and become food for imagined new scenarios and 
works.
(2005: 222)
The	fluid	networks	Knorr	Cetina	 labels	 ‘global	microstructures’	 are	unified	by	
members sharing a meaning of time; a long- term outlook based around historical 
narratives such as a battle between the three monotheisms. The Jihadists’ success 
(or survival) has depended on harnessing mediatised, translocal socialities and 
continuously	adapting	as	the	new	media	ecology	develops,	always	finding	new	
supporters	or	members	who	will	 create	 interpretations	of	new	events	 to	fit	 the	
longer narratives. While we have seen that this adaptation has not necessarily 
been planned, and is rather the outcome of competition between putative leaders 
of ‘the Jihad’, the effect has been to take advantage of the ‘contingent openness’ 
that characterises the new media ecology.
 We have been able to explain this by applying a methodology that integrates 
a number of strands of research. We have followed media content or stories (like 
the	Gaza	conflict)	across	a	number	of	cultures	operating	simultaneously:	multi-
lingual Jihadist media, mainstream news and audience cultures. Since the sheer 
volume of media sources and content makes it impossible to systematically code 
and analyse any ‘comprehensive’ measure of Jihadist or mainstream media, 
instead of choosing a practical but restrictive corpus of material to analyse, we 
have turned conventional media- security analysis upside down by following the 
story. This ‘nexus analysis’ parallels a model of the ‘circulation of commodities’ 
offered several decades ago by Arjun Appadurai (1986). By circulation, he was 
concerned with the production and consumption of commodities and what drives 
the demand for them; not simply the market dynamics of modern economics, but 
the meaning certain objects have in certain cultural contexts. His model reso-
nates with our exploration of the demand for, and patterns of circulation of, 
Jihadist materials. He wrote:
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we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in 
their forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through the analysis of these 
trajectories that we can interpret human transactions and calculations that 
enliven things. Thus, even through from a theoretical point of view human 
actors	encode	things	with	significance,	from	a	methodological point of view it 
is the things- in-motion that illuminate their human and social context.
(Appadurai 1986: 5)
Tracing the movement and proliferation of items of Jihadist media content is a 
means to the ends of establishing, among other things:
•	 what	connectivity	exists	between	Jihadist	and	mainstream	cultures;
•	 what	 responses	 such	 connectivity	 engenders	 from	 mainstream	 publics,	
whether fear of terrorism or bemusement or hilarity at Jihadist culture; and
•	 whether	mainstream	news	media	inadvertently	legitimise	Jihadist	ideas	and	
cultures, and create fear in news audiences.
For Appadurai, as for contemporary media theorists (e.g. McNair 2006) circula-
tion can be explained by a dialectic between control and chaos. Political and 
social elites in most societies try to ensure that exchange relations keep to a 
certain order – that the movement of goods, people and information is stable, 
predictable and structured in a way that prevents the emergence of any challenge 
to the elites themselves. However, such control is never total or permanent, and 
a certain breaching will occur:
What is political about [circulation] is the constant tension between the 
existing frameworks (of price, bargaining, and so forth) and the tendency of 
commodities to breach these frameworks.
(Appadurai 1986: 57)
The point Appadurai made, and that nexus analysis puts into practice, is that it is 
by following the content – looking from the content’s point of view, even – that 
we can gain a perspective on those whose hands the content passes through, and 
their goals and beliefs at the time. Appadurai looks at the kula system of 
exchange	 in	 the	 Western	 Pacific,	 ‘the	 best	 documented	 example	 of	 a	 non-	
Western, preindustrial, nonmonetized, translocal exchange system’ (op. cit.: 18). 
The kula, he writes, ‘is an extremely complex regional system for the circulation 
of particular kinds of valuables, usually between men of substance, in the 
Massim group of islands’ (ibid.). Two types of objects are usually exchanged: 
necklaces go round the islands in one direction, while armshells go the other 
way. As these objects move, they gain a biography and a reputation of sorts. 
Equally, it is through this circulation that the reputations are established of the 
men who take hold of the necklaces and shells and later pass them on. Moreover, 
the ritual as a whole creates a larger meaning in the society and political arrange-
ments of these islands. Memories, hierarchies and partnerships are enacted.
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 Jihadist leaders constructed a media system through which digital content was 
produced, disseminated and discussed. In Chapter 2 we found that the Jihadists, 
despite having a relatively coherent narrative which was reinforced by the 
Global War on Terror discourse offered by political leaders in the US and else-
where, failed to mobilise mass popular support among Muslims; al- Zawahiri 
lamented ‘the extent of the gap in understanding between the Jihad movement 
and the common people’. The circulation of images signifying Muslim suffering, 
Western hypocrisy, Jihadist heroism and so on was intended to create effects: to 
legitimise violence and recruit and mobilise supporters. The new media ecology 
facilitated the circulation and dispersion of the Jihadists’ narrative and hence the 
opportunity to legitimate their violent actions. However, the very openness of 
that ecology resulted in a loss of control of the ‘core message’ as alternative 
interpretations	 and	 versions	 of	 the	 narrative	 emerged	 and	 charismatic	 figures	
explicitly challenged the positions of al- Zawahiri and others. We explained in 
Chapter 3 how this system was breached by autonomous Jihadists themselves, 
who contested core messages and produced their own content and disseminated 
it	 independently	of	 the	official	Jihadist	media	system.	It	was	in	 the	interests	of	
these Jihadist supporters to do so. The system was also breached by agencies 
which	simply	obliterated	the	official	Jihadist	media	system	by	taking	down	their	
websites. The control- chaos dialectic is driven by competing interests, particu-
larly among elites:
[I]t is possible to witness the following common paradox. It is in the inter-
ests	of	those	in	power	to	completely	freeze	the	flow	of	commodities,	by	cre-
ating a closed universe of commodities and a rigid set of regulations about 
how	 they	 are	 to	 move.	 Yet	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 contests	 between	 those	 in	
power (or those who aspire to greater power) tends to invite a loosening of 
these rules and an expansion of the pool of commodities. This aspect of elite 
politics is generally the Trojan horse of value shifts.
(Appadurai 1986: 57)
Identifying a closed, failing elite, new actors emerged who cultivated legitimacy 
by	deeds	 rather	 than	words,	 and	 a	 new	mix	of	 on-	 and	offline	behaviour	 took	
hold.	To	be	a	 Jihadist	 leader	was	as	much	about	actions	 in	 the	field	of	kinetic	
war as about clerical expertise.
The missing connection between Jihadists and mainstream 
news and audiences
How did this Jihadist culture connect to mainstream news content or audience 
understandings of ‘radicalisation’? The unavoidable fact is that for the two years 
of	our	study,	the	only	explicit	moment	of	connection	identified	in	our	integrated	
study was the 2008–2009 Gaza crisis, when British news media reported on the 
presumed radicalising effect of Israel’s actions (and Britain’s lack of opposition 
to	those	actions),	to	the	extent	that	news	reports	briefly	addressed	online	Jihadist	
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media propaganda being disseminated in those weeks. Jihadism was an implied 
presence, becoming materialised in the form about police raids on Muslim 
homes, attempted and actual attacks, and the implication that young, ‘vulner-
able’ individuals must have been radicalised to some extent by extremist ‘mater-
ials’ or ‘through the Internet’. But despite the ‘existential’ threat posed by 
Jihadist ‘global terrorism’, mainstream news and audience understandings were 
both characterised by an absence of the shifting characters, ideology, network 
form, and successes and failures of Jihadism. Instead, uncertainty about the 
nature	and	form	of	 this	 threat	enabled	unverifiable	discourses	about	 radicalisa-
tion to run wild. And as was clear in Chapter 6 (and see below) this correlated 
with anxieties about terrorism threats even among those sceptical about the 
concept or policies they associated with ‘radicalisation’. Hence, discourses about 
radicalisation may have in themselves generated terror.
 Our study has offered evidence of the ways in which television in particular 
functions to reproduce these discourses about radicalisation, while offering very 
little information about Jihadist culture. In contrast to the millennial time frame 
of Jihadists, Western news media coverage of ‘radicalisation’-related events in 
the years following 9/11 saw the likes of Sky News, CNN and the BBC in par-
ticular deliver to viewers a particular temporality, the extended present. In the 
extended present, unfolding events are represented as a known and possibly 
unavoidable	series	of	ongoing	crises	within	a	global	war	on	terror	of	indefinite	
and	 unknowable	 duration.	 The	 extended	 present	 is	 fortified	 by	 the	manner	 in	
which mainstream television offers simulations or premediations of terrorist 
attacks, featuring in the BBC’s case many of the very journalists, political 
advisors	and	unofficial	‘experts’	who	featured	in	the	coverage	of	the	actual	7/7	
attacks.	 This	 blurring	 of	 fact	 and	 fiction,	 official	 and	 unofficial,	 may	 sustain,	
legitimate or even normalise discourses of global fear and risk whose relation to 
the actual activities and capacities of Jihadists is unknowable.
 Security journalism around radicalisation- related events is an awkward voca-
tion,	given	the	absence	of	verifiable	information	and	the	need	to	fill	the	24-hour	
news schedule. Nor can we blame journalists for offering vague notions of ‘radi-
calisation’ when security services admit any model is impossible (Githens- Mazer 
and	Lambert	2010)	and	politicians	continue	 to	use	 this	 ‘useful	fiction’	 in	 their	
public statements. Nevertheless, regardless of good intentions and challenges 
faced, the actual product of security journalism in the period studied perpetuated 
stereotypes and global fear discourses. For instance, although British media were 
reluctant to even mention al- Qaeda or give details on individual suspects, refer-
ence to the need to engage Muslim communities in the aftermath of these break-
ing security events offers an identity to the threat if only by implication. 
Nowhere were these problems more evident than in BBC Newsnight’s episode 
on the Gaza crisis broadcast on 12 January 2009.
	 In	Chapter	5	we	identified	the	Newsnight programme as an exemplar of spec-
ulative remediation. This was evident in its multiple connecting of the images 
and other media modalities (around the new media ecology) of apparently 
unchecked Israeli destruction of Gaza and its people, to a process of 
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radicalisation in UK communities and online. In this way the Gaza was a ‘perfect 
storm’ in the potential weaponisation of Western mainstream news through its 
translation	and	amplification	of	the	discourses	of	radicalisation	within	the	intense	
highly	reflexive	period	of	‘event	time’	of	the	conflict.	We	juxtaposed	the	News-
night reporting with our analysis of the actual attempted legitimisation of Global 
Jihad that was taking place online within the same event timeframe. Through 
this we demonstrated how the new media ecology is both ‘imagined’ and tra-
versed through the multiple representations of the mainstream in the non- 
mainstream	and	vice-	versa	as	the	discourses	on	the	conflict	modulated	between	
chaos	and	order,	amplification	and	containment.	The	 larger	and	complex	 itera-
tions of these discourses across all or even many mainstream news platforms and 
the wider new media ecology would be impossible to systematically code and 
analyse.
 However, in our selection and analysis of a practical but restrictive corpus of 
material we illuminated a nexus of radicalisation that developed through the con-
nectivities of the information infrastructure, but also despite them. In other 
words, this nexus is not just about the direct linkages made between a set of 
agents but about a particular kind of speculation (speculative remediation) that 
involves assumptions as to the nature of the formation and extent of the dis-
courses being represented on the Internet. One can therefore conclude that it is 
the mediality of the Internet that affords the medium an impact beyond simply 
the ways in which it is represented (in this case on television). Its impact is 
related to an implicitly shared sense of how the medium is ‘consumed’ and 
accessed and used by the various agents connected to this particular nexus 
including by journalists representing or ‘imagining’ the Internet as a medium in 
and through which radicalisation emerges.
 How then do ordinary citizens understand radicalisation? Previous studies 
have shown that although people often have contradictory or unclear understand-
ings of security and their own relation to threats ‘out there’, these understandings 
are (a) explicable, and (b) affect their attitude to government security policy and 
whether they believe such policy is legitimate. It was important, then, to explore 
how people have been living with and making sense of the security context of 
the period, and ‘radicalisation’ in particular. Through comparative ethnographic 
analysis, we found that audiences- cum-citizens do not simply believe or not 
believe what they are being told about radicalisation by journalists and politi-
cians. Rather, the practice of consuming news about radicalisation is one of 
several ways in which people come to understand the nature of their society, 
their own position in it, and the boundaries of the mainstream and margins or 
extremes. This includes the emergent role of mediality in shaping such medi-
atised understandings. Hence, not only is a study of everyday understandings of 
radicalisation instructive for security studies in itself, but it opens up more long-
standing sociological questions about the logics of identity and difference 
through which contemporary societies are being constituted. The social function 
of the term ‘radicalise’ was implicit in Raymond Williams’ entry on ‘radical’ in 
his Keywords (1983):
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Radical has been used as an adjective in English from C14, and as a noun 
from C17, from fw radicalis, lL, rw radix, L – root. Its early uses were mostly 
physical, to express an inherent and fundamental quality, and this was extended 
to more general descriptions from C16. The important extension to political 
matters,	always	 latent	 in	 this	general	use,	belongs	specifically	 to	 lC18,	espe-
cially in the phrase Radical Reform. Radical as a noun to describe a propo-
nent of radical reform was common from eC19: ‘Radical is a word in very 
bad odour here, being used to denote a set of blackguards . . .’ (Scott, 1819); 
‘Love is a great leveler; a perfect Radical’ (Cobbett, 1822); ‘the term Radical 
once employed as a name of low reproach, has found its way into high places, 
and is gone forth as the title of a class, who glory in their designation’ (1830); 
‘the radical mob’ (Emerson, 1856). Radicalism was formed from this use, in 
eC19, and was followed by radicalize. The words then have a curious sub-
sequent history. Radical, especially with a capital letter, was by the second 
half of C19 almost as respectable as liberal, and Radicalism generally fol-
lowed. But radical was still available, in some uses, in the sharper eC19 sense. 
Where	 in	1852	we	find	 ‘incipient	 radicalism,	chartist	 tendencies,	or	 socialist	
symptoms’, there was by lC19 a clear distinction between Radicals and Social-
ists, and in the course of time most Radical parties, in other countries, were 
found considerably to the right of the political spectrum.
Whether ‘radical’ denotes left, right, respectable or violent, the term will continue 
to be used in relation to a social mainstream, and hence uses of the term ‘radical’ 
and ‘radicalise’ are indicators of social and political imaginaries in any period. We 
found, for instance, that consuming news about radicalisation gives people a sense 
of being part of a news public, since radicalisation is assumed to be something ‘eve-
ryone hears about’ even if its precise meaning is not clear or often politicised. While 
research participants offered a very diverse range of meanings when asked what 
‘radicalisation’ means, their understandings all expressed some notion of a relation-
ship	between	a	mainstream	democratic	society	and	marginal	or	extreme	figures	who	
contest that society, in some cases through calls for, or use of, violence.
 Even those concerned about radicalisation are thinking about a range of issues 
together, rather than the Jihadist terrorism so central to contemporary security pol-
icies. Some were unsure what they thought about radicalisation, others only gave it 
attention when large- scale media events broke. But it is striking that a majority of 
interviewees said they felt threatened by calls for violence. Moreover, they 
assumed everyone must feel threatened, just as ‘everyone hears’ about radicalisa-
tion, and hence theirs was a natural reaction. That a fairly critical sample of inter-
viewees still largely felt a sense of threat perhaps demonstrates the effect of living 
in conditions of hypersecurity; uncertainty may be the condition to believe the 
worst, despite one’s self- identity as critical or ‘not- your-typical- viewer’. We are 
only just beginning to understand the relation between uncertainty (including types 
of uncertainty), media, and responses to security policy.
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Appendix I
Demographic information
Appendix I Demographic information (total: 51 respondents)
Frequency Percentage
Gender
Female 22 43
Male 29 57
Age
20–29 20 39
30–39 20 39
40–49  9 18
50–59  2  4
Country
England 37 72
France 10 20
Denmark  3  6
Australia  1  2
Religion
Christian  4  8
Muslim  3  6
Jewish  3  6
No religion 27 53
Not disclosed 14 27
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Appendix II
Phenomena interviewees associate with 
‘radicalisation’
The following list of items refers to the range of phenomena that audience inter-
viewees spoke about when asked what ‘radicalisation’ meant to them. It is not 
quite an A–Z.
1968
Abu Hamza
Afghan women protesting
Anarchists
Animal rights
Anti- capitalist movement
Anti- EU views
Black power salute 1968 Olympics
Blockage of universities
Born again Christians
Boss snapping
Capitalism
Catholic church
Choreology
Communists
Crusades
Darwin
Dictatorships
Dieudonné
Early Labour Party
Ecological activists
English civil war – Cromwell
Extreme left
Extreme right
Fathers 4 Justice
Feminism
Fundamentalist Christians
Gandhi
Government
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Hippies
Homophobia
Hooligans
Hoyerswerda
Human rights
Ian Paisley
Irish Republican Army
Islamic radicalism
Israel–Palestine relations
It doesn’t exist
Jihad
Ku Klux Klan
Kurdish question
Martin Luther King
Marxist groups in Kerala
Media propaganda
Militant Jews
Minority groups in Iran
Mongols
Movements against segregation
Nail bomber
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
Native Americans
Nazis
North–South Korea
Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste
Omagh bombing
Opposition movements in Iran
Opposition to the Vietnam war in the US
Organisations against Animal Cruelty
Osama bin Laden
Parti Radical de Gauche
Parti Socaliste
Protests in Thailand
Radical sexual politics
Right wing groups
Right- wing groups in Russia
Riots in Greece (November–December 2008)
Roman Empire
Sarkozy
September 11, 2001 attacks
Skinhead
Société Nationale des Chemin de fer français
Social movements in Latin America
Socialists
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Appendix II  135
Sociological concept
Sri Lanka cricket team
Stopping taking showers
Tarnac people
Terrorism
The police
The Pope on contraception
The Socialist Workers Party
Tibet
Tiananmen square protestors
Tony Blair
Women’s right movements
Yugoslavia
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Notes
1 Media and radicalisation: grappling uncertainties in the new 
media ecology radicalisation gone wild
1 The Iraq Inquiry (see www.iraqinquiry.org.uk) launched on 30 July 2009 aimed to 
‘identify lessons that can be learned from the Iraq conflict’. Witnesses that appeared in 
person before the committee members included the most senior members of the UK 
political elite including the former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the (at the time of his 
appearance) the sitting Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Baroness Manningham- Buller’s 
comments should be seen in the context of her giving evidence to the Inquiry following 
its break for the 2010 UK general election. In other words, the ensuing change of govern-
ment may come to be seen as a marker which enabled a more public critical reflection on 
policy and practice in terms of a rationale for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, especially by 
those who were members of the government/security services over that period.
2 Oxford English Dictionary entry available at: http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/ 
50297778 [accessed 11 April 2010].
3 Oxford English Dictionary entry available at: http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/ 
50196101 [accessed 11 April 2010].
4 ‘Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives’, 
Change Institute for the European Commission (Directorate General Justice, Freedom 
and Security), February 2008, note 3, p. 7, online, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
home- affairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_ideology_and_
narrative_en.pdf [accessed July 2008].
5 The research project is: ‘Legitimising the discourses of radicalisation: political viol-
ence in the new media ecology’, Award Number: RES- 181–25–0041, led by this 
book’s authors. See www.newmediaecology.net/radicalisation/index.html and www2.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/nsc.
6 We are indebted to Paul Eedle, a member of the ESRC Programme Advisory Board 
and Managing Director of Out There News for making available this material to us.
7 We are indebted to Carole Boudeau for these observations and analysis.
2 Legitimising Jihadist ideology
 1 This chapter is developed from an earlier article: Awan, A.N. (2009) ‘Success of the 
Meta- Narrative: How Jihadists Maintain Legitimacy’, in CTC Sentinel, 2(11): 6–9.
 2 The phrase ‘hearts and minds’ is most famously associated with the British counter- 
insurgency campaign in Malaya (1948–1960), and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
employment of it during the Vietnam War. However, the phrase has been increasingly 
invoked by politicians, commentators, security services and governmental organisa-
tions in the current conflict with radical Islamism. See for example the 2007 report 
from the UK Dept. for Communities and Local Government entitled Preventing 
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Violent Extremism – Winning hearts and minds www.communities.gov.uk/publica-
tions/communities/preventingviolentextremism.
 3 Letter from Ayman al- Zawahiri to Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, 9 July 2005, The Office of 
the Director of National Security, online, available at: www.globalsecurity.org/secur-
ity/library/report/2005/zawahiri- zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm.
 4 Letter from Osama bin Laden to Mullah Omar, 5 June 2002, US Military Academy 
Counterterrorism Center, Document AFGP- 2002–600321.
 5 Al- Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Fursan Taht Rayah Al- Nabi (Knights Under the Proph-
et’s Banner), Part 11, section 1.A, online, available at: www.scribd.com/doc/6759609/
Knights- Under-the- Prophet-Banner.
 6 Whilst Osama bin Laden had released other statements prior to the 1996 ‘fatwa’, these 
earlier messages are considered to have been addressed to more local Saudi audiences 
such as the Ulama (scholars) or wider appeals to Arab or Muslim constituencies.
 7 Online, available at: www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen1.htm.
 8 In a speech given on 16 September 2001, President George W Bush stated, ‘This is a 
new kind of – a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are 
beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.’ 
Online, available at: www.georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov and navigate to 
News, 2001, September, 16.
 9 From the sermon ‘Among a Band of Knights’, 14 February 2003, cited in Lawrence 
(2005).
10 ‘Bounty set over Prophet cartoon’, BBC News, 15 September 2007, online, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6996553.stm [accessed 15 September 2007].
11 The Global Jihadists have consistently appealed to anachronistic medieval categories 
of this nature in order to frame the current conflict.
12 From a speech given by George W. Bush on 6 November 2001, online, available at: 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror.
13 Transcript online, available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2004/11/ 
200849163336457223.html.
14 See Tim Reid, ‘Al- Qaeda supporters back John McCain for president’, The Times, 23 
October 2008.
15 Online, available at: www.alhesbah.org [accessed 21 October 2008].
16 See Haroon Siddique ‘McCain adviser says terrorist attack would boost campaign’, 
The Guardian, 24 June 2008.
17 Letter from Ayman al- Zawahiri to Abu Musab al- Zarqawi (2005), online, available 
at: www.cfr.org/publication/9862/letter_from_ayman_alzawahiri_to_ abu_musab_alzar-
qawi.html.
18 The literal meaning of the commonly used phrase Jihad fee sabeelillah.
19 These include The Caliphate Voice Channel (http://cvc- online.blogspot.com) and the 
previous incarnation, The Mujahideen Shura Council (http://albayanat.blogspot.com).
20 In this case being the ‘criterion for demarcating right from wrong’. See for example 
Surah 25 of the Quran.
21 Prior to the ‘downing of the Jihadist forums’, these were considered to be the most 
important Jihadist new media spaces available; see Awan and al- Lami (2009).
22 This term was coined by Kepel (2004) to describe Salafi Muslims who began devel-
oping an interest in violent Jihad during the mid- 1990s.
23 Letter from Ayman al- Zawahiri to Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, 2005.
24 For a detailed discussion of the legitimate parameters of war in the Islamic tradition 
see Kelsay (2008).
25 See McCants (2006).
26 Reinforcing our reciprocal legitimation thesis, this tactic is a employed by a number 
of Islamophobic commentators and organisations too.
27 For a discussion of some of the arguments put forward by radicals in order to justify 
the killing of civilians, see Wiktorowicz (2005).
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28 It is now widely recognised that a significant proportion of Jihadist forum members 
include a motley crew of counterterrorism officials, anti- Jihadist activists, journalists, 
and academics. Indeed there is growing evidence that al- Hesbah, the most secure and 
respected of the Jihadist forums was in fact a CIA vehicle – of course this does not 
mean that the forum was not used by real Jihadists as the case of Abu Dujanah proved 
(see Chapter 3).
29 This is not to imply that these traditional ideologues may not also be immersed in the 
new media environments; al- Maqdisi has a number of websites and has engaged in 
debates directly on Jihadist forums.
30 The Lesser Jihad refers to conventional warfare against an external enemy (predomi-
nantly defensive in nature), whereas the Greater Jihad entails every Muslim’s internal 
spiritual struggle; see Firestone (1999).
31 The Lesser Jihad in the classical tradition is recognised not as an individual duty (fard 
‘ayn), but rather as a collective or communal duty (fard kifaya).
32 For more on Faraj, see Jansen (1986).
33 Khan, Muhammad Siddique (2005) Martyrdom Testament, online, available at: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm.
34 Bin Laden, Osama (1998) World Islamic Front Statement for Jihad Against Jews and 
Crusaders, online, available at: http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
35 Ibid.
36 Literally meaning Seceder, the Kharijites were an early heretical Islamic sect.
37 Osama bin Laden, al- Jazeera TV Channel Interview, 1991.
38 As is now well known, the vast majority of victims of Jihadist violence have been 
Muslims; i.e. only 15 per cent of the fatalities resulting from al- Qaeda attacks between 
2004 and 2008 were Westerners. During the most recent period studied the numbers skew 
even further. From 2006 to 2008, only 2 per cent are from the West, and the remaining 98 
per cent are inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. See Helfstein et al. (2009).
39 Such as using Down’s Syndrome sufferers (Howard 2008), or women raped by Jihad-
ists as suicide bombers (Haynes 2009).
40 Cf. Bennett et al. (2007).
41 Juba is the nom de guerre of one (possibly more) highly trained sniper involved in the 
Iraqi insurgency, who claims to have killed hundreds of US soldiers; see www.bagh-
dadsniper.net.
42 Alali and Eke (1991) first used this term in suggesting that journalists act as ‘rhetori-
cal amplifiers’ for either terrorists or government officials when reporting on a news 
story on terrorism.
43 See Chapter 3 for more on the control exerted.
44 Both figures have impeccable Jihadist credentials and were arguably present at the 
founding of al- Qaeda in 1988 in Peshawar.
45 The prohibition on takfir was one of the three principle points endorsed by The 
Amman Message in 2005, which brought together 200 of the world’s leading Islamic 
scholars from 50 countries. See www.ammanmessage.com.
46 Ibid.
47 Letter from Ayman al- Zawahiri to Abu Musab al- Zarqawi.
48 Al- Zawahiri has attempted to engage his critics through his text The Exoneration 
(2008) and through the 2008 virtual open meeting facilitated by as- Sahab, however, 
his response has focused principally on the critics’ inability to comprehend the true 
state of the situation due to their absence from the Jihad fronts.
3 Media Jihad
 1 Parts of this chapter are based upon an earlier article: Awan, A.N. (2010) ‘Jihadist 
Ideology in the 21st Century: Legitimation, Contestation and Mediation’, in Deol, J. 
and Kazmi, Z. (eds) Contextualising Jihadi Ideology. London: C. Hurst & Co.
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 2 Indeed some commentators have even suggested it is a distinctly modern Western 
phenomenon; a product of globalisation and modernisation that is far removed from 
traditional Muslim societies, and in many ways reminiscent of the Protestant Refor-
mation; see Roy (2004).
 3 Quoted in Ulph, S. (2005).
 4 The term ‘counterculture’ is a variant of the subculture theme first popularised by 
Roszak (1968).
 5 Abdullah Yusuf Azzam was a highly influential Palestinian scholar and advocate for 
defensive Jihad, particularly during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He also 
served as an early mentor for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
 6 Abu Huthayfa, Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah, 20 June 2000, 
pp. 9–11. Harmony database, AFGP- 2002–003251.
 7 O’Loughlin, B. (2010) ‘Images as weapons of war? Representation, mediation and 
interpretation’, Review of International Studies, doi: 10.1017/ S0260210510000811.
 8 See for example Fisk’s (1996) eyewitness account at the time and his later book Pity 
the Nation: Lebanon at War (2001), particularly chapter 18.
 9 Historically the regions that demarcated dar al- Islam from dar al- harb, and therefore 
the realm that animates bin Laden and his ilk most strongly.
10 This is the most widely accepted definition of Web 2.0; see www.oreillynet.com/
pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what- is-web- 20.html.
11 Al- Ansari, Abu al- Harith (2008) Irshad al- Sa’ul ila Hurub al- Rasul, online, available 
at: http://pdfdatabase.com/download/abu- al-harith- al-ansari- irshad-al- saul-ila- hurub-al- 
rasul-d8a5d8b1d8b4d8a7d8af-d8a7d984d8b3d8a4d988d984-d8a5d984d989-d8add8b-
1d988d8a8-d8a7d984d8b1d8b3-doc- 4571909.html.
12 Al- Salim, Muhammad bin Ahmad (2003) 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad, 
online, available at: www.archive.org/details/39WaysToServeAnd Participate.
13 Al- Awlaki’s work is in fact based upon al- Salim’s (2003) text, with large portions of the 
text having been plagiarised outright without any sort of acknowledgement or attribution.
14 Al- Awlaki, Anwar (2009) 44 Ways to Support Jihad, online, available at: http://ibnab-
dullah.blogspot.com/2009/05/44-ways- to-supoort- jihad.html.
15 Al- Suri is perhaps best known for this theory decentralised ‘leaderless terrorism’ which 
he describes as nizam la tanzim (system, not organisation), and which has informed the 
modus operandi of most Jihadist terrorists attacks in the post- 9/11 milieu.
16 Al- Suri, Abu Musab (2005) ‘Theory of Media and Incitement in the Call to Global 
Islamic Resistance’ in Call to Global Islamic Resistance, online, available at: www.
archive.org/details/TheGlobalIslamicResistanceCall.
17 Cited in Black (2007).
18 Cited in Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group 
Task Force on Internet- facilitated Radicalisation (2007).
19 See Economist (2007).
20 Ibid.
21 See www.almasry- alyoum.com/printerfriendly.aspx?ArticleID=217021.
22 Quoted in The Economist (2007).
23 Online, available at: www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/pdf/ukpga_20060011_en. pdf.
24 See Telegraph (2009).
25 See The Economist (2007).
26 Online, available at: www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_3_chap1.
htm.
27 Online, available at: www.worldofislam.info/ebooks/joincaravan.pdf.
28 Al- Zarqawi ‘Ilhaq bi- al-Qafila’, online, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=1rIq
 Yt21FWA.
29 See AIVD (2008).
30 Al- Suri (2005) ‘Theory of Media and Incitement in the Call to Global Islamic Resist-
ance’ in Call to Global Islamic Resistance.
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31 Ibid.
32 Formerly available at: www.alm2sda.net.
33 Cited in Weimann (2006).
34 See Labi (2006).
35 ‘Three jailed for inciting terror’, BBC News, 5 July 2007, online, available at: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6273732.stm.
36 Demir, Adem and Dickey, Christopher ‘The Bomber’s Wife’, Newsweek.com. 7 
January 2010, online, available at: www.newsweek.com/id/229792.
37 Ibid.
38 Online, available at: www.shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=59653.
39 Demir and Dickey 2010.
40 Site at www.al- faloja.info/vb is now lapsed.
41 See Awan and al- Lami (2009).
42 See http://shamikh1.net/vb/.
43 See McLuhan (1964).
4 Media events: televisual connections 2004–2006
 1 This is a consistent finding across three interlinked studies: Afterseptember11.tv, 
Shifting Securities, and Legitimising the Discourses of Radicalisation.
 2 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Interview Z2.1, lines 156–163, italics added.
 3 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Interview Z2.1, lines 164–168.
 4 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/the_day_britain_stopped/ default.stm.
 5 See www.bbc.co.uk/drama/smallpox2002.
5 The mainstream nexus of radicalisation: the 2008–2009 Gaza 
conflict
 1 See for example, Jonathan Miller, ‘Phosphorous controversy in Gaza’ www.channel4.
com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/phosphorous% 2bcontroversy%2bin
%2bgaza%2b%2b/2909012.html, updated 22 January 2009.
 2 Nicholas Watt, ‘ITV and Channel 4 to air Gaza appeal as pressure mounts in BBC’, 
The Guardian, 24 January 2009, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/
jan/24/bbc- gaza-aid- appeal-dec.
 3 Paul Bromley, ‘Gaza Appeal – Sky’s decision explained’, blog available at: http://
blogs.news.sky.com/editorsblog/ then navigate Older Blogs/ to 26 January 2009.
  4 Translated from the original Arabic.
 5 See: Shumookh Al- Islam forum www.shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php? t=30650 and 
Ana Muslim Islamist forum http://muslm.org/vb/showthread.php? t=324347 [both 
accessed 25 October 2010].
 6 Formerly available at: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28790359/.
 7 Site at www.al- faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?p=224623 is now lapsed.
 8 The date on the article reads 8 November 2008 but was only released on 18 January 
by al- Fajr. The only reason we can think of for this delayed release, or perhaps recir-
culation and advertisement, was because it suited al- Qaeda’s current campaign to 
legitimise the targeting of ‘Jews and Crusaders wherever and however’. Also, produc-
ers may be hoping to achieve more credibility for Attiyatallah’s arguments [on killing 
Westerners] following the killing of many civilians in Gaza.
 9 Site at www.al- faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?p=224620 is now lapsed.
10 Site at www.al- faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=42210 is now lapsed.
11 Site at www.al- faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=41319 is now lapsed.
12 www.aljazeeratalk.net/forum/showthread.php?p=1988687.
13 Reference to Jews.
14 Site at www.al- faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=40866 is now lapsed.
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6 Audience uncertainties: imagining the mainstream and extremes
1 Online, available at: http://today.yougov.co.uk/sites/today.yougov.co.uk/files/YG- 
Archives-pol- spectator-WarOnTerror- 060817.pdf.
2 Online, available at: http://today.yougov.co.uk/sites/today.yougov.co.uk/files/YG- 
Archives-pol- skynews-WarOnTerror5years-060911.pdf.
3 ‘Anti- Terrorism, Citizenship and Security in the UK’, Economic and Social Research 
Council, Award ref: RES- 000–22–3765. See: www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ ESRCInfo-
Centre/ViewAwardPage.aspx?ts=1&data=%2FFrXHTl993r3JquW%2FO3REmBC1H
M8rUZ3TLl%2F8jkbSfAanMoCh9fMFy4xfWhxErZ2HgE2fB7I%2BX6SXJqvUW6h
HoDHCgMRr%2F5R5vDjnFXvGaA7Jj6m3Iu9Pw%3D%3D.
4 Legitimising, Interview JE & JDB, line 80. All names have been anonymised.
5 RF is a 35 years old Kurdish male who has been living in London for nine years and 
who works for a human rights NGO. Politically, he is an anarchist and consequently 
holds no religious beliefs.
6 Legitimising, Interview RF, lines 114–21.
7 FB is a 42 years old Franco- English male who lives in London and who works as a 
fundraising manager for a children charity. Politically, he describes himself as a liberal 
and, religiously, as an atheist.
8 Legitimising, Interview FB, lines 153–6.
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